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Violent extremism has emerged as one of the 
leading challenges to the realization of sustainable 
peace globally. Across South and South-East Asia, 
violent extremism poses a direct threat to inclusive 
development by fuelling intolerance, forcibly 
displacing communities, exacerbating cycles of 
insecurity and armed conflict, exploiting existing 
inequalities, and obstructing the enjoyment of 
human rights and the rule of law. Underpinning 
this violence are gender stereotypes that are used 
to radicalize and recruit men and women, as well 
as girls and boys, to violent extremist groups. 
The United Nations Secretary General’s Plan 
of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism calls 
for a comprehensive approach to preventing 
and countering violent extremism, including 
through addressing the gendered and structural 
conditions which allow it to flourish. This is echoed 
in UN Security Council resolution 2242, which 
highlights the necessity of women’s inclusion and 
participation in approaches to prevent violent 
extremism and urges Member States and UN 
entities to integrate a gender analysis of the 
drivers of radicalization in research, policies, and 
programming responses.
The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and UN Women have been working to 
ensure that efforts to prevent violent extremism 
are inclusive and based on the promotion and 
protection of human rights, including women’s 
rights. This research is the result of a joint effort 
between both agencies to better understand 
the relationship between violent extremism and 
gender power relations in South and South-East 
Asia, specifically as it relates to radicalization and 
recruitment, in order to inform programming and 
policy responses. 
This publication includes expert analyses 
through case studies to highlight how unequal 
gender power structures fuel and shape violent 
extremism around the region. It pays specific 
attention to how constructions of masculinity 
influence radicalization and the perpetration of 
violent extremism, offering much-needed insights 
into how men and boys are implicated in these 
processes. 
This research emphasises how structures 
of patriarchy  and    harmful   performances 
of   masculinity are deeply embedded in the 
modus operandi of violent extremist groups. 
The researchers found that such groups 
often manipulate or build on existing gender 
stereotypes to incite men and women to commit 
violence and to find refuge and support within 
extremist communities. Much greater efforts 
are needed to ensure policies address harmful 
constructions of masculinity and femininity 
promoted by violent extremist groups. 
Programmes must work with local communities to 
respond to the unequal gender power dynamics 
that shape and fuel extremist violence, including 
through empowering women and girls to be 
agents of peace. 
This volume offers policy makers and practitioners 
a unique insight into the gender dynamics that 
underpin violent extremism in South and South-
East Asia. We hope it will benefit stakeholders 
working in this area to ensure that holistic 
understandings of gender identity are integrated 
into policy and programming approaches to 
prevent violent extremism.
Mohammad Naciri Valerie Cliff
Regional Director
UN Women Regional Office for 
Asia and the Pacific
Deputy Regional Director for  
Asia and the Pacific
Director, Bangkok Regional Hub
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Violent extremism has a clear gender 
dimension that produces disproportionate 
effects on women and those who do not 
subscribe to accepted notions of gender 
and sexuality1. However, while it is well-
established that violent extremism produces 
gendered impacts, there has been relatively 
little attention paid to how gendered power 
relations influence violent extremism, 
including why individuals join extremist 
groups, how these groups themselves 
function and what beliefs that they hold. 
Our gender identities, including 
characteristics considered masculine or 
feminine, influence nearly every aspect of our 
daily lives, from how long we wear our hair 
to who is allowed to make decisions within 
families and societies. It stands to reason 
that such gendered power relations shape 
the nature of violent extremism in individuals, 
families and communities. 
Security-oriented attempts to address violent 
extremism, such as military and police tactics, 
have recognized the effects that violent 
extremism has on women. This has often come 
in the form of securitizing women’s rights. 
For instance, the purported need to protect 
women victims from violent extremists, 
thus justifying the use of counterterrorism 
approaches without examining why women 
are disproportionately targeted in the first 
place. Likewise, security approaches have 
sought to instrumentalize the gendered 
impacts of violent extremism. For example, 
while these approaches acknowledge the 
restriction of women’s rights as a sign of 
radicalization – and therefore an early warning 
sign of violent extremism –  they do not tend 
to question why women are differentially 
impacted by violent extremism and are often 
blind to the broader effects that gendered 
power relations have on violent extremism. 
To better understand the role that gender 
plays in violent extremism, we must not only 
analyse women as victims or as promoters of 
peace – or even perpetrators of violence. It is 
critical that we also analyse the ways in which 
gender relations influence the choices of men 
and women to engage with violent extremist 
groups; how they influence the actions that 
they carry out within those groups; and how 
they shape the stories that these groups tell 
about themselves.
Many academic studies draw links 
between certain stereotypically masculine 
characteristics such as aggression, strength 
and lust, and the perpetration of violence.2 
In the past, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) have identified desirable gendered 
norms tied to violence in their manifesto 
“Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto 
on Women by the Al-Khanssa Brigade”.3 
Released in 2015, the manifesto clearly 
defines gender categories that reward men’s 
violence and women’s submission. ISIS also 
uses this stereotypically violent masculine 
language and imagery as a technique to 
recruit and radicalize young men, offering 
3them avenues to claim honour, power, 
or supposed manhood. There remains a 
significant gap in the literature, however, 
regarding how conceptions of masculinity 
relate to violent extremism, and how this 
relationship manifests in South and South-
East Asia specifically.4
While violence is often linked to masculinity, 
the reality is much more complex and 
often paradoxical. For example, although 
in general women are often expected to 
occupy submissive, private roles, in South 
and South-East Asia they have taken on 
increasingly active and public roles in violent 
extremist groups. This includes as high-profile 
recruiters and perpetrators of violence, which 
would seem to contradict the expectations 
of women in violent extremist groups as 
passive and invisible. While limited research 
is available, accounts from women violent 
extremists often indicate a keen sense of 
agency and empowerment in their decisions 
to join extremist groups.5
Literature has tended to focus on women’s 
role or victimhood in violent extremism 
and not on masculinity and how broader 
gendered power structures influence violent 
extremism. This is especially true in the South 
and South-East Asian regions. To develop 
policy and programming solutions to address 
these challenges, UNDP and UN Women 
commissioned this research volume. The four 
authors featured use various methodologies 
including discourse analysis, interviews, and 
other forms of qualitative research as well as 
quantitative exploration to provide a deeper 
understanding of the linkages between 
gender identity and violent extremism.
David Duriesmith’s paper, Adaptation of 
4 See USAID (2018). The Role of Women in Violent Extremism in Asia. United States Agency for International Development, 
Washington. Available at http://openasia.org/en/g/wp-.
5 See USAID (2011). The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency. Putting Principles into Practice. 
USAID Policy. September 2011. Available at http://tinyurl.com/chcmfeb . See also M. Conway (2016) Determining the 
Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism. Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157408 .
militarized masculinity and violent extremism 
in the Southern Philippines provides a 
relational analysis of militarized masculinities 
in the southern Philippines to illustrate how 
notions of masculinity and femininity operate 
in local settings, and how they are linked to 
notions of violence.
In Extremist Myths and Violent Extremist 
Masculinities, Katherine Brown, Harmonie 
Toros, and Swati  Parashar examine how 
gender identities are portrayed in the 
foundational myths and narratives that violent 
extremist groups tell about themselves. 
By examining four myths in Indonesia and 
the Philippines, the authors demonstrate 
how unpacking the plot lines of violent 
extremist myths enables us to gain a better 
understanding of the purpose of violent 
extremist groups and the roles assigned to 
women and men.
In Trajectories of Gender Inequality, Identity 
and Violent Extremism in Rural Bangladesh, 
Farhana Rahman explores the relationship 
between violent extremism and domestic 
violence against women, which is often 
considered to be an unconnected private 
matter, through interviews with communities 
in rural Bangladesh. Rahman examines how 
stereotypical constructions of masculinity and 
femininity are maintained through community 
structures, such as fatwas, and explores how 
these constructions can be manipulated 
by violent extremist groups for recruitment 
purposes.
Finally, Jacqui True’s paper, Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence Reporting and 
Terrorism in Asia, explores the relationship 
between gender inequality, sexual and 




















































presence of terrorist groups. True examines 
whether increased reports of SGBV are a 
lead indicator of – or precursor to – terrorist 
violence by cross-analysing SGBV reports and 
terrorist incidents from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) in three countries: Myanmar, 
the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.
Coming from different angles and utilizing 
diverse case studies, the authors identify an 
important set of overlapping thematic issues, 
conclusions, and recommendations that can 
be used to guide policies and programming 




1. There is a pronounced 
need for a relational and 
contextual understanding 
of masculinities and 
femininities in settings where 
violent extremism flourishes 
Collectively, the authors highlight the 
importance of understanding diverse 
notions and characteristics of masculinity 
and femininity. Their combined analysis 
demonstrates that within programmes and 
policies on violent extremism there is a 
tendency to apply rigid models of gender 
identity. Expressions of masculinity and 
femininity, however, are complex, contextual 
and relational phenomena. 
David Duriesmith presents that the concept 
of toxic masculinity is often regarded as 
a singular set of problematic practices 
and ideas. He discusses how this prevents 
practitioners from understanding the nuances 
and complexities of masculinity and the ways 
6 Rulings on a point of Islamic law given by a recognized authority.
in which it varies contextually and locally. He 
further argues that, in contrast to the view of 
toxic masculinity as a global phenomenon, 
masculinities are instead grounded in 
specific locations and defined relationally. 
Notions and characteristics of masculinity are 
historically constructed in specific contexts 
and shaped in relation to cultural and political 
expectations of what it means to be a man, as 
well as local grievances and dynamics. 
In the case of the Philippines, Duriesmith 
argues that men engaged in violent 
extremism often define their masculinity in 
relation to other men within a society, and 
particularly those in the national military. 
He asserts that both militarized masculinity 
and masculinities expressed within violent 
extremist groups rely on one another to claim 
authority and status. He also argues that the 
femininity of female violent extremist actors 
can be maintained through their relationship 
to men. For example, prominent female 
leaders who are related to notable male 
leaders are tolerated, while women whose 
actions are not sanctioned by a male family 
member are castigated or largely written out.
The volume returns to this theme throughout 
the papers. Farhana Rahman’s examination 
of communities in rural Bangladesh discusses 
the perception that men are expected to 
discipline their wives in order to “reclaim their 
manliness when their wife has stepped out of 
line” by, for example, taking up employment, 
speaking to men outside of their families, 
or not showing adequate respect to their 
husband. Rahman’s paper demonstrates how 
local cultural contexts can entrench notions 
of masculinity and femininity that legitimize 
violence against women. She further 
explores the role that imams and fatwas6 
play in maintaining these gender hierarchies, 
creating conditions where gender identities 
5can be manipulated by violent extremist 
groups. 
In their research, Katherine Brown, Harmonie 
Toros and Swati Parashar show that the 
narratives embedded in violent extremist 
myths in the Philippines and Indonesia shape 
notions of masculinity and femininity that 
“construct meaning, identity, and purpose 
for violent extremist groups.”
Though local social norms, historical events, 
and cultural narratives predominantly form 
violent extremist masculinities, they also 
tend to link to transnational notions of 
masculinity. Brown et al. explore how violent 
extremist groups who claim linkage to 
Islam use narratives and myths to glorify a 
powerful global Islamic masculinity. Rahman 
details how local violent extremist groups 
refer to “global jihad” and “global Islamic 
masculinities” in their teachings. Duriesmith 
likewise notes that some violent extremist 
splinter groups in the southern Philippines 
view their cause as part of a larger global 
struggle to right injustices against Muslims 
transnationally, and thus do not view the 
local peace process as a legitimate solution 
to their grievances. The authors collectively 
conclude that it is not possible to understand 
the masculinities and femininities that are 
related to violent extremism through the 
unidimensional analysis of global narratives; 
rather, a more granular, relational and 
contextual understanding of these identities 
is needed to better understand how or 
whether they contribute to the promotion of 
violent extremism.
2. Violent extremist cultural 
narratives play a critical role 
in promoting men as martyrs 
and women as victims 
Another theme explored throughout the 
collection is the role of violent extremist 
cultural narratives in reinforcing violent 
notions of masculinity while at the same time 
diminishing the role women play both as 
perpetrators of violent extremism and agents 
of peace.
The paper by Brown et al. demonstrates how 
terrorist myths sustain gender stereotypes 
through representations of men as valiant 
and the absence of women who played 
key roles. For example, narratives created 
around the Marawi siege in the Philippines 
broadly overshadow the crucial role played 
by Farhana Maute, a prominent figure in the 
Maute Group, in orchestrating the attacks 
that struck the city in 2017. 
In his work, Duriesmith demonstrates how 
women’s involvement in violent extremism in 
the southern Philippines is concealed not only 
by extremist groups, but also to some extent, 
by government authorities. In his analysis of 
the conflict in Mindanao, Duriesmith notes that 
despite their prominent role as combatants, 
military leaders and peacemakers during 
the decades-long Moro conflict, women 
have been systematically removed from 
official discourses and narratives, only to be 
depicted instead as helpless spectators of a 
power struggle between men. 
In the paper “Creating the Ideal Man and 
Woman” Rahman explores how ideas 
surrounding women’s second-level social 
standing are reinforced through fatwas 
declared by imams, who play a central role 
as religious, social and political leaders 
within communities in rural Bangladesh. She 
notes that while fatwas themselves do not 
intrinsically call for violence, such rulings 
tend to convey ideals traditionally associated 
with masculine identities, sustaining men 
as community gatekeepers, and excluding 
women from narratives. Fatwas, therefore, 
can reinforce existing power structures in 
the community, creating conditions in which 
violent extremist groups can thrive. In that 




















































interviews, conducted in communities at risk 
of radicalization, echo the stereotypical views 
conveyed by imams and fatwas with respect 
to masculinities and femininities. 
3. The portrayal of men 
as both protectors and 
enforcers is paradoxical
A major theme discussed by the authors is 
the idea of men as both protectors of women 
and at the same time as enforcers of women’s 
assigned societal roles. For example, while it 
may be seen as men’s role to protect women 
from other men, at the same time they police 
women’s actions, which can sometimes come 
in the form of violence towards those women. 
Men engaging in violent extremism may see 
their actions as protecting women’s femininity 
and purity. Brown et al. and Duriesmith 
argue that communities with experiences of 
colonial struggle may use this history, and 
the myths surrounding it, to both shape their 
masculine identities and justify their violent 
extremist tactics and ideologies. Protection 
of their homeland is simultaneously tied 
to the need to protect their women – both 
from violence perpetrated by outsiders, but 
also from intermarriage and the dilution of 
lineage. In this scenario, women are seen as a 
kind of virgin land whose purity requires male 
protection. 
Furthering this notion, Brown et al. 
demonstrate how masculinity across violent 
extremist cultural narratives is presented as 
heroic, self-sacrificing, steadfast and stoic. 
Violent extremist groups are portrayed 
as protectors of women against defiling 
enemies, such as the West and/or the central 
government. For instance, the Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) group described the 2002 Bali 
bombings as acts of bravery perpetuated by 
ordinary village boys against the West. 
While men seek to reclaim their traditional 
roles as community protectors through 
violent extremism, they also try to re-
establish themselves as enforcers of women’s 
stereotypical gender roles. Rahman and 
Duriesmith both provide examples of 
how violent extremist masculinities help 
men reclaim traditional roles when they 
perceive their masculine identities are under 
threat. Rahman argues that in some rural 
communities in Bangladesh, violent extremist 
groups are perceived as a way to reclaim 
traditional roles for young men who feel 
ridiculed and undermined by the urban social 
norms and the perceived Western influences 
that allow women increasing power and 
autonomy. Through interview-based case 
studies, Rahman demonstrates how incidents 
of domestic violence rise when men feel that 
their identities or roles in the community are 
challenged by women’s economic and social 
empowerment.
Duriesmith claims that many men believe their 
masculinity is threatened by the increasing 
number of migrant women who have become 
economic providers to their families in the 
Philippines. The situation leads some of these 
men to join violent extremist groups so that 
they can reclaim their position as community 
protectors. Duriesmith further argues that 
this ability to offer young men a pathway into 
adulthood is one of the key reasons behind 
the longevity of violent extremist groups. 
He also asserts that the chronic lack of 
adequate material conditions and economic 
opportunities in the Philippines inhibits some 
men from reclaiming their honour through 
avenues other than violence.
Jacqui True highlights a clear correlation 
between the rise of SGBV perpetrated by 
men and the increase in incidents of violent 
extremism. She uses statistical regression 
to provide a comprehensive analysis that 
7demonstrates linkages between increasing 
incidences of terrorist attacks and increased 
levels of SGBV in Myanmar, the Philippines, 
and Sri Lanka. 
Conclusions
Based on the findings of the four papers, 
three key conclusions emerge:
1. It is problematic to 
understand notions of 
masculinity and femininity 
as monolithic concepts.
The reduction of masculinities and 
femininities to a singular, all-encompassing 
set of behaviours and motivations prevents 
practitioners and researchers from fully 
understanding and analysing the ways in 
which they are locally derived, relationally 
formed and vary from context to context. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand 
that both men and women define themselves 
in relation to one another.
2. Violent extremist 
groups manipulate and 
instrumentalize existing 
gender power structures 
and cultural narratives within 
communities to validate their 
actions. 
Often, the actions of violent extremist 
groups are depicted as alien to societal 
norms. However, this research demonstrates 
that violent extremist groups draw on pre-
existing gender norms and cultural narratives 
to legitimize their cause, recruit members, 
and even to justify attacks. Further, violence 
within families and communities, such as 
intimate partner or domestic violence and 
sexual harassment or assault, cultivates an 
environment where violence is normalized, 
making it easier to justify extremist violence. 
Thus, violent extremism and violence against 
women should not be viewed as isolated 
phenomena but rather as part of a continuum. 
To disrupt the draw of violent extremist 
groups, it is essential to understand how 
they position themselves within community 
cultural and gender norms. 
3. The protector/enforcer 
paradox justifies men’s 
violence, cements their 
position in society, and 
ignores women’s agency.
Men’s positions as protectors of women’s 
dignity and purity, as well as enforcers of the 
types of roles that are considered acceptable 
for women to hold in communities, are deeply 
tied to men’s power, positioning, and status 
in society. These two roles are used to justify 
violence, both against women and against 
other men who are seen to pose a threat to 
women. The framing of men’s roles in this 
way also serves to ignore women’s agency – 
as actors both within violent extremist groups 
and in communities as a whole.
Recommendations for 
research, policy, and 
programming in violent 
extremist contexts
Based on these common themes 
and conclusions, several important 
recommendations for designing research, 
policies and programmes to prevent violent 
extremism emerge. 
Research 
These case studies demonstrate that 
masculinities and femininities vary 




















































local levels. It is critical to understand 
the drivers of violent extremism to better 
inform evidence-based approaches. Thus, 
research should seek to comprehend these 
specific trends by recognizing variance in 
gender expressions and relations across 
local contexts and examining how this 
understanding interplays with regional and 
global interpretations. Further, while the 
researchers here present various case studies 
demonstrating correlations between SGBV 
and violent extremism or terrorism, more 
research is needed to clarify if there is a 
causal relationship and to better understand 
whether and how this connection plays out in 
other settings, using other variables.
Recommendations
• More systematized qualitative analysis that 
includes gender and violent extremism as 
well as localized contextual analysis on 
gender identity and relationships.
• Research on the relationship between 
violent extremism and SGBV and how it 
applies to different contexts, incorporated 
into all programming aimed at PVE. 
• More quantitative analysis on both 
violent extremism and SGBV, both at 
the government level (including cross-
departmentally and at the subnational 
level) and in academia.
• A review of successful early warning 
mechanisms to explore the extent to which 
gender elements are included and how. 
Policy 
To address violent extremism, policies must 
target the power structures that create 
conditions conducive to violent extremism. 
We have established through this research 
that one of the defining factors of community 
power structures are gender relations 
7 Available at https://undocs.org/S/RES/2467(2019).
and roles. Thus, it is essential that policies 
incorporate understandings of how gender 
influences the creation, perpetration and 
appeal of violent extremism.
The recently adopted UN Security Council 
Resolution 2467 (2019)7 recognizes sexual 
violence as a tactic of terrorism. Research 
developed in this study further indicates a 
correlation between SGBV and terrorism 
such that the former can serve as a 
predictive indicator for the latter. This link 
has implications for early warning systems 
and other preventive policies. Even though 
the specific causality of this association 
is not yet fully understood, it is clear 
that the relationship exists and therefore 
governments should closely track and 
monitor reports of SGBV in efforts to prevent 
violence that can lead to violent extremism. 
Other gender equality indicators such as 
freedom of movement and of dress can 
likewise strengthen these systems.
Recommendations
• Policies and laws to tackle violent 
extremism, such as National Action Plans 
on PVE, National Action Plans on women, 
peace, and security, or counterterrorism 
legislation, must consider local notions 
of masculinities and femininities and how 
these may fuel violent extremism.
• The availability and quality of SGBV 
data should be increased, including at 
a subnational level, not only to allow 
for better research and analysis, but to 
eventually assist in the identification of 
areas at risk of violent extremism.
• Early warning systems should include 
indicators linked to gender power relations, 
including SGBV, hate speech, and other 
dimensions of gender inequality.
9Programming
Diminishing the draw of violent extremist 
narratives requires challenging the legitimacy 
of violent extremism groups and shifting 
national narratives around masculinity. 
We therefore need to collaborate with 
religious leaders, both female and male, 
on countering violent extremist ideologies 
in ways that are grounded in religious and/
or cultural beliefs. Programmes must focus 
on educating and using context-specific 
justifications to promote non-violence and 
respect for women’s human rights. This should 
involve using locally conducted research 
to inform the design and implementation 
of programmes, to ensure that they are not 
perceived as an outside imposition. In this 
sense, working with local organizations that 
are trusted by communities to shape and 
deliver programming is essential to prevent 
perpetuating cycles of radicalization and 
violence.
To prevent the spread of violence towards 
women, PVE programming should take a 
whole-of-society approach. Tackling the 
gender power imbalances that influence 
radicalization and the perpetration of violent 
extremism involves challenging beliefs 
about gender roles that are often deeply 
entrenched in communities. It is thus crucial 
that programming also provides men and 
boys with alternative avenues to fulfil their 
sense of purpose and empower themselves 
in ways that do not infringe on the rights and 
well-being of women.
Recommendations 
• Programmes must be informed by local 
beliefs and realities as well as by global 
narratives on violent extremism. 
• Programming should understand gender 
norms as contextual and varying, thus 
addressing the group as well as the 
individual. It is also important is to connect 
groups of individuals across provinces, 
countries and regionally – to identify the 
existence of regional and national trends.
• Programming should understand gender 
norms as relational, and thus, take a 
whole-of-family and whole-of-community 
approach when designing interventions. 
To ensure this, ownership needs to be 
ensured by involving key local stakeholders 
in the design of the programme.
• Programming aimed at building resilience 
and confidence in communities to address 
violent extremism, should incorporate 
gender-transformative approaches, to 
both reconstruct harmful community 
power structures and advance gender 
equality as well as prevent the burden of 
community resilience from being placed 
solely on women. 
• Programming aimed at building the 
capacity of and training law enforcement 
officers should focus particularly on how 
masculinities and femininities shape power 






















































The Nexus between Masculinities, Femininities, and Violent Extremism
Chapter 1
Adaptation of Militarized  
Masculinity and Violent Extremism  
























































masculinities as both 
locational and relational 
To effectively respond to violent extremism 
(VE), there is a need to develop effective 
and targeted responses that challenge the 
link between masculinity and violence.1 
Masculinity researchers argue that existing 
scholarship on violent extremism tends to 
treat gender as a synonym for women and fails 
to explore how notions of masculinity shape 
men’s involvement in violent extremist groups 
(Necef, 2016).  As most violent extremists 
are male, masculinity scholars argue, there 
is a need for specific policy responses that 
gender-menstreams efforts to counter violent 
extremism (CVE) policy (Ezekilov, 2017). These 
calls mirror recent efforts in women, peace 
and security (WPS) to engage men and boys 
in the agenda though targeted programming 
and policies (Duriesmith, 2017b).
A major challenge facing gender-
menstreaming in CVE in Asia concerns the 
lack of empirical knowledge around how 
violent extremist masculinities operate 
in the region, with very little scholarship 
directly exploring masculinities and violent 
extremism in the region (USIAD, 2018; True et 
1 The terminology of violent extremism is deeply contested in academic scholarship. In particular, there is debate 
over whether extreme views are the cause of violence or about how to understand groups with extreme ideologies 
that do not condone violence (Schmid 2014). Furthermore, sites of armed conflict often feature blurry boundaries 
between violent extremist groups, insurgent organizations and criminal networks. In this paper, the terminology of 
violent extremism is used in relation to groups that have been labelled as such by governments and the international 
community. This use does not imply that the terminology of violent extremism is the best characterization of these 
groups; however, considering that this paper provides a critique of work on violent extremist masculinities, the use of 
the term is appropriate.
2 Countries that are economically developed such as the USA, the UK, Canada, Western European nations and developed 
parts of Asia
3 Increasingly the term toxic masculinity has begun to be employed in public discourse to refer to harmful forms of 
masculinity. The uses of the term vary between a form that is harmful to men themselves to one that is harmful to society 
at large or oversteps a moral or societal line. These accounts risk giving the impression there is a singular form of real 
or good masculinity and that other harmful forms are deviations. For more information, see Michael Salter’s piece 
The Problem With a Fight Against Toxic Masculinity in The Atlantic and available from (https://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2019/02/toxic-masculinity-history/583411/) or Michael Flood’s explainer available from https://xyonline.
net/content/toxic-masculinity-primer-and-commentary.
al., 2019). This paucity of research means that 
the current knowledge base relies on broad 
correlations between violent masculinity 
and violent extremism that have been 
established in the Global North2 and Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region (see 
Bairner, 1999; Kimmel, 2003; Kimmel, 2018; 
Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals 2014). These 
correlations, while important, risk creating 
a generalized trope of violent extremist 
masculinity that is formed by an imprecise but 
common-sense notion of toxic masculinity or 
hyper masculinity3
To remedy the tendency to generalize, 
this paper explores how violent extremist 
masculinities in the Southern Philippines are 
shaped in relation to mainstream militarized 
masculinities in the state. To do this, the paper 
analyses how violent extremists replicate, 
invert or exaggerate mainstream militarized 
masculinities. Replication in this context 
exists when a group adopts narratives or 
norms of mainstream militarized masculinity 
without substantial alteration. Inversion 
exists when the group defines some aspect 
of its masculinity in direct opposition to 
mainstream militarized masculinity while 
replicating its overall form. Exaggeration 
exists when a mainstream narrative or norm 
is adopted but taken substantially further 
in its brutality or intensity. It is hoped that 
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this analysis provides new insights into how 
the dynamics of militarism shape violent 
extremist masculinity in the Southern 
Philippines. Beyond the immediate value of 
understanding the dynamics present in this 
case, the study highlights the importance 
of being aware that violent extremist 
masculinities are varied, grounded in a 
specific location, and relationally defined.
Across Asia, dominant constructions of 
militarized masculinity differ substantially 
in relation to religion, nationalist ideology, 
the role of women, and many other aspects. 
This research reveals the limitations of work 
that presents a monolithic model of toxic 
masculinity based on cases in the Global 
North and the MENA region. While this 
paper is an initial exploration of these issues 
and limited in scope, it is an important first 
step in highlighting the need for relational 
analysis of violent extremist masculinities if 
prevention strategies are to become truly 
gender-sensitive. 
The paper begins with a literature review on 
militarized masculinity and violent extremism. 
It then analyses how mainstream aspects of 
military masculinity are replicated, inverted 
and exaggerated in materials produced by 
violent extremist groups in the Southern 
Philippines. Finally, the research provides 
analysis and recommendations on how 
work on gender and violent extremism can 
consider the links between different forms of 




There is a critical link between masculinity 
and violence (Cockburn, 2004). This work 
suggests that social norms regarding what 
it means to be male tend to encourage men 
to engage in violent or destructive behaviour 
to prove their manliness. In societies where 
the use of violence is closely associated 
with manliness, this link can fuel conflict and 
make armed responses to disagreements 
appear legitimate, inevitable and natural 
(Duriesmith, 2017a). While the link between 
masculinity and violence is one of the most 
robust relationships established in social 
science, it is also essential to understand the 
different ways in which it manifests itself. 
There is a tendency in media discourse 
to write about so-called toxic or hyper 
masculinity as a singular set of problematic 
practices and ideas exhibited to varying 
degrees. Academic scholarship widely rejects 
this approach, subjecting it to rigorous 
scrutiny by scholars who work directly on 
violence prevention (see for example Salter, 
2016 and Seymour, 2018). Instead, the field of 
critical studies on men and masculinities has 
tended to follow R.W. Connell’s suggestion 
that a plurality of masculinities needs to be 
recognized, reflecting the differing ways 
to be a man in any given society (Connell, 
2005; Flood, 2002). This framework indicates 
not only that masculinities differ between 
countries but, as masculinities scholars argue, 
there are multiple articulations of masculinity 
in each location and these articulations are 
defined in relation to other masculinities, 
femininities and non-binary articulations of 
gender (Myrttinen et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, scholarship emphasizes that 
the salient set of masculinities tend to be 
deeply contested even within close-knit 
organizations like the US military (Barrett, 
1996). These multiple articulations can be 
seen, for example, in contestation between 
men with military experience and men with 
business experience regarding which set of 
skills is regarded as the manliest. The claim 
to masculine status also tends to involve 
contestation over the rewards certain men 
are afforded for performing dominant 





















































might claim that authority should be given 
to those who have served their country by 
putting their bodies on the line, the other 
group may argue that rationality and business 
acumen is a greater determinant of manly 
status.
Beyond the multiplicity of these articulations, 
research stresses that masculinities should 
not be seen as disembodied sets of abstract 
ideas about how men ideally should behave 
(Hearn, 2004; Connell, 2004). Rather, 
scholarship demonstrates that masculinities 
are better understood as sets of sedimented 
practices, reinforced by material conditions 
and institutional arrangements (Lusher and 
Robins, 2009). While the most privileged 
mode of masculinity (often referred to as 
hegemonic masculinity) does matter, its 
impact may not be direct (Chisholm and 
Tidy, 2017). For example, the expectation 
that men accumulate wealth and provide for 
their family does not necessarily mean that 
all, or even most, men define their manhood 
primarily in relation to wealth. Rather, aspects 
of the association between manhood and 
wealth may structure a range of masculinities 
that actively resist materialism on one hand 
or tacitly support, or even fetishize it, on 
the other hand. These aspects of dominant 
masculinity become reference points against 
which other articulations of gender are 
defined. 
Commentary on masculinity and violent 
extremism tends to flatten these 
complexities. This is particularly the case in 
public commentary, emphasizing that violent 
extremism tends to be committed by men and 
its enactment is linked to traditional notions 
of manhood (Kimmel, 2018; Roose, 2018). 
While this analysis points out an important 
connection, it tells us little about exactly 
how masculinity leads some men, in some 
places, to engage in violent extremism while 
for others it does not. This approach also 
sheds faint light on the significant variations 
in articulations of violent  extremism or the 
distinct roles that women play in different 
violent extremist organizations.  Not all 
articulations of traditional masculinity 
support violent extremism; similarly, not 
all articulations of violent extremism 
are supportive of traditional notions of 
masculinity (as is the case with some far-left 
violent extremism.
This framing of an uncomplicated link 
between traditional masculinity and violent 
extremism fundamentally misreads the 
relational quality of masculinities; that 
each manifestation is defined in relation to 
multiple contested forms of masculinity and 
femininity in any given space. While violent 
extremist groups often draw on narratives 
of transcending ideology and group 
membership, existing work on gender and 
militarism suggests that it is not the presence 
of violent masculinity in the abstract that 
matters. Rather, the articulation of violent 
extremist masculinities, in a given place, 
is likely to vary greatly and this variance 
produces tangible differences in the acts 
in which men are willing to engage. For 
example, Judith Gardner and Judy El-Bushra’s 
2017 study, Somalia: A state of male power, 
insecurity and inequality, found that although 
global gendered narratives of brotherhood, 
a return to morality, and the need to reclaim 
lost Islamic honour all mattered, much more 
important were local gender dynamics. In the 
case of Somalia, these included the role of 
clans in establishing men’s status: 
 The global war on terror narrative has 
tended to cast Somali males – and Muslim 
males more widely – as inherently violent, 
susceptible to radicalization and a threat 
to Western security interests. Rift Valley 
Institute’s inception study findings suggest 
that for the Somali male this narrative is 
simplistic and inaccurate. Somali society is 
not routinely militarized, nor is violence – 
including domestic violence – a culturally 
accepted and glorified characteristic of 
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manhood. On the contrary, throughout 
a man’s life and its milestones, such as 
marriage and elderhood, his masculinity 
is judged by how well he manages his 
responsibilities in accordance with well-
defined and exacting social norms and 
standards of behaviour (Gardner and El-
Bushra 2017: 2).
While their study did confirm the importance 
of global narratives, such as the War on 
Terror, Brown et al. (in this collection) suggest 
that international analysts tend to overstate 
these issues without paying adequate 
attention to the local dynamics of masculinity. 
This analysis mirrors the contributions of 
Brown, Toros and Parashar, in this collection, 
regarding the importance of local and global 
narratives in shaping local gender dynamics. 
Similarly, Rahman’s paper in this collection 
shows the central role of fatwas in spreading 
violent masculine ideology in Bangladesh. 
The central role of fatwas in Bangladesh also 
highlights how local factors can intimately 
shape the gender dynamics of violent 
extremism in a particular location. 
These findings align with my own 
previous work on how Indonesian  militant 
masculinities indicated the  importance of 
men’s  perceptions of other articulations of 
local masculinity in a given space (Duriesmith, 
2018; Duriesmith and Ismail, 2019). In 
particular, earlier work suggested that the 
forms of masculinities that characterized 
Indonesian militant groups reflected local 
dynamics around the role of the military, 
secularism, and the state. Though these 
dynamics had global characteristics, the 
most significant factor remained the interplay 
between competing definitions of how a man 
should behave and the material conditions 
that make those definitions salient. The 
depiction of violent extremist masculinities 
as monolithic not only fails to capture these 
important dynamics, but it also reinforces 
messaging from violent extremist groups that 
they are in perennial global conflict with an 
immoral “other”. 
The above suggests that, to comprehend 
violent extremist masculinities, we need to 
understand the other masculinities they relate 
to on an intimate level. One of the key links, 
as yet underexplored in Asian contexts, is the 
role of mainstream militarized masculinities 
in shaping violent extremist masculinities. 
Research on militarized masculinity indicates 
that militarization not only affects men who 
directly participate in military institutions, 
but that militarization of society shapes all 
other masculinities (Mankayi and Shefer, 
2005). Militarization impacts masculinities 
that emulate military norms without direct 
involvement as well as men who come to define 
their masculinity in opposition to militarism 
(Salter, 2014).  Suggesting this link is not to 
argue that violent extremist masculinities 
will directly replicate mainstream militarized 
masculinities. While this may be the case, 
there is also the likelihood of inverting the 
norms and tropes of mainstream militarized 
masculinity and exaggerating others. 
Methodology
To explore the links between mainstream 
militarized masculinity and violent extremism 
in Asia, this study explores the case of violent 
extremism in the Southern Philippines. The 
paper draws on scholarly sources about 
militarism, gender and the state to establish 
a functional understanding of mainstream 
militarized masculinities. Drawing on this 
scholarly analysis of militarism, the paper 
analyses sources relating to violent extremism 
in the south of the country to gain insight into 
how they relate to mainstream articulations 
of militarism. 
In developing an account of violent extremist 
masculinities, I have used a range of sources 





















































NGO reports and other grey literature. 
Collections of translated material from violent 
extremist groups such as jihadology.net, 
which provide direct access to propaganda 
and media releases from violent extremist 
groups, were particularly helpful. Though 
the paper draws on a diverse range of 
sources, the most valuable materials were 
videos produced by these groups including 
execution films and propaganda. Significantly 
more work could be done to explore these 
dynamics through fieldwork or access to a 
wider range of translated sources than those 
gathered for this paper. After collecting 45 
sources, I subjected each one to thematic 
analysis to identify themes of militarized 
masculinity. 
While productive in scoping  aspects of 
violent extremist masculinities in the   Southern 
Philippines, the paper retains several 
limitations. Due to the nature of the conflict 
in the Southern Philippines, and international 
attention on Islamic State (IS), these sources 
focus on a range of groups including Abu 
Sayyaf, the Maute group and Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria or ISIS-inspired Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) splinter groups. While 
the analysis considers this limitation, it is 
possible that additional dynamics of violent 
extremist masculinities have been overlooked 
due to the high profile of these sources.  In 
particular, there are likely to be interesting 
intergroup dynamics within the south that 
shape violent extremist masculinity but were 
not captured. The sources drawn on for this 
paper overwhelmingly target an international 
or national audience and this means that 
much of that nuance may be missed. 
This analysis suggests that the relationship 
between militarized masculinity and violent 
extremist masculinities is not straightforward 
4 The broader historical account of warrior and military institutions in the Philippines is outside the scope of this paper. 
While there is a lot to say about precolonial and colonial military dynamics, the account here necessarily focuses on 
contemporary militarized masculinity.
and contains some contradictory components. 
The study also highlights the need for greater 
exploration of the relationship between local, 
national and global articulations of gender in 
a more dynamic fashion than has been present 
in other scholarship. These investigations are 
not exhaustive and do not provide complete 
answers regarding the nexus of masculinity, 
violent extremism and militarism in the 
Philippines. What this exploratory study 
does confirm, however, is the need for 
a situated analysis of masculinities that 
explores how practices in a given context 
produce masculinities. Moreover, such 
an analysis should not rely on vague or 
monolithic accounts of violent extremist 
masculinity. This observation confirms the 
conclusions of existing anthropological work 
on the subject of violent extremism and 
reflects the hope that this work will open a 
new avenue for analysing violent extremist 
masculinities across Asia.
Analysis part 1
Militarized masculinity  
in the Philippines 
Before comparing the construction of violent 
extremist masculinities, it is necessary to 
first contextualize mainstream militarized 
masculinity in the Philippines. Masculinity 
in the Philippines is shaped by multiple 
long-standing traditions of militarism and 
colonization that inform the various and 
contested ways to be a man across the 
country. The history of militarism in the 
Philippines has deep roots with long-standing 
martial traditions that pre-date contemporary 
colonialism (Nadeau, 2008: 4–5).4 This history 
is complicated, as today the Philippines 
is located at the intersection of numerous 
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regional powers that have each shaped the 
character of gendered culture in the region 
(Eviota, 1992: 33). Scholarship on gender in 
the Philippines emphasizes the formative 
impact of Spanish, American and Japanese 
colonization in crafting a direct link between 
the military forces, respect, and being a man 
(McCoy, 2002). The Philippine military, like 
many South-East Asian militaries, charts its 
origins to colonial institutions (McCoy, 2002: 
14). 
The initial structure of the state military, 
which existed prior to full independence in 
1946, mirrored those of the United States 
(Kaminski, 2013: 1086). While women were 
formally permitted to join the military as 
early as 1963, it was not until 1991 (with the 
Women in Development and Nation-Building 
Act) that women were permitted to join 
the Philippine Military Academy or to serve 
(Tapales, 2003: 168). This is not to suggest 
that women were not involved in political 
violence prior to 1991, as women played key 
roles in the Communist People’s Party of the 
Philippines and the Moro National Liberation 
Front (Henshaw, 2017: 65–66). Similarly, 
women continue to play a central role in the 
violent extremist groups in the state (Ingram, 
2019). Despite the diverse roles that women 
have played, the notion of militarism and 
the military remain closely associated with 
notions of masculinity in the region.
The connection between militarism and 
masculinity in many ways mirrors links 
seen in  the Global North. Like other 
postcolonial states, the Philippines has 
some military traditions in common with 
militaries in the Global North, while also 
diverging substantially on other points. 
Shared characteristics include “being good 
providers, virile sex partners, firm and 
strong fathers” (Pingol, 2001:7). Similarly, 
military culture in the Philippines replicates 
the hierarchical tendencies, the pattern of 
homosocial violence, and the strict policing 
of sexual diversity that characterize militaries 
in the Global North. These patterns have 
a direct link to colonial influence on the 
Philippine military. 
McCoy’s 2002 study Closer than brothers: 
Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy 
strongly emphasizes the shadow colonialism 
casts over militarized masculinity in the 
Philippines. This work, which charted the 
1940 and 1971 classes of the Philippines 
Military Academy, explores how militarized 
masculinity was shaped by experiences 
of colonialism and then came to replicate 
colonial anti-insurgent tactics in its own 
institutions. While McCoy (1998: 295-296) 
finds that the original class of 1940 began 
with a sense of detached professionalism 
and service to the nascent nation, he argues 
that the subsequent experience of counter-
insurgency undermined this professional 
ethos and replaced it with a new emphasis on 
national unity and strength. Over subsequent 
years, McCoy (2002: 183-221) shows how 
militarized masculinity in the Philippines came 
to justify brutal tactics to protect the state 
from perceived internal threats. This dynamic 
has meant that the military culture of the 
Philippines army emphasizes independence, 
moral strength, opposition to external 
oppression and, above all, brotherhood. 
The rapid emergence of communist and 
Muslim rebel groups after independence 
meant that the untried military institutions 
of the Philippines were shaped by the threat 
of national disintegration (McCoy, 2002; 
Alburo, 2011). The military institutions of the 
Philippines cut their teeth using counter-
insurgency tactics that mirrored many of 
the tactics employed by former colonial 
oppressors. 
While the norms associated with 
Philippine militarized masculinity still bear 
commonalities with those of militaries in the 
Global North, the dynamics of colonialism, 





















































separatist backlash all shift the nature 
and implications of these norms. Since 
independence, Philippine military masculinity 
has continued to be shaped in relation 
to the threat posed by separatist groups. 
Militarized masculinity was likewise shaped 
by Ferdinand Marcos’ rule between 1965 
and 1986, and in particular, through the nine 
years of martial law before he was deposed. 
Marcos’ authority was in part justified by his 
claims of involvement in military campaigns 
against the Japanese, which bolstered his 
status as a masculine warrior (McCoy, 2002: 
143-180). When Marcos took power, he rapidly 
expanded the military and continued a close 
association with the armed forces during the 
period of martial law. This period solidified 
the association between the Philippine state, 
military service, and masculine political 
authority. 
The existence of the threat of separatists 
has secured  the  centrality   of  militarized 
masculinity in the state, becoming 
increasingly relevant in recent years with 
the rise of President Rodrigo Duterte 
(Tanyag, 2018). Militarized masculinity 
in the Philippines has also been directly 
shaped by an emphasis on pedigree, or 
connection to family tradition. This means 
that many politicians and political figures 
may not have direct personal connection 
with the military, such as Benigno Aquino III, 
whose great grandfather Servillano Aquino 
was a prominent general in the Philippine 
Revolution against Spain. Similarly, there is 
greater tolerance of female leaders who are 
affiliated with a powerful family, although this 
does not necessarily challenge the political 
centrality of militarized masculinity in the 
Philippines. These factors all affect the social 
significance of the military while at the same 
time sculpting the dominant masculinity in 
5 Political economy refers to the links between the economy, social structures and political institutions. For more details 
on the case of the Philippines see Bello et al. (2000) and Parreñas (2000).
state institutions. 
The political significance and structure of 
militarism in the Philippines also reflects shifts 
in the broader political economy and the 
impact of globalization in recent years, which 
have destabilized other aspects of men’s 
traditional roles.5 The increased significance 
of militarized masculinity in the past 40 
years needs to be understood within the 
broader context of how masculinities have 
changed in the Philippines. The effects of a 
globalized political economy on  Philippine 
men are widely documented, producing 
vulnerabilities that are distinct to those faced 
by many women. The trend towards women’s 
migrant labour in the political economy of the 
Philippines has meant that men’s historical 
role as the pillar of the family (haligi ng 
tahanan) has been undermined (Yea, 2015: 
129). No longer able to financially support 
their families, some men must assume the 
role of house-husband with fewer alternatives 
to gain economic status and wealth within 
the Philippines (Pingol, 2001; Angeles, 
2001). While the increased significance of 
women’s migrant labour in the economy of 
the Philippines has not produced gender 
equality, as much of the labour has remained 
in stereotypically feminine roles, it has shifted 
family dynamics and limited men’s capacity 
to live up to patriarchal ideals of masculinity. 
These shifts alter the significance of other 
domains of traditional masculinity, such as 
the military.
Historically,  the  ability  to  provide 
economically is one of  the most 
significant   roles for men. As Yea (2015: 
129) notes, men prove their manhood 
when they “start a family and can 
demonstrate that they are able to look after 
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the family’s welfare”. The loss of this historical 
position for many Philippine men has led to 
the emergence of grey-market activities like 
the organ trade and criminal organization on 
the main island of Luzon (Yea, 2015: 133–135). 
In this context, the security forces provide a 
conventionally masculine domain that still 
provides men with a degree of wealth, status 
and stability. With a third of the population 
under 15 years of age and half under 24, 
militarism provides young men with one 
of the only reliable pathways for status and 
belonging (Templer, 2017: 29). These changes 
have not occurred with corresponding shifts 
in social norms regarding the expectation 
that men provide for their family; thus, they 
have not produced more substantial forms 
of gender equality. The youthfulness and 
economic vulnerability of men contributes to 
the dominance of militarized masculinity. 
The significance of militarized masculinity 
has shifted at various times since Philippine 
Independence but has most recently been 
shaped by the War on Terror and the rise 
of populism. Since 2001, the armed forces 
have been actively involved in fighting the 
War on Terror. This engagement resulted 
in the rebranding of an existing conflict 
against radical splinter groups, such as 
Abu Sayyaf, due to their connections with 
global terror networks. The shift reframed 
existing struggles within broader discourses 
of what is now referred to as violent 
extremism. This transformation of the pre-
existing local  conflict to a perennial and 
global struggle against  terror has placed 
renewed  importance on militarism in the 
Philippines and allowed political leaders to 
deflect criticism of the slow peace process or 
purported military abuses committed in the 
south.  
Subsequent political leaders, such as 
President Duterte, have also reinforced the 
centrality of the military in Philippine identity. 
They have shaped their authority around 
having the strength to suppress fighting in the 
Southern Philippines. As Tanyag suggests, 
the populist use of vulgarity, threats of sexual 
violence and use of martial law in 2017 have 
all shifted the tone of militarized masculinity 
(2018). Although these factors are not new, 
they have fortified the model of strongman 
masculinity in public discourse. 
While many aspects of militarized masculinity 
in the Philippines replicate militarized 
masculinity in the  Global    North, local 
dynamics have produced substantial 
differences. In contrast to dominant 
constructions of masculinity in the Global 
North, hegemonic masculinity in the 
Philippines was historically less preoccupied 
with aggression, emotional suppression and 
physical strength (Rubio and Green, 2009). 
The violent excesses of the Philippine military 
are produced in a different context and 
reflect diverse histories and contexts to those 
of Western militaries. The inculcation of 
strongman culture, the replication of colonial 
forms of violence and clientelism all reflect 
particular histories and dynamics (Quimpo, 
2005). The specific history of the Philippine 
military, and the material conditions which 
shape the country, define the nature and 
significance of national violent extremism.
The conflict between separatists in the 
Southern Philippines and rules from the 
north predates independence and tracks 
back to the precolonial sultanates. While 
there are diverse armed groups, including 
left-wing organizations and secular groups, 
the majority now adopt some variation of 





















































the bulk of violent extremist groups in 
the country originate from Mindanao and 
the surrounding islands in the Southern 
Philippines. These groups come from the 
13 predominantly Muslim ethnic groups 
that make up the Moro people. There have 
been several violent extremist groups since 
Independence, but the main groups over 
the past decade include Abu Sayyaf, Ansar 
Khalifa, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Fighters (BIFF), Khalifa Islamiyah, the Maute 
group and other ISIS-inspired splinter groups 
from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 
These groups vary from large, organized and 
territorially bound organizations to small 
family-based bands of fighters such as the 
Maute group. While there is considerable 
diversity across these groups in terms of the 
tactics they are willing to employ and their 
theological responsibilities, all share at least 
some ideological commitments and have 
been involved in separatist struggles against 
the Philippine government.
Analysis part 2
Violent extremist masculinity 
and the Mindanao conflict 
Analysis of the sources relating to violent 
extremism in the Southern Philippines 
revealed four key themes in shaping 
notions of masculinity: global brotherhood; 
reclamation of lost honour; the protection 
of Islam’s purity; and the transition to 
manhood through participation in militant 
groups. These themes are hardly surprising 
for groups of this nature and might be read in 
a universalized way. When situated within the 
broader context of the Philippines, however, 
they can be understood in relationship to 
mainstream militarized masculinity through 
the dynamics of replication, exaggeration 
and inversion.  
Armed groups in the Southern Philippines 
regularly claim membership in a global 
struggle, with organizations such as Abu 
Sayyaf, the BIFF and Khalifa Islamiyah all 
expressing loyalty to the Islamic State. 
Videos released by groups also regularly 
invoke the notion of brotherhood and seek to 
connect local issues – such as displacement, 
economic deprivation and military abuse – 
to a worldwide struggle against disbelief. 
Similarly, the styling of videos picks up on 
techniques employed internationally, such 
as the use of nasheed, or Islamic religious 
songs, to portray members of local violent 
extremist groups as the kind of globalized 
warrior monks idealized by Islamic State 
(Stenersen, 2017; Brown, 2018). As with videos 
produced in the Balkans, the Middle East and 
Central Asia, the propaganda from groups in 
the Southern Philippines tries to draw on a 
shared vocabulary of imagery and tropes that 
link their struggle to global movements. 
The attempt to frame participation in these 
groups as a global enterprise is profoundly 
gendered and claims a masculine status not 
rooted primarily within local tensions over 
land ownership or the struggles that young 
men face in Moro societies.  This finding 
supports analysis in this collection by Brown, 
Toros and Parashar of the 1968 Jabidah 
Massacre. The authors also suggest that the 
myth of the Jabidah Massacre has been used 
to downplay local ethnic or territorial tensions 
and connect current conflicts to a history 
of interreligious struggle. Similarly, their 
analysis of the Battle of Marawi suggests the 
central role of globalizing local conflicts by 
positioning violent extremist masculinities as 
transcending these local concerns by being 
part of a larger cause.
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This globalization of violent extremist 
masculinities directly replicates the narratives 
used by the armed forces in their references 
to the global War on Terror to justify their 
actions. As with mainstream militarized 
masculinity in the Philippines, the claim of 
be part of a larger perennial struggle shifts 
the dynamic of conflict and undermines 
existing efforts to establish peace through 
regional autonomy. In 2012, the MILF signed 
a peace deal with former President Aquino 
III ensuring autonomy in Mindanao. While 
this agreement represents a significant step 
towards ending the conflict, it also threatens 
the authority and status of the smaller armed 
groups in the region who will no longer have 
a place in an integrated Bangsamoro region. 
The presentation of the conflict as global, 
rather than regional, is expedient both for 
the armed splinter groups aligned with 
Islamic State, and for military men who wish 
to maintain their central role in the Philippine 
state. Efforts to diminish the salience of these 
violent extremist masculinities, therefore, not 
only requires challenging the legitimacy of 
separatist violent extremist groups, but also 
demands shifting national narratives around 
militarized masculinity. In a case like the 
Philippines, both groups of militarized men 
gain status from the elevation of the conflict 
into the global arena. De-escalation of the 
conflict and attempts to combat violent 
extremist masculinities will necessitate similar 
shifts in mainstream militarized masculinity. 
The replication of global conflict narratives 
– which positions these conflicts as part of 
a larger globalized struggle – by both sides 
represents a symbiotic relationship between 
these two articulations of masculinity, defined 
as they are by their opposition to one another. 
This globalized conflict narrative not only 
reinforces the legitimacy of violent extremist 
masculinities, but it also undermines 
women’s rights in the region, rendering 
it more difficult to address the abuses of 
the state military that fuel conflict. Women 
in Mindanao play a central role within the 
conflict as direct combatants, military leaders 
and peacemakers. In particular, women’s 
organizations play a crucial role in curtailing 
local rido, or clan conflicts, and establishing 
dialogue between competing sides (Dwyer 
and Cagoco-Guiam, 2012: 8). Indeed, women 
historically, and currently, assume central 
roles in the clan system that dominates Moro 
societies. 
There are long-standing patterns of 
reciprocal conflict and revenge in the 
Southern Philippines that are increasingly 
subsumed by the global narrative of manly 
struggle between Islam and its enemies. 
The political significance of women in 
Mindanao is completely written out in 
representations of the struggle both by the 
state military and violent extremist groups. 
Box 1: Replication
Replication is a common dynamic in violent extremist groups and entails the replication of 
components of mainstream masculinity. This often involves a violent extremist group adopting an 
aspect that is accepted in mainstream society, such as the expectation that men will protect the 
weak. In contrast to exaggeration or inversion, replication does not entail substantial alteration 
of the norm or narrative. The adoption of the norm may involve a claim that violent extremist 
men, and not men in mainstream society, fulfil the expectation authentically. Or replication may 
be a more reciprocal relationship where both sides buy into the same narrative, as is the case 






















































Both militarized masculinity and violent 
extremist masculinity in the Philippines rely 
on the notion that women are passive and 
that their experiences are secondary to the 
more important struggles between men. 
The second key theme which emerged 
consistently in sources relating to violent 
extremist masculinity in the Southern 
Philippines is the need for men to reclaim 
their lost honour. In particular, videos and 
media releases from violent extremist groups 
often state that the Moro people have been 
humiliated, oppressed or shamed by the 
Philippine government. These assertions 
directly point to the Philippine government 
as the oppressor of the Moro people and 
demand redress for the wrongs committed. 
While the framing of this humiliation has 
global resonance in discourses around 
oppression and humiliation during 
colonialism, it also inverts the narrative 
of humiliation and reclamation of honour 
employed by the Philippine. As explained 
earlier, mainstream militarized masculinity 
in the Philippines is shaped directly by the 
experience of colonialism and attempts to 
reassert national dignity through militarism. 
This narrative has been adopted and 
inverted by violent extremist groups who 
level the charge of colonialism against the 
Philippine state and the claim humiliation by 
the military. President Duterte reinforces this 
dynamic by asserting the central importance 
of maintaining national strength through 
military intervention. As Tanyag (2018) 
suggests, the national leader appears to 
condone the use of brutality against Moro 
populations, including sexual violence. While 
Duterte’s rhetorical style helps maintain his 
position as a strong leader, it also reinforces 
the narrative of emasculation to which violent 
extremist groups appeal. It is precisely 
such practices of mainstream militarized 
masculinity in the Philippines that enable 
violent extremist groups to effectively invert 
the narrative of colonial humiliation. 
Violent extremist groups invert narratives of 
colonial oppression to justify their existence 
and tactics. As Brown, Toros, and Parashar 
note, by claiming oppression by a colonial 
northern power who has humiliated their 
people, violent extremist groups in the 
Southern Philippines replicate a familiar 
narrative while infusing it with fundamentally 
different meaning. The similar structure of 
the narrative employed makes the account 
easily intelligible within the context of the 
Philippines. Such narratives can be viewed 
in the frequent video messages dispersed 
by violent extremist groups in the south, 
which draw liberally on tropes of colonial 
occupation and reclamation of Muslim land. 
Box 2: Inversion
Inversion is a dynamic that occurs when violent extremist masculinity takes a norm or narrative 
that exists in mainstream masculinity and alters a key component of it while retaining similar 
narrative structure. This can commonly be seen in instances where violent extremist groups make 
the claim that real men are willing to use any tactics to get the job done, thereby inverting 
mainstream military norms around the use of tactics that target civilians. Inversion contrasts 
replication by exchanging some aspects of a mainstream norm or narrative while retaining a 
relationship to the mainstream version. Other examples involve narratives told about the nature 
of a conflict that may replicate many common reference points but invert the interpretation of 
those events entirely. While inversion produces very different norms and narratives to replication, 
it is still defined in relation to the mainstream narrative it intends to disrupt. 
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The way in which some aspects are directly 
adopted – while the meaning itself is flipped 
– is exactly what makes inversion such a 
powerful component of violent extremist 
masculinities in the Southern Philippines. 
As with the globalization of the conflict, 
the narrative of colonial humiliation is also 
used to silence and marginalize women on 
both sides. When conflict is framed around 
the need to reassert honour and dignity, it 
becomes very easy for women to become 
symbolic figures of victimhood whose purity 
needs protection from a rapacious other. 
This framing occurs on both sides in the 
Philippines. Military strongmen like Duterte 
invoke the spectre of violent Muslim men 
to justify muscular interventions as the only 
way to peace. This narrative is again inverted 
by violent extremist groups who point to 
instances when the state military commits 
abuses against civilians or breaks customs 
around purity.6 
Finally, violent extremist groups in the 
Southern Philippines appear to have 
endured in part due to their ability to offer 
a pathway into adulthood for young men in 
Mindanao who suffer significant economic 
obstacles, including restricted freedom of 
movement, few job prospects and constant 
6 There are numerous examples of this including prominent instances when military units in the South have been rewarded 
with lechon (pork) and alcohol after winning battles. These symbolic acts are intended to humiliate Muslim men while 
fuelling VE narratives that this is a perennial war against unbelievers. 
scrutiny from the state. Dwyer and Cagoco-
Guiam’s 2012 report Gender and Conflict in 
Mindanao signalled that limitations placed 
on young men’s mobility formed a powerful 
driver of conflict as they found themselves 
humiliated at checkpoints, frustrated by 
restrictions on their movement, and excluded 
from education and job opportunities. Such 
limitations placed on men create a sense 
of loss of social role and significance. With 
few other pathways to masculine status 
left, joining a violent extremist group offers 
a unique chance for young men to prove 
their manhood (Dwyer and Cagoco-Guiam, 
2012: 9-10). This dynamic resembles that of 
mainstream militarized masculinity discussed 
above and reflects the exaggeration of 
militarization as a pathway to manhood 
under material conditions that have blocked 
other avenues. 
This exaggerated form, as seen in the 
Southern Philippines, also reflects norms 
among Moro groups regarding masculinity. 
Within many Moro ethnic groups, men are 
expected to respond to humiliation with 
violence to reclaim their status. As explained 
by Torres (2014: 13), “an offense committed 
against a man that shames (sipug) him 
results in a reduced self-image. This situation 
creates a state of enmity and has potential 
Box 3: Exaggeration
Exaggeration is a dynamic that exists when violent extremist groups adopt an aspect of mainstream 
masculinity while magnifying components of it. Most notably, exaggeration exists in many violent 
extremist groups in relation to masculine norms of sacrifice or brotherhood. These norms, which 
exist in mainstream masculinity, are adopted by violent extremist groups but taken much further, 
thus requiring far more intense tests of manhood or exaggerated displays that would be read as 
excessive in mainstream society. In the Philippines, the exaggerated expectations of reciprocal 
violence do have resonances with mainstream militarized masculinity but they take the demands 





















































for conflict as society expects the offended 
person to seek redress for the grievance so 
as to erase the shame and sustain his self-
image as a brave man.” Similarly, Barreveld 
(2001) noted that in many Moro languages 
there is no word for excessive violence, 
with the closest terminology being terms 
of masculinity and bravery.  While these 
pre-existing cultural factors indicate that 
aspects of masculinity were already primed 
for violent extremism, they have been further 
activated by their relationship to mainstream 
militarized masculinity. This relationship 
should not be read as discounting pre-
existing norms that enable violence but as a 
necessary complement to an understanding 
of prevailing masculine norms in Moro 
communities. 
For mainstream Philippine society, 
participation in the armed forces provides 
one of the few readily accessible pathways 
for males to assert their manhood, including 
by earning income and providing for the 
household. In so doing, they engage in 
security actions that undermine the capacity 
of Moro men to access pathways to traditional 
masculinity, thus creating the material 
conditions for violent extremism to thrive. 
It is easy to look at this case and conclude 
that the problem resides with Moro forms 
of masculinity; however, this fundamentally 
misreads the relational nature of masculinity. 
The contestation over masculine status is 
one that relies on the relationship between 
mainstream militarized masculinity and the 
forms of masculine protest seen in violent 
extremist groups. Both militarized masculinity 
and violent extremist masculinity rely on one 
another to claim authority and status. Their 
salience and respectability necessarily rely on 
the actions of the other. The singling out of 
the masculinity of violent extremist groups as 
uniquely pathological misreads the dynamic 
nature of militarism in the Philippines.
Conclusion
This paper draws on the example of violent 
extremism in the Southern Philippines to 
suggest that violent extremist masculinities 
must be understood contextually and 
relationally. It argues that to fully appreciate 
the role of gender in propagating violent 
extremism, it is necessary not only to 
demonstrate the broad correlation between 
masculinity and violence, but to also pay 
attention to the articulations of masculinity 
against which armed groups define 
themselves. The study does not claim to be 
comprehensive in scope as it explores the 
relationship between militarized masculinities 
and violent extremist masculinities in just one 
case. Due to the methodology employed and 
its limited focus, the study is not intended 
to provide complete answers regarding the 
complex relationship between masculinity, 
militarism and violent extremism in the 
Philippines. Many of the findings remain 
tentative suggestions which warrant further 
investigation to confirm exactly how such 
dynamics might be playing out on the ground. 
Further attention needs to focus on numerous 
gender dynamics to fully understand and 
contextualize the proliferation of violent 
extremist masculinity in the Philippines. 
However, based on the research, analysis 
clearly needs to target a specific context and 
be more granular in character rather than risk 
overgeneralization. 
The profound differences in militarism and 
militarized masculinities across Asia mean 
that an overly broad approach would be 
misinformed. Similarly, the limited work on 
violent extremist masculinities to date has 
suffered from a tendency to focus on the 
most exceptional and spectacular aspects 
of manhood rather than the more routine 
components that propel men to join violent 
groups. In the case of the Philippines, broad 
ideological agendas were relevant, but so too 
were much more mundane concerns, such as 
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young men’s lack of access to employment 
or education. Certainly, more work needs to 
be done to explore the question of structural 
disadvantage within masculinity work on 
violent extremism.7 Some early positive 
signs can be seen in the Philippines’ recent 
National Action Plan on Preventing and 
Countering Violent Extremism that includes 
a pillar on socioeconomic interventions and 
explicit provisions on gender.
There is much more work to be done in 
this regard, particularly in understanding 
masculinity and the everyday character of 
violent extremism in the Asian region. In 
this instance, the key components of violent 
extremism’s commonplace aspects were 
not possible to explore in detail due to the 
research method employed. The analysis 
does, however, suggest that more detailed 
ethnographic study would likely yield 
valuable insights regarding violent extremist 
masculinities not captured here. While the 
connection between mainstream masculinity 
and violent extremism in Asia is poorly 
understood, this paper takes a modest step 
towards clarifying the link. 
Furthermore, the research emphasizes 
the importance of understanding violent 
extremist masculinities relationally, avoiding 
monolithic accounts of toxic or hyper 
masculinity. Indeed, the comparison between 
mainstream militarized masculinities in the 
Philippines and violent extremist masculinities 
suggests that both forms exist relationally and 
symbiotically. The dynamics underpinning 
this relationship are informed by the patterns 
of colonialism, military rule and globalization 
that inform gender relations in the Philippines. 
The focus on dynamics necessitates a shift in 
7 Work on the link between poverty and armed violence is not straightforward and deeply contested. While some studies 
suggest that social marginalization, lack of education and poverty might correlate with militancy, these claims have also 
been widely disputed. For more on these debates, see Blair et al. (2013), Bhui et al. (2014), and Berman and Matanock 
(2015). The bulk of work on this topic focuses on broad quantitative analysis of correlations between poverty, education 
and violence. From a gender perspective, this analysis has limitations because it does not explore the social significance 
of depravation within a gendered context. More work is needed on this topic, particularly within Asia where these 
dynamics may differ significantly from the locations where existing research has focused.
how responses frame the problem of violent 
extremist masculinities. Rather than being a 
set of isolated qualities, norms and narratives, 
this study suggests that violent extremist 
masculinities are produced in intimate 
relationship with other forms of masculinity 
in society. These dynamics should be further 
studied to build on this initial scoping study. 
The findings of this paper should also be 
read in relation to research by Rahman and 
by Brown, Toros and Parashar in this volume. 
Both papers likewise confirm the interplay 
between local narratives, material conditions 
and power structures in forming violent 
extremist masculinities. The two papers adopt 
different focus areas and methodologies – for 
example Rahman’s analysis of the production 
of ideal men and women through fatwas – 
but both papers do confirm the importance 
of contextualizing violent extremist 
masculinities. Thus, any attempt to unmake 
violent extremist masculinities will be far 
more effective if it targets the dynamics and 
relationships that make certain masculinities 
more pronounced. 
For programming on gender and violent 
extremism, the findings of this study imply 
considerable value in focusing on the local 
dynamics of masculinity rather than the 
broad correlation between patriarchal 
masculinity and violence. While existing 
programmes focused on masculinity and the 
rise of violent extremism are not insensitive to 
local masculinity, there is growing interest in 
replicating existing models of engaging men 
and boys from other sectors and focusing 






















































In contexts like the Philippines, it is not 
just a broad link between manhood and 
violence that has made violent extremist 
masculinities so prominent. Rather, there are 
specific economic conditions and structural 
arrangements that make the military so 
effective. If programming works with at-risk 
communities on the direct impact these 
conditions have for men (and particularly 
young men), it is likely that efforts to 
engage men will be more locally relevant 
and effective. Such efforts would require 
leveraging greater local knowledge and 
more substantial adaptation of existing 
programming but are likely to have a 
substantial pay-off compared to potential 
costs. Similarly, the findings suggest that 
approaches that target violent extremist 
masculinities in isolation are likely to have 
limited effectiveness. 
Despite the limitations of this study, there 
remain lessons regarding how to respond 
to violent extremist masculinities. The most 
substantial implication of this study is 
the importance of targeting mainstream 
militarized masculinities in addressing 
violent extremism. So far, interventions 
focused on gender and violent extremism 
have tended to focus on at-risk communities. 
This research indicates that in the Philippines, 
and more broadly, it is not enough to work 
with at-risk communities. Rather, mainstream 
masculinities such as the militarized 
masculinities analysed here are also critical 
for defining other relational masculinities in 
society. By shifting aspects of mainstream 
military practice (e.g. actions that humiliate 
southern communities), the emphasis on 
the global War on Terror, and the practice 
of reciprocal violence will likely all have an 
impact. 
The provision of gender-sensitive reform 
training in the security sector would likely be 
particularly effective due to the significant 
agency militaries have in relation to issues 
like violent extremism. There have been 
serious efforts to make security sector reform 
more sensitive to gender (Duriesmith and 
Holmes, 2019). While a large component 
of this work has been to render militaries 
more hospitable environments for female 
service providers, another substantial aspect 
has been challenging patriarchal notions of 
soldiering. It would be useful to reform this 
programming to also include a component 
on the potentially harmful effects military 
personnel can have on the propagation of 
violent extremist masculinities. 
This effort would require localizing each 
training to specifically target the interaction 
between militarized masculinity and violent 
extremist masculinities in that location to 
show the value that altered forms of security 
practice might offer. Such an approach 
would require substantial buy-in from military 
leadership and would likely require prior 
relationship-building to convey the value 
of gender-sensitive security sector reform 
in effecting change on violent extremist 
masculinities. Despite the challenge of 
changing entrenched military practice, 
the growth of work on challenging sexual 
exploitation and abuse suggests that it is 
an attainable goal (Westendorf and Searle, 
2017).
By viewing these components of mainstream 
militarized masculinity relationally, we can 
see new sites for engagement that do not 
require directly working with men involved 
in violent extremist groups – individuals who 
are often both difficult to access and resistant 
to change. The research has the potential 
to inform programming that targets at-risk 
communities directly. By considering the 
relational construction of violent extremist 
masculinities to mainstream masculine 
norms, programming can more effectively 
develop messaging that neither essentializes 
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nor exceptionalizes violent extremist 
masculinities. To do so, we may learn from 
the rich scholarship concerning working with 
men and boys to promote gender equality 
(Flood, 2019). 
Various techniques have been developed to 
change men’s attitudes towards gender. These 
include small group work with perpetrators 
or potential perpetrators, community-level 
programming, curriculum development 
and male advocate programmes. Such 
work has been adapted to the problem of 
violent extremism in at-risk communities and 
among those most vulnerable to recruitment, 
such as young men. It is probable that 
techniques focusing on working with men 
on gender could also be adapted to address 
violent extremism. Despite the omission of 
scholarship on this topic, the research does 
provide a robust body of evidence regarding 
how programmes can work directly with 
mainstream men to shift their approach to 
masculinity (Flood, 2015). If programmes 
targeting men and boys were adapted to 
be sensitive to the conflict dynamics that 
promote violent extremist masculinities, they 
might well produce positive change. Such 
an approach is likely to prove more effective 
if it reflects an appreciation for why certain 
masculine norms or narratives are clearer in 
one context than another. It likewise has the 
potential to situate programming within the 
contexts of violent extremism in Asia.
Finally, this paper further indicates the role of 
political economy in shaping violent extremist 
masculinities. It is not new, for example, 
to suggest that poverty might be linked to 
militant action. However, this paper implies 
that mainstream trends in relation to political 
economy, such as the role of migrant labour 
in the Philippines, might shift mainstream 
masculinities in ways that indirectly shape 
violent extremist masculinities. The shifts in 
political economy in the Philippines have 
had the effect of reshaping mainstream 
masculinities to centre strongman politics 
and the role of the military. This change has 
had the domino effect of then reshaping 
the country’s violent extremist movements 
as military action became more kinetic and 
significant in the states.
An understanding of how such large, 
potentially indirect shifts in the political 
economy might impact mainstream 
masculinities will help policymakers develop 
effective responses. In the case of the 
Philippines, this means that programmes 
focusing on women’s empowerment might 
also, for example, include some messaging 
to counter potential backlash. As the rise of 
mainstream militarism is linked to women’s 
enhanced economic role, it is reasonable 
to suggest that a similar dynamic may occur 
within at-risk communities. Though this is by 
no means a reason not to pursue women’s 
empowerment, it does mean that parallel 
programmes with men would do well to pre-
empt backlash politics. This advice reflects 
how local dynamics in each state shape the 
landscape of violent extremist masculinities 
and the importance of understanding the 
particulars of local political economy. 
While the study indicates that similar local 
power dynamics are likely to shape violent 
extremism in other parts of Asia, it is not 
intended to suggest that these contexts are 
likely to be similar. Other sites like Indonesia 
or Myanmar may echo patterns that this 
paper suggests are in the Philippines. It 
would be a mistake, however, to shift from 
a globalized model of violent extremist 
masculinity to a regional Asian model 
instead. Only historically grounded analysis 
that is sensitive to material conditions and 
relationally oriented can provide a stronger 
basis of knowledge on violent extremist 






















































Alburo, K.Z.K. (2011). Brothers, Lovers, and Revolution: Negotiating Military Masculinity and Homosexual Identity 
in a Revolutionary Movement in the Philippines. Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, 11(2).
Angeles, L.C. (2001). The Filipino male as “macho-machunurin”: Bringing men and masculinities in gender and 
development studies. Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, 16(1), pp. 9–30.
Bairner, A. (1999). Soccer, masculinity, and violence in Northern Ireland: Between hooliganism and terrorism. Men 
and Masculinities, 1(3), pp. 284–301.
Barrett, F. (1996). ‘The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy’. Gender, 
Work and Organization, 3(3), pp. 129–142.
Barreveld, D. J. (2001). Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Laden’s East Asian 
Connection. Lincoln, NE: Writers Club Press.
Bello, W.F., De Guzman, M., Malig, M. L. and Docena, H. (2005). The anti-development state: The political 
economy of permanent crisis in the Philippines. Zed Books 
Berman, E. and Matanock, A.M. (2015). The empiricists’ insurgency. Annual Review of Political Science, 18, pp. 
443–464.
Bhui, K., Warfa, N. and Jones, E. (2014). Is violent radicalization associated with poverty, migration, poor self-
reported health and common mental disorders? PloS one, 9(3), p. e90718.
Blair, G., Christine Fair, C., Malhotra, N. and Shapiro, J.N. (2013). Poverty and support for militant politics: 
Evidence from Pakistan. American Journal of Political Science, 57(1), pp. 30–48.
Brown, K. E. (2018). Violence and Gender Politics in the Proto-State “Islamic State”. In Ann Tickner, Swati Parashar 
and Jacqui True (eds.) Revisiting Gendered States: Feminist Imaginings of the State in International Relations, 
Oxford University Press. New York.
Chisholm, A. and Tidy, J. (2017). Beyond the hegemonic in the study of militaries, masculinities, and war. Critical 
Military Studies, 3(2), pp. 99–102.
Cockburn, C. (2004). The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace. In: W. Giles and J. 
Hyndman, eds. Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 
24–44.
Connell, R.W. (2004). Encounters with structure. International journal of qualitative studies in education, 17(1), 
pp. 10–27.
Connell, R.W. (2005). Masculinities. Polity, Cambridge.
Duriesmith, D., and Holmes, G. (2019). The masculine logic of DDR and SSR in the Rwanda Defence Force. 
Security Dialogue, 50(4), pp. 361-379.
Duriesmith, D., and Ismail, N. H. (2019). Militarised masculinities beyond methodological nationalism: Charting 
the multiple masculinities of an Indonesian jihadi. International Theory, 11(2), pp. 139-159.
Duriesmith, D. (2017a). Masculinity and New War: The gendered dynamics of contemporary armed conflict. 
Routledge, New York. 
Duriesmith, D. (2017b). Engaging men and boys in the women peace and security agenda: Beyond the ‘good 
men’ industry, LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series, 11/2017.
Duriesmith, D. (2018). Hybrid Warriors and the Formation of New War Masculinities: A Case Study of Indonesian 
Foreign Fighters. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 7(1).
Dwyer, L. and Cagoco-Guiam, R. (2012). Gender and conflict in Mindanao. Asia Foundation.
Emig, R. (2018). Terrorist Masculinities: Political Masculinity between Fiction, Facts, and Their Mediation. Men 
and Masculinities, Online pre-publication 05/06/2018. 
29
Ezekilov, J. (2017). Gender “Men-Streaming” CVE: Countering Violence Extremism by Addressing Masculinities 
Issues. Reconsidering Development, 5(1).
Eviota, E. U. (1992). The political economy of gender: women and the sexual division of labour in the Philippines. 
Zed Books, London.
Flood, M. (2002). Between men and masculinity: An assessment of the term ‘masculinity ‘in recent scholarship on 
men. In Riggs, D. (ed.), Manning the next millennium: Studies in masculinities. Black Swan Press, Perth.
Flood, M. (2015). Work with men to end violence against women: a critical stocktake. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 
17(sup2), pp. 159–176.
Flood, M. (2019). Engaging Men and Boys in Violence Prevention. Palgrave Macmillan.
Gardner, J. and El-Bushra, J. (2017). Somalia: A state of male power, insecurity and inequality: Findings from the 
inception study on the impact of war on Somali men Rift Valley Institute, Nairobi. 
Gutierrez, F. C. (2018). Violence and Hypermasculinity in University Fraternity Initiations: Situating the 
Reproduction of Masculinity in the Philippines. The Journal of Men’s Studies, pre-publication version released 
online 28/11/2018.
Hearn, J. (2004). From hegemonic masculinity to the hegemony of men. Feminist theory, 5(1), pp. 49–72.
Henshaw, A. L. (2017). Why Women Rebel: Understanding Women’s Participation in Armed Rebel Groups. 
Routledge, Abingdon.
Ismail, N. H. (2018). Masculinity in Radicalization. AsiaGlobal Online. Accessed 16/02/2019.
Ingram, K. (2019). Revisiting Marawi: Women and the Struggle Against the Islamic State in the Philippines, 
Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/revisiting-marawi-women-and-struggle-against-islamic-state-philippines 
Accessed 12/09/19.
Jones, S. (2018). Radicalisation in the Philippines: the Cotabato Cell of the “East Asia Wilayah”. Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 30(6), pp. 933–943.
Kaminski, T. (2013). ‘Philippines’, in Piehler, G. K. ed. Encyclopedia of military science. Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, pp. 1085-1089.
Kimmel, M.S. (2003). Globalization and its mal (e) contents: The gendered moral and political economy of 
terrorism. International Sociology, 18(3), pp. 603–620.
Kimmel, M.S. (2018). Healing from Hate: How Young Men Get Into-and Out Of-violent Extremism. University of 
California Press.
Lusher, D. and Robins, G. (2009). Hegemonic and other masculinities in local social contexts. Men and 
Masculinities, 11(4), pp. 387–423.
Mankayi, N. and Shefer, T. (2005). Masculinities, militarization and unsafe sexual practices: a case study of a young 
man in the South African military. Agenda (63), pp. 66–78.
McCoy, A. W. (1998). Closer than Brothers: Two classes at the Philippine Military Academy, Converse, in E. V. 
Converse III ed., Forging the sword: selecting, educating, and training cadets and junior officers in the modern 
world. Imprint Publications.
McCoy, A. W. (2002). Closer than brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy. Yale University Press.
Myrttinen, H. (2018) (online first view). Stabilizing or Challenging Patriarchy? Sketches of Selected “New” Political 
Masculinities. Men and Masculinities. 
Myrttinen, H., Khattab, L. and Naujoks, J. (2017). Re-thinking hegemonic masculinities in conflict-affected 
contexts. Critical Military Studies, 3(2), pp. 103–119.
Nadeau, K. M. (2008). The history of the Philippines. Greenwood Publishing Group, Westpoint.
Necef, N. Ü. (2016). “If men were men then women would be women”: ISIL’s construction of masculinity and 





















































Parreñas, R. S. (2000). Migrant Filipina domestic workers and the international division of reproductive labour. 
Gender & Society, 14(4), pp. 560-580.
Pingol, A. (2001). Remaking masculinities: Identity, power, and gender dynamics in families with migrant wives 
and househusbands. UP Center for Women’s Studies, Manilla. 
Poloni-Staudinger, L. and Ortbals, C. (2014). Gendering Abbottabad: Agency and hegemonic masculinity in an 
age of global terrorism. Gender Issues, 31(1), pp. 34–57.
Quimpo, N. G. (2005). Oligarchic patrimonialism, bossism, electoral clientelism, and contested democracy in the 
Philippines. Comparative Politics, 37 (2). pp. 229–250
Roose, J. (2018). ‘Ideological masculinity’ that drives violence against women is a form of violent extremism. The 
Conversation. Published 12/07/2018. https://theconversation.com/ideological-masculinity-that-drives-violence-
against-women-is-a-form-of-violent-extremism-99603 
Rubio, R.J. and Green, R.J. (2009). Filipino masculinity and psychological distress: A preliminary comparison 
between gay and heterosexual men. Sexuality Research & Social Policy, 6(3), p. 61–75.
Salter, M. (2014). Toys for the boys? Drones, pleasure and popular culture in the militarisation of policing. Critical 
Criminology, 22(2), pp. 1631–1677. 
Salter, M. (2016). ‘Real men don’t hit women’: Constructing masculinity in the prevention of violence against 
women. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 49(4), pp. 463–479.
Schmid, A. P. (2014). Violent and non-violent extremism: Two sides of the same coin. ICCT Research Paper.
Seymour, K. (2018). ‘Cowards’ and ‘Scumbags’: Tough Talk and Men’s Violence. International Journal for Crime, 
Justice and Social Democracy, 7(4), pp. 132–147.
Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. E. eds. (2011). Women, gender, and terrorism. University of Georgia Press.
Stenersen, A. (2017). A History of Jihadi Cinematography. In: T. Hegghammer, ed. Jihadi Culture: The Art and 
Social Practice of Militant Islamists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 108-128. 
Tapales, P. D. (2003). ‘Gender Policies and Responses Towards Greater Women Empowerment in the Philippines’, 
Public administration and globalization: Enhancing public-private collaboration in public service delivery, United 
Nations, New Delhi, pp. 163-176.
Templer, R. (2017). Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia Analytical Paper on Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia, 
Supporting Inclusive and Peaceful Societies in Asia and the Pacific (SIPSAP). UN Development Group Asia-Pacific 
Governance and Peace Building Cluster, Bangkok.
Torres, W. M. (2014). Introduction. In Torres, W. M. (ed.) Rido: Clan feuding and conflict management in Mindanao. 
Ateneo de Manila University Press, Manila. pp.–39.
True, J., Gordon, E., Johnson, M., and O’Brien, K. (2019). Building an Evidence Base for Empowering Women for 
Peaceful Communities: A case study of Bangladesh and Indonesia. UN Women Regional Office for Asia and the 
Pacific, Bangkok. 
Ugarte, E. F. (2010). ‘In a wilderness of mirrors’: the use and abuse of the ‘Abu Sayyaf’ label in the Philippines. 
South East Asia Research, 18(3), pp. 373–413.
USAID (2018). The Role of Women in Violent Extremism in Asia. United States Agency for International 
Development, Washington. The Role of Women in Violent Extremism in Asia. Westendorf, J. K. and Searle, 
L. (2017. Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations: trends, policy responses and future directions. 
International Affairs, 93(2), pp. 365–387.
Yea, S. (2015). Masculinity under the knife: Filipino men, trafficking and the black organ market in Manila, the 
Philippines. Gender, Place & Culture, 22 (1), pp. 123–142.
3131
The Nexus between Masculinities, Femininities, and Violent Extremism
Chapter 2
Violent Extremist Myths and 
Masculinities: two country case studies
Katherine E. Brown (lead author),  






















































Myths, masculinity and 
violent extremism
Through grand narratives, myths help explain 
what might otherwise be unintelligible. 
They are models of, and  for, society. They 
tell us about the apparent fabric of the 
world, revealing moral messages that hold 
the narrator’s universe together. Mythical 
narratives are not just a matter of individuals 
creating their inner and social self; they are 
also what bind societies and cultures together. 
Myths enable the integration of events and 
actions through time into meaningful patterns 
that help explain the interrelationships of 
events in our lives. Mythical narratives also 
tell us which events and actions are significant 
and which can be ignored. As such, myths 
always have normative content, describing 
what is important, good, and better, and 
what is not (Halverson et al., 2011). Our sense 
of meaning and purpose, our values and 
motivations, are based on these narratives. 
Charles Taylor argues that stories about self 
and society are how humans construct the 
“horizons of meaning” that form the critical 
background for social relations and life 
choices. These narratives always represent 
a kind of movement in moral space. They 
are our way of constructing coherence and 
continuity in our lives (Leonard and McClure, 
2004). Myths do not gain authority based 
on the accuracy of their claims to truth, but 
because they are perceived as credible, 
as natural, almost obvious. As the political 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre said, “[m]
yths are alive or dead, not true or false” 
(MacIntyre, 1967). In other words, myths must 
be believed to be true, but from an outsider’s 
perspective they may appear absurd and 
easily falsifiable. However, myths sit above 
such empirical truth claims because they are 
processes of meaning-making. The same 
can be said of the specific myths of violent 
extremist groups.
By recognising the essential element of 
myths as meaning-making through grand 
narratives, we can better understand the 
persistence and adaptability of violent 
extremist groups (Glazzard, 2017). Such 
groups create their own mythologies and 
perpetuate historical and classical myths in 
the societies around them. Deconstructing 
and analysing these stories enables us to 
better understand the legitimation strategies, 
actions, and frameworks of understanding 
used by extremists. This insight suggests that 
attempts to counter extremist groups that 
rest on challenging the empirical grounds of 
their narratives without also addressing these 
broader questions of belief and meaning-
making will ultimately fall short.  
It is likewise vital to apply a gendered lens 
to this analysis. Gender, like myths, is socially 
constructed, and refers to the attributes 
and opportunities that a given society at a 
given time considers appropriate for men 
and women, as well as the relationships 
between and among them. Myths are part 
of the process by which these gender roles, 
behaviours, activities and attributes are 
normalized within violent extremist groups. 
Gender analysis is more than determining 
what women do; it draws our attention to 
the power relations, institutions, and roles 
in extremist groups and in wider societies, it 
involves unpacking what men and women do 
socially, politically and economically as part 
of violent extremism. The gender ideologies 
of the groups help us understand the ways 
in which these groups function, their identity, 
and their cause. Revealing which femininities 
and masculinities are prioritized in extremist 
myths – in other words, what kind of cultural 
meanings and values the myths apply to 
maleness and femaleness, respectively – 
helps us further understand the ways in which 
violent extremist groups make sense of their 
cause and who they think they are.
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Methodology
This is a comparative study of two countries. 
Rather than focusing solely on one country, the 
methodology allows for better identification 
of lessons for countering violent extremist 
narratives and disrupting their connections 
with society. The comparative approach also 
resists essentializing any perceived master 
narratives of a global Islamist extremism 
(Halverson et al., 2001). We assert that 
culture and cultural variations influence the 
manifestation and concerns of extremist 
groups even when such groups claim a 
connection to a wider mythology. 
There are limitations to this comparative and 
narrative approach. First, it may be read as 
reducing religion to belief rather than also 
recognizing the importance of belonging 
and behaviours in understanding it. Second, 
the focus on myths necessarily means less 
attention paid to the everyday and real-life 
operations and experiences of extremists 
and those living alongside them. Third, the 
country case studies and myths themselves 
all draw upon religious ideas and violent 
politics connected to Islam or Islamic identity; 
this may lead some to conclude erroneously 
that these myths are therefore purportedly 
Islamic or that Islam is inherently violent. We 
therefore stress that myth-making among 
violent extremist groups is not unique to 
these religiously framed groups: Marxist 
and other groups in South Asia hold secular 
myths pertaining to Indian independence 
icon Mahatma Gandhi, such as the story of 
the lone white ticket inspector refusing to 
honour the first-class ticket of the Indian-
born barrister, whose brown skin placed him 
among those designated as coloured under 
South Africa’s apartheid (Nandy, 2002). We 
also stress that all religions and religious 
identities have the capacity for violence, and 
that it is not possible to study that violence 
in isolation or without understanding the 
context of religious narratives.
A key difference between our approach 
and much current research on extremist 
narratives and counter-narratives is that 
we do not presume in advance to know the 
function of extremist myths; they are not 
assumed to be instrumentalist propaganda. 
Extremist myths are regarded as part of 
the wider culture in which extremist groups 
and individuals exist. An awareness of the 
importance of a recognizable extremist 
culture has only just emerged in academic 
and think-tank considerations. Thomas 
Hegghammer (2017), Elizabeth Kendall, 
Daniella Pisou, Thomas Johnson (2011, 
2017), and Michael Semple (2011) are among 
those studying culture and utilizing literary 
approaches to understand extremism. While 
insightful, these researchers primarily focus 
on the Middle East and North Africa region, 
and do not formally consider myths. 
This study’s data collection derives from 
primary and secondary source material. The 
focus is on the content and context of myths 
rather than their production or delivery; it 
is hard to identify their reception in wider 
society. Myths were selected based on a) their 
contemporary importance to extremist and 
armed non-state actors in the two countries 
and b) whether they enable the extremist 
groups to connect to the wider society around 
them. The structure of this paper follows the 
methodological steps we used in the analysis 
for each case study: taking each country in 
turn, first, we look at mythical characters, 
then the plot lines of each myth, before finally 
exploring the functions of myths.
The discussion of these myths is not to affirm 
the truth claims made by the extremist 
groups, and it is not to adjudicate the veracity 
of their statements. The methodological 
aim is to examine how extremist groups 
construct gender, specifically masculinity, 
within their telling of the myths and how this 























































The Philippines has been home to numerous 
non-state armed groups motivated both by 
ideology and identity or secessionist claims. 
It often ranks in the top 20 countries in the 
world for incidence of terrorist violence 
(Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). 
This violence includes attacks carried out 
by large left-wing organizations such as the 
Maoist-inspired New People’s Army, as well 
as numerous Islamist groups fighting for the 
separation or autonomy of Mindanao (an 
island group in southern Philippines and 
traditional home of the Moros or Muslim 
minority) and/or to establish radical Islamist 
rule in the region and extend the so-called 
Islamic State. This paper will focus on the 
myths of the latter two movements because 
of their key role in the landscape of violent 
extremism in the Philippines, and to facilitate 
structured comparison. 
The Moros, or Bangsamoros, as they call 
themselves, have struggled with being 
ruled by the Christian-dominated state for 
centuries. Motivated by widespread political 
and economic discrimination and the desire 
for self-governance, the movement took up 
arms in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
Box 4: Mythological narrative approach
 Features of myths
Myths address matters of life and death. They have explanatory components; teachable 
moments; supernatural and extraordinary characters and powers; confrontation between 
irreconcilable opposites; dilemmas which shape the story. Gendered relations within 
extremists’ myths, the construction of the ‘hero’s quest’, and the means available to succeed 
within the myth, demonstrate how violent extremist groups make sense of violent action and 
of the relations between group members and wider society.
 Analysing characters
Characters serve as ideal types for violent extremist group members and potential recruits. 
There are heroes, tricksters, evil villains and victims, and supernatural beings. From their 
actions and the consequences we see values of the myth: honour, loyalty, love, obedience. 
Women are rarely heroes; instead they are often the ‘prize’ of the quest, but sometimes they 
are tricksters or villains.  
 Analysing plots
Plots and settings are often epic featuring extraordinary and extreme events and actions. 
Often myths are quests, with trials, tests, and danger. Monsters and evil villains are defeated, 
usually at great cost. Heroes are rewarded. What they fight for, how they fight, how they are 
recompensed, shows what is considered important and how causality is understood. 
 Analysing functions
Myths have the broad function of meaning-making. Myths help groups make sense of current 
situations, behaviours and rituals. Myths legitimize the status quo or offer theories to explain 
world change. To understand their functions for extremists, it is necessary to contextualise 
and locate the myth and the group in wider society. 
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first armed group to be formed was the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), followed 
by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 
which remains to this day the most important 
non-state armed group fighting for greater 
autonomy, and at times independence. Both 
MNLF and MILF have entered successive 
agreements with the national government, 
and MILF is currently a central actor in the 
implementation of a peace agreement to 
establish greater autonomy in Mindanao.
Since first MNLF and then MILF entered 
peace talks, various hard-line splinter groups 
have formed, the most important of which 
have been Abu Sayyaf (AS), the Bangsamoro 
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and, more 
recently, the Maute Group. All three groups 
have links and have pledged bay’aa1 or 
allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Indeed, 
AS leader Isnilon Hapilon, until his death in 
2017, was declared by IS to be “Emir of the 
Soldiers of the Khilafah [Caliphate] in East 
Asia,” (Rumiyah, 2017) thus establishing a 
strong link between the two organizations 
and allowing IS to claim credit for the attacks 
carried out by these groups in Mindanao, 
including two bomb attacks that killed 13 
people in July and August 2018 (Counter 
Extremism Project, 2018b). 
Aside from what can be broadly understood 
as local criminal activity, including extortion 
and kidnapping, AS, BIFF and the Maute 
Group have carried out violent attacks against 
civilians with varying degrees of effectiveness, 
including bomb attacks on civilian targets, 
direct attacks on police and armed forces, 
and sieges of towns in Mindanao, including 
Marawi in 2017.
1 The bay’aa (sometimes spelt as bay’ah or bay’a) is a pledge of allegiance. It has specific religious connotations and 
is more than offering support, and places the group offering their allegiance under the authority of those to who it 
is offered. However in different regions it carries more or less significance in practical terms, but holds symbolic and 
normative value. For a discussion see Milton (2015). 
2 Mushrikin is someone who engages in Shirk. Shirk is loosely translated as a polytheist, or those who associate or ascribe 
divinity to someone/something other than Allah (God), and is sometimes applied to Christians because of the theology 
of the trinity.
Although MILF has a very strong Islamic 
identity and argues that Mindanao should 
not be governed in a way that is contrary 
to Islam, neither MILF or MLNF have made 
the establishment of a radical Islamist state 
a central goal of their struggle (Toros, 2007; 
2012). By contrast, AS, BIFF and the Maute 
Group by pledging allegiance to Islamic 
State have adopted the “goal of establishing 
Allah’s rule in the land,” and rejected the 
“apostasy” of “entrance into democracy, 
and … allying with the mushrikin” (Rumiyah, 
2017).2 These three groups describe the 
Philippine army as “crusaders” whose deaths 
are to be celebrated (“so Allah aided us 
against them and we massacred them”). 
Hapilon  described MILF and anyone 
willing to enter into negotiations with the 
government as “misleading deviants.” 
Furthermore, a few months before his death, 
Hapilon insisted that the groups linked to 
IS “would never accept putting down their 
weapons” (Rumiyah, 2017). 
The Jabidah Massacre  
of 1968
Bangsamoro rebellions can be traced back 
centuries. The origin of the contemporary 
armed campaigns, however, are often traced 
back to the Moros response to the 1968 
Jabidah Massacre, turning it into a central 
myth of the Moro rebellion (Tiglao, 2018). 
Some political figures and commentators still 
contest the events of the Jabidah Massacre, 
arguing that these are fabrications of the 
Moro movement or of opposition figures to 
then President Ferdinand Marcos. However, 





















































12 and 68 Moro recruits were killed by their 
commanders on March 18, 1968 on the island 
of Corregidor off Manila. For the purposes of 
this study, however, the facts of the events are 
less relevant than the myth that was created 
around it. 
Principal characters
Although a variety of characters have entered 
the myth of Jabidah, two villains, two heroes 
– all four of them men – and a civilian woman 
are particularly interesting for this study. 
The two villains, then-president Ferdinand 
Marcos and Major Eduardo “Abdul Latif” 
Martelino, are both clearly identified as the 
culprits behind the massacre. Marcos, who 
governed the Philippines from 1965 to 1986 
and used the response post-Jabidah as a 
reason to crack down on Moro dissenters, is 
presented in the myth as animated “by the 
obsession to stay in power” and willing to 
resort to “extra-legal actions,” to secure his 
aims (Jubair, 1999). 
The operational hand of the massacre, 
though, is identified as Martelino, a major 
who converted to Islam to marry Sophia (or 
Safiyah3), the only woman to figure broadly 
in the myth. Sophia, after whom Martelino 
named the camp in which the Muslim recruits 
were living and training at the time of the 
massacre, is presented as a young woman of 
particular beauty, so much so that one version 
erroneously notes that her name means, 
“stunningly beautiful woman” (Medina and 
Pulumbarit, 2013). Martelino plays a central 
role in recruiting the young Muslim men and 
was held accountable for their killings. The 
two heroes are both Muslim men: the lone 
survivor of the massacre, Jibin Arula; and in 
some versions of the myth, Nur Misuari, the 
founder and at the time of writing current 
head of MNLF. After an initial intensive 
3 Safiya is the Muslim version of the same name,
media and political presence following the 
massacre, Arula was forced into hiding for 
decades but then returned to the spotlight 
some 40 years later to recount his experience 
of the events in numerous rallies in Mindanao 
and elsewhere.  
Plot lines
The Jabidah Massacre myth starts with 
Marcos’s plan to send young Muslim recruits 
undercover into the nearby Malaysian 
province of Sabah, to which the Philippines 
lays claim, to stir up violence that Marcos 
would then use as justification to invade and 
reclaim the area. The plot line then splits into 
two versions. The one preferred by MNLF, 
MILF and other armed groups is that the 
young Muslims discovered they were being 
trained to fight against other Muslims in 
Sabah and refused to do so on grounds that 
they could not kill their Muslim brothers. In 
this version, Martelino ordered that the men 
be executed to avoid any news of the plan 
reaching the press or the opposition. 
In the second version of the story, supported 
by Arula’s testimony as the only survivor, 
the recruits knew the aims of the mission all 
along but were tired of being abused and 
denied their promised pay and mutinied 
against their commanders, which led to their 
execution. As the shooting started, Arula 
started running despite being shot in the 
thigh. He fell off a cliff into the sea, where 
he hung onto a plank of wood for hours 
avoiding detection, and was then able to 
convince local fishermen that he “got drunk 
and fell off a ship” and needed rescuing. 
Jibin Arula then tells the story of how Nur 
Misuari met him a short time later when he 
was under the protection of an opposition 
governor and promised revenge: “Jibin, I 
can’t help you with money but remember we 
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will avenge Bangsa Islam. We will fight the 
government of President Marcos” (Arguillas, 
2009). In this myth, Misuari founded MNLF 
just after the massacre and in response to it. 
Commemorating the 30th anniversary of the 
massacre in 1998, Misuari declared 18 March 
to be Bangsamoro Day (Curaming, 2017).
Functions of the myth
The Jabidah Massacre myth performs three 
principle functions for the Moro armed 
groups. First, it serves as the origin myth 
behind the state’s violence, which the Moros 
are responding to in self-defence. The second 
function lies in the consolidation of the myth 
of Moro identity, one that is distinct from 
the Christian majority and from other ethnic 
groups. Third, the massacre is a recruitment 
myth that valorizes the Moros who join the 
fight to defend themselves and avenge 
injustice. As noted by Aristotle, an origin “is 
that which does not itself follow anything by 
causal necessity, but after which something 
naturally is or comes to be” (Aristotle). By 
mythologizing the Jabidah Massacre as the 
beginning of the Bangsamoro struggle, the 
myth’s proponents present the Moro call to 
arms as the only possible response to such 
violence. It thus naturalizes the violence of 
MNLF, and that of subsequent splinter groups 
as the only response to the “oppressive 
character of the state, which is allegedly bent 
on exterminating Muslims” (Aljunied and 
Curaming, 2012). 
The myth also consolidates the Moro/Muslim 
as a distinct identity by stressing that all the 
victims were Muslim and all the perpetrators 
were either Christian or “fake converts,” 
(as Martelino is accused of being (Jubair, 
1999)) and that the Muslim recruits were, in 




harm their Muslim brothers of Sabah. This 
has an added ethnic dimension, as the myth 
highlights that both villains, Marcos and 
Martelino, are Ilocano, an ethnolinguistic 
group from the northern Philippines. This 
serves to reinforce the construction by which 
the many ethnolinguistic groups living in 
Mindanao all become primarily Moro/Muslim. 
Finally, the myth has served clear recruitment 
functions over the decades. The MILF 
website says that from the massacre “Moro 
consciousness, based on Islamic revivalism 
and knowledge of a distinct history and 
identity, gathers steam. Political organizations 
emerge to culminate eventually in the 
establishment of the MNLF.”4 Even 50 years 
later, Abduhraman Idris, the grandson of 
one of the recruits, in an Al Jazeera interview 
stated: “As a Bangsamoro youth, we have 
to correct historical injustice as we are the 
future of the Bangsamoro.”5  Ultimately, the 
injustice of Jabidah is a rallying call for Moros 
to join the struggle. 
Gendered dynamics
Three main gendered aspects of the myth 
have been identified, two focusing on women 
and one on men. First, the presence of Sophia 
or Safiya is important. She is a young woman of 
extreme beauty and her looks and naivety are 
taken advantage of by unscrupulous ‘other’ 
men (in this case, Martelino who allegedly 
pretends to convert). In a construction that 
is common in the myths of war and fighting, 
Sophia represents Mindanao itself, a virgin 
land of natural beauty that is described as 
spoiled by the crusaders. Tellingly, Martelino 
names the camp after her, turning her into 
the physical territory on which the betrayal 





















































Second, Martelino as a villain is presented as 
lacking respect for women and is described 
as “adventurous, womanizer, unscrupulous, 
reckless, mercenary” (Aljunied and Curaming, 
2012). The heroes on the other hand speak, in 
the words of Misuari himself, as wanting to 
protect “our mothers,” while Arula is said to 
have longed for the first wife he had to leave 
behind when he went into hiding (Arguillas, 
2009a).  Men are revealed to us as good or 
bad based on their treatment of women and 
whether they have pious relationships with 
them.
Finally, women are presented as a means to 
integrate a social group for both hero and 
villain in the myth. Martelino uses Sophia to 
appear to become a Muslim, while Arula is 
told to “go and find a woman from Visayas 
and marry her” in order to integrate a new 
social group and avoid detection after the 
massacre (Arguillas, 2009a). Thus, in the final 
dynamic, relationships to women are seen as 
a key vector of social integration – whether 
genuine or deceitful. Overall, the myth 
sustains gender constructions of women as 
virgin territory to be protected by heroes 
from defiling villains, as well as women as 
the foundation of men’s social identity. 
The Battle of Marawi
The myth surrounding the Battle of Marawi 
between the IS-linked Maute Group and 
sections of AS, and the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines offers an interesting and 
contrasting version of the Jabidah myth. As it 
relates to events that occurred in 2017, it has 
not had the time to develop into as layered 
a myth, but its production during the 153-day 
battle offers an interesting insight into the 
process of mythologizing the present. AS and 
the Maute Group, and also IS, mythologized 
the  battle  through  statements,  publications, 
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QL7ITEv4kiE 
videos and songs that were circulated during 
the siege as well as after. 
Initially, the end of the Marawi siege and 
the deaths of Hapilon and the Maute Group 
leadership, along with several hundred other 
insurgents, considerably weakened these 
groups (Heydarian, 2019). However, several 
analysts have warned that the violence of 
the  state response, coupled with the slow 
reconstruction, represent key recruitment 
assets for these groups in Mindanao. Indeed, 
Joseph Franco argues that “beyond victories 
in the kinetic space, it is clear that socio-
economic roots of conflict in Mindanao 
need to be resolved lest Marawi just be 
the harbinger of recurring conflict” (Franco, 
2017). 
Principal characters
Four men are key with three presented as 
heroes and one as a weak hostage. The first 
is Isnilon Hapilon, the leader of AS who was 
declared by IS as the “Emir of the soldiers 
of the Khilafah [Caliphate] in East Asia.” The 
two others are the brothers Abdullah and 
Omarkhayam Maute, leaders of the Maute 
Group. All three died in the Marawi siege. 
Finally, there is Father Chito Soganub, a 
Catholic priest, taken hostage at the start of 
the fighting, who was forced to appear in a 
video appeal to President Rodrigo Duterte.6 
Plot lines
Although widely accepted accounts of the 
Battle of Marawi state that it began as a 
response to attempts by the Philippine Army 
to arrest Hapilon after receiving intelligence 
he was in Marawi, the myth constructed by 
IS and its regional allies is that the battle 
was pre-planned by Hapilon and the Maute 
brothers. Indeed, video footage shows the 
three men sitting with several other men 
carefully planning the areas to be attacked, as 
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well as the sequencing of the attacks.7 IS itself 
claimed that it was Hapilon and the Maute 
group that “stormed the city of Marawi … 
chased out the local police and the military, 
and raised the banner of the Islamic State” 
(Rumiyah, 2017: 5). Aside from engaging 
in precise planning, the men also clearly 
aim at demonstrating effectiveness and 
ruthlessness. Abdullah Maute is heard telling 
the group: “I will kill four every time I fire a 
gun,” and “we can penetrate the schools and 
take some hostages.”8 By contrast, Christian 
men, epitomized by Father Chito, are 
presented as weak and begging for mercy. In 
the video released during his captivity, Chito 
himself sets up the contrast, stressing that 
“they are ready to die for their religion.” 9  
Functions 
The myth so far has had three principal 
functions. The first is to outflank MILF and 
demonstrate that the groups linked to IS, 
and in particular AS and the Maute Group, 
represent true fighters for Islam. Events 
have, Hapilon states in an interview, “helped 
uncover the reality of those misleading 
deviants” (Rumiyah, 2017: 40). This outflanking 
has a clear recruitment function that the IS-
linked groups are open about, stating that 
the battle revealed the “evil nature of [MILF’s] 
methodology and the lies perpetrated by 
their leaders, with some fighters joining the 
Islamic State” (Rumiyah, 2017: 37). The second 
function is to demonstrate the increasing 
reach of the Khilafah or Caliphate declared 
by IS in 2014. Indeed, the mythologizing of 
the battle also served IS, which chose to 
headline it in one of its English-language 
publications, Rumiyah (2017). Its opening 




10 A nasheed is a chant, hymn, or song in a cappella or accompanied by percussion instruments. They are often religious. 
See Gråtrud (2016) and Said (2012).
11 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKNbmjPprC4 
that “despite the claims that the Islamic 
State has been weakened, the mujahidin’s 
ousting of the Crusaders and their puppets 
and their attainment of consolidation in the 
land can come as quickly and unexpectedly 
in any region on earth” (Rumiyah, 2017: 5). 
The publication then shows a picture of an 
“IS checkpoint” in Marawi, an indication of 
their control of territory. 
Gendered dynamics
Several gendered dynamics can be identified 
in the publications of the groups, most of 
them relying on, and sustaining, gender 
stereotypes through the representation 
of men and women but also through the 
absence of key women. One element of the 
myth widely used by IS about fighting in other 
contexts, is the women-as-reward dynamic. 
Indeed, a nasheed, or religious song,10 was 
circulated called The Brothers of Marawi 
that promised in its chorus: “Diamonds and 
pearls and palaces awaiting the men of 
Tawhid; Virgins and wine, never ending time 
and gardens with rivers beneath.”11 
There is also a feminization of Christians 
throughout the myth. This can be seen 
in propaganda footage showing fighters 
destroying statues of the Virgin Mary in 
churches with the butts of their rifles but also in 
the portrayal of Father Chito in his appeal for 
mercy. Father Chito’s appealed emotionally 
for empathy from President Rodrigo Duterte: 
“From our heart, please consider us, Mr 
President, you know it is hard sometimes, 
from time to time we hear bursts of gunfire.” 
That appeal is placed in sharp contrast to his 
representation of his kidnappers as rational 





















































and as willing to fight and die.12  
Finally, the myth is interesting due to the 
absence of Farhana Maute, mother of the 
Maute brothers. Indeed, the Philippine 
state and mainstream media ascribe a 
considerable role to Farhana Maute in 
financing the group and recruiting new 
members. A businesswoman believed to 
have property even in the capital Manila, 
Farhana is accused of using her strong clan 
connections to also support the group. She 
was arrested during the siege, traveling in a 
“vehicle loaded with firearms and explosives” 
leading a military spokesperson to call 
her the “heart of the Maute organization” 
(Reuters, 2017). The absence of Farhana from 
the myth constructed by the violent extremist 
organizations can be seen as a telling 
indication that the groups do not wish to 
disrupt gender stereotypes, particularly with 
audiences beyond the Philippines that may 
have trouble comprehending the matriarchal 
structures that exist in parts of the country.
Case study
Indonesia
Indonesia is both a majority-Muslim nation 
with the world’s largest Muslim population, 
and an ethnically and religiously diverse 
country (Timberman, 2013). Violent extremist 
acts since the 2002 Bali bombings have 
fuelled many incidents threatening religious 
tolerance and pluralism within the country and 
security dynamics across the region. Two well-
known jihadist movements have drawn youth 
into acts of terrorism since the independence 
of the country from Dutch colonial rule. The 
words Darul Islam (DI) are used chiefly to 
describe the post-1945 organization that 
tried to realize the ideal of a Negara Islam 
Indonesia (an Islamic State of Indonesia). 
The roots of the DI, however, lay in 1942 
12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QL7ITEv4kiE 
with the Islamic mystic Sukarmadji Meridian 
Kartosuwirjo. The DI was wiped out under a 
fierce military campaign by the government 
that ended in the 1960s. Since then, Islamic 
radical and militant movements such as 
Komando Jihad, Warman Reign of Terror, 
Free Aceh Movement, Usroh, Ring Santa, and 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have committed acts of 
terrorism against foreigners and state targets 
(Counter Extremism Project, 2018).
Local and national political considerations 
influence the Indonesian government’s 
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism 
(P/CVE) efforts. At the local level, the advent 
of decentralization and elections made local 
politicians more susceptible to pressure from 
hard-line groups. They have become willing 
to appear more Islamic to pre-empt such 
groups, particularly in the run-up to elections. 
As a result, numerous local ordinances 
enforcing Islamic values have been adopted. 
Additionally, there is no consensus in the 
Indonesian Muslim community on what 
would constitute unacceptable speech or 
incitement to violence (Timberman, 2013). 
This was exemplified in the 2016 case of 
Jakarta’s Christian governor who was named 
a suspect in a case of alleged blasphemy.
In the past, Indonesia’s transition to a 
democratic, participatory political system 
has presented several challenges for the 
government. The government was careful in 
their response to insecurities caused by the 
scourge of violent extremism so as to avoid 
antagonizing Islamic interests. In the domestic 
realm, following the Bali bombing, Jakarta 
promulgated a Presidential Emergency 
Decree on the Prevention of Terrorism and 
implemented a new anti-terrorism law. 
Although the legislation does not empower 
the Indonesian central government to the 
same degree as Singapore’s Internal Security 
Act, it does enable security personnel to 
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detain suspected terrorists for 20 days. 
This period can be extended for another 
six months based on preliminary evidence 
reported by intelligence services. 
Prior to the introduction of the new anti-
terrorism legislation, Indonesia’s counter-
terrorism efforts were focused primarily on de-
radicalisation programmes, intelligence, and 
police operations (Febrica, 2010). Following 
these efforts, the strategy changed towards 
a more comprehensive approach in dealing 
with counter-terrorism and P/CVE, including 
both hard and soft measures. Within these 
programmes, emphasis has been placed 
on the empowerment of religious leaders, 
scholars and psychologists, to provide 
counter-narratives. 
Terrorism in Indonesia has revolved around 
contestations between secular forces and 
those who desire an Islamic caliphate. The 
latter have always drawn linkages to anti-
colonial struggles and evolved their own 
narratives and myths about Indonesia’s past. 
Since the main perpetrators of terrorism 
in Indonesia have been the Darul Islam 
(DI) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its 
affiliates, it is useful to pay attention to the 
myths perpetuated by these groups and their 
principal ideologues. 
The Darul Islam rebellions
On 12 October 2002, Muhammad Iqbal blew 
himself up along with hundreds of others 
at the Sari Night Club on the island of Bali. 
In his suicide note, he hardly referred to 
the terrorist group behind the bombings, 
Jemaah Islamiyah. Instead, he mentioned 
the contributions of Darul Islam, a group 
that predated independence and whose 
leader was captured and executed 40 
years before Iqbal’s mission. Iqbal wrote 
about the commitment of DI founder, Imam 
Kartosuwirjo, to the independence of the 
Islamic  State  of  Indonesia  and  called  upon 
all the other children of DI and its armed 
wing Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII) to fight for 
Islam. His reference to DI and TII underscores 
continuities between the pre-independence 
goal of creating an Islamic state of Indonesia 
and the current jihadist structure. Frequent 
references to DI rebellions among groups 
like the JI locate the current jihadi trend as 
part of the freedom struggle, largely against 
Western powers, to create an independent 
and Islamic Indonesia. Such groups believe 
that the early anti-colonial efforts such as 
the DI rebellions were derailed and quashed 
by the postcolonial secular republican state 
first under President Sukarno and later under 
Suharto. 
Principal characters
Kartosuwirjo was a nationalist who developed 
the concept of an Indonesian Islamic State 
known as Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). 
He was also involved in the Indonesian 
revolution during Dutch aggression after the 
Proclamation of Indonesian Independence, to 
defend the existence of Indonesia as a state 
(Penders, 2002). Kartosuwirjo proclaimed a 
jihad against the Dutch and the republicans 
“until the Islamic Revolution is ended and the 
Islamic State exists completely in the whole of 
Indonesia”. However, after the independence 
revolution, Kartosuwirjo, through his 
movement DI, continued his revolution 
against the Sukarno government. Eventually 
in 1956, the Indonesian government decided 
to launch a large-scale offensive against DI. 
The capture and execution of Kartosuwirjo in 
June 1962 further weakened the movement 
(Soebardi, 1983).
The story of Kartosuwirjo’s two swords named 
Ki Dongkol and Ki Rompang highlights 
a peculiarity in his beliefs underscoring 
the difference between his own ideas and 
those of modernist Islamists. Kartosuwirjo 
perpetuated the myth that, when wielded in 





















































and victory in battle. He also claimed that 
he was a Ratu Adil (Just King) and also the 
Great Imam, and his followers believed that 
he could vanish with the speed of light, could 
put potent curses on defectors, and that he 
was immortal (Kumar, 2009). 
Kartosuwirjo’s conviction that he was an 
international Muslim leader, equal to a 
prophet, went against fundamental beliefs of 
Islam. During that volatile period, however, 
they were unquestioned. Sidney Jones, 
the most authoritative voice on terrorism 
and radicalization in Indonesia, argues that 
Kartosuwirjo “remains the primary political 
inspiration for [JI leader] Abu Bakar Bashir, 
his associates and thousands of others.” 
Plot lines
Kartosuwirjo and his DI followers had earlier 
worked with the republicans against the 
Dutch colonialists but when they realized 
that their aspirations for an Islamic state of 
Indonesia were thwarted under the Sukarno 
regime, they directed military campaigns 
against government forces. By 1962 the DI 
rebellion was crushed and Kartosuwirjo was 
captured and executed. DI then splintered 
into several factions and went underground. 
While DI failed to attain its political goal of 
an Indonesian Islamic State, it nevertheless 
“inspired subsequent generations of radical 
Muslims with its commitment to a shari’a-
based state and its heavy sacrifices in the 
cause of jihad” (Fealy, 2004). DI continues to 
provide ideological sustenance to militant 
Islam in Indonesia, and the idea of an 
Islamic state continues to resonate with new 
generations, as was evident in Iqbal’s suicide 
note (Jones, 2010). Kartosuwirjo’s justification 
for jihad against a kafir or infidel state (first the 
Dutch, then a secular republic), as embodied 
13 Pancasila is an Indonesian political philosophy that has five principles, and was first formulated by Sukarno. It is now 
state ideology. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pancasila; Ramage D. E (1995) Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam 
and the Ideology of Tolerance Routledge: London.
in the JI rebellion, continues to feed the myth 
about the enemy that does the bidding of the 
outsider and is inimical to Islam and Muslims. 
Functions
First, through this myth terrorist groups 
restore the postcolonial continuities of 
violence and terrorism. The secular state 
in Indonesia is understood using the same 
metaphors and references as for the former 
Dutch colonialists. Second, the DI myth 
challenges the Indonesian state ideology 
of Pancasila13  or “Five Principles”, and 
provides an alternative value system to 
form and govern the state. It is therefore not 
only resistance against the state but a vision 
of an alternative order. This is an important 
reminder that violence against the state is 
not just destructive but also seeks to create, 
and, therefore, their masculinities are not 
only protest masculinities. Third, the myth 
instructs listeners about the events of the 
rebellion or about heroes in order to inspire, 
and it gives wider lessons in morality, divinity 
and politics; in the words of Clifford Geertz, 
they “synthesize a people’s ethos” (Geertz, 
1973). 
Gender dynamics
The DI myths have sustained the notion 
of powerful Islamic masculinity in contest 
with a weak, colonial and later, secular 
independent state. Warrior masculinities 
are also constructed by “tensions between, 
and synthesis of, anti-colonial notions 
of organised violence that are rooted in 
Indonesian history and globalized jihadi 
discourse on war” (Duriesmith, 2018). The DI, 
JI and other jihadist groups in Indonesia have 
been hierarchical organizations where women 
have been relegated to the private sphere. 
This is necessary because nationalism and 
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postcolonialism did not bring a patriarchal 
dividend to all men; non-Javanese and 
working-class men are infantilized in state 
discourses (Nilan, 2009). To compensate for 
this, we see women’s domesticity justified 
as reflecting biological density (kodrat), 
enshrined in regional law, but from extremist 
perspectives also sanctioned by God (rather 
than the kingly or presidential authority). 
Second, we see the myth mirroring the 
policies of Suharto, informally known as 
the Father-King, in this case from the Just 
King and the Great Imam. Geertz and other 
anthropologists note how the strong father-
figure is dominant in Indonesian culture 
(Geertz, 1976). The concept of bapakism, 
or ”father knows best”, frames these 
relationships between men in Indonesia, and 
in both cases the leaders are immortalized 
and their powers over time have increased in 
the eyes of supporters.
Bali bombing
In October 2002, 202 people were killed 
and another 209 injured in explosions in the 
tourist centre of Bali during a coordinated 
attack on two sites, Paddy’s Irish Pub and the 
Sari Club. A third smaller device detonated 
outside the United States consulate in 
Denpasar, causing only minor damage. An 
audio cassette carrying a recorded voice 
message purportedly from Osama bin Laden 
stated that the Bali bombings were in direct 
retaliation for support of the United States’ 
War on Terror and Australia’s role in the 
liberation of East Timor. Following this attack, 
subsequent bombings were attributed to JI 
in 2003 at the Marriott Hotel, the Australian 
Embassy in 2004, a beach resort in Bali in 
2005, and others in 2009, 2010, 2014, 2015, 
2016, and 2018.
Principal characters
Feri, known as Isa, and Arnasan, known as 
Iqbal, both died in the bombings. Imam 
Samudra, Ali Imron, Amrozi Nurhasyim and 
Huda bin Abdul Haq are the three additional 
bombers executed for their involvement. In 
Amrozi’s home, authorities found speeches 
by Osama bin Laden, and Abu Bakar Bashir, 
as well as  training  manuals  for  carrying out 
jihad. Bashir praised the bombers as heroes 
after their executions: “Their fighting spirit in 
defending Islam should be followed. We will 
win the fight in this world or die as martyrs. 
Even if they are murdered, they will die as 
Islamic martyrs.” 
Abu Bakar Bashir is the ideological founder 
of Jemaah Islamiyah and is serving a prison 
sentence for his role in the bombings. Recent 
efforts to release him from prison by President 
Widodo have not yielded any results, as the 
80-year-old Bashir is unrepentant. He has 
perpetuated the myth that there is no terrorist 
group called Jemaah Islamiyah and that the 
Bali bombings were a Jewish-CIA conspiracy. 
He has also claimed that the 9/11 attacks 
were orchestrated by the United States 
and Israel as a pretext to attack Muslims in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. “In Bali, where 200 
people died, it was America’s bomb. That 
was a major attack and Amrozi doesn’t have 
the capability to do that” (Altran, 2005). He 
has repeatedly stated that Indonesia must 
adhere to sharia law under an Islamic state. 
“We demand an Islamic state, and not some 
form of Islamization of society. We want the 
state to be Islamic, with Islamic leaders who 
have the courage and will to implement the 
sharia in total. There is no other way” (Noor, 
2006). He has persistently called for “hatred” 
against America as a religious duty. He talks 
of three ways of attacking: “with your hand, 





















































Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, 
was believed to have ordered a new strategy 
of hitting soft targets such as nightclubs 
and bars rather than high-profile sites like 
foreign embassies. He remains detained in 
Guantanamo Bay but is not linked directly to 
the bombings. Imam Samudra determined 
that Bali should be the target. After several 
years  in   judicial   custody   and   court  trials, 
Imam was executed in 2008 along with two 
others. He captured the myth of foreign 
conspiracies against the Islamic world, in 
his trial statements, confessions and in his 
2004 book, Aku Melawan Teroris, or “I fight 
terrorism”. He argued that Muslims around 
the world are oppressed by “America 
and its allies,” who are “cruel and sadistic 
monsters.” He wanted to debunk the myth 
that JI was involved in terrorism because its 
members were poor, illiterate and misguided 
by Islamists. He wanted his readers and 
most Indonesian Muslims to believe that JI 
was engaged in the righteous path of jihad 
towards the creation of an Islamic state in 
Indonesia. His autobiography offered a 
justification of jihad that eventually became 
a popular best-seller, inspiring younger men.
Plot lines
The myth sets up ordinary village boys 
winning against powerful global or Western 
forces. Against such power attacking Islam 
and Indonesia, the myth suggested there was 
a religious duty to carry out the bombing. 
Two died in the attack, but even in the myth 
it is not clear if this was a deliberate act of 
suicide or if the bombs went off prematurely. 
As a result, the two are more easily seen as 
martyrs if they did not deliberately seek their 
own death. Initially, the three surviving men 
who were prosecuted for their roles refused to 
seek a pardon; as their execution dates came 
14 A Manichean worldview is one where the world is divided into two – good and evil with no ambiguity. 
closer, however, all three sought to overturn 
and appeal their convictions. They were 
unsuccessful and, in the eyes of JI supporters, 
became martyrs in 2009. The attack was 
originally planned for 11 September 2002, 
to mark the first anniversary of the attacks in 
the United States. This rationale is connected 
to a global Islamic Manichean worldview14, 
seeking a dramatic awe-inspiring action. The 
bombers seem less enthused by desires for 
an Islamic State, as others in JI have wanted, 
but were very much focused on hatred of the 
United States and Christians. 
Conspiracy theories quickly emerged in 
Indonesia. According to these, either the CIA 
or Israeli Secret Service carried out the attack 
to demonize Islam, or the Indonesian military 
instigated it to reassert its power, which had 
been waning since the fall of Suharto. Finally, 
many doubted that Al-Qaida or JI had the 
skills or capacity to carry out an attack of this 
nature. Alongside Bashir’s denials, this was 
a view originally held by many in Indonesian 
politics and in the military. Indonesia’s former 
president Abdurrahman Wahid argued in 2002 
that when it comes to the various bombing 
cases and arrests of suspected terrorists at 
that point, “none of the news that terrorists 
are here is convincing to me.” Lieutenant–
General Zaini Maulani, former Head of 
Indonesia’s National Intelligence Agency, 
argued in 2003 that the United States was 
using the threat of Islamic extremism and its 
war on terrorism to gain control of Indonesia 
(Singh, 2004). The situation underscores 
that the myth reflects conspiracies on both 




The Bali bombing myth is one of world-
creation and affirmation and it was based on 
and affirms a world divided in two: a world of 
war, and a world of Islam or peace. The Bali 
myths confirm a global conspiracy against 
Islam, enabling Indonesian jihadis to feel 
affinity with suffering Muslims in other conflict 
theatres such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
Istimata (or Absolute Struggle) webpage 
declared: “Let it be acknowledged that 
every single drop of Muslim blood, be it 
from any nationality and from any place will 
be remembered and accounted for… To 
all you Christian unbelievers … [t]he cries 
of the babies and Muslim women...has [sic] 
never succeeded in stopping your brutality. 
Well, here we are the Muslim men! We will 
harness the pain of the death of our brothers 
and sisters. You will bear the consequences 
of your actions wherever you are.”15 Local 
angst and concerns about a secular state that 
destroys Islam in Indonesia are merged with 
the global jihadist ideology of Al-Qaida and 
IS. This creates a moral geography where 
there is a strict segregation of foreign and 
indigenous elements. Pancasila is foreign, 
sharia is indigenous and aspirational; 
secularism is Western, Islamic is Indonesian; 
the United States and Israel are conspirators 
destroying peace in the Islamic world and 
killing Muslims. Most attacks subsequently 
follow the Bali model: targeting foreign (non-
Islamic) and Western elements. The myth of 
the simple binary division of power and of 
people confirms who or what is a legitimate 
target and who is not in the JI world. 
However, the Bali bombing caused divisions 
and split JI away from Al-Qaida. While many 
in JI believe that jihad and violence against 
civilians and non-Muslims are necessary in 
15 Istimata webpage www.istimata.com (now shut down) and Kompas, 5 December 2002.
16 Ali Imron cited in Associated Press, 17 January 2003; Jakarta Post, 17 January 2003.
areas where Muslims are under direct threat, 
and so supported other JI attacks in Ambon 
and Poso, the attack in Bali did not fit this 
model (Jones, 2005). 
Gender dynamics
First, the Bali myth reveals the desire to 
reclaim the perceived perfect masculine self 
through the perfection of Islam. This perfect 
selfhood is constructed through notions of 
hegemonic masculinity that draw on warrior 
myths, weapon-wielding jihadis and total 
annihilation of the enemy for greater good. 
Second, by targeting nightclubs and 
tourism, the bombers demonstrated that 
they can act decisively against promiscuity 
and sinfulness, thereby reinforcing the link 
between individual morality, state morality 
and the need for jihad and reform. This moral 
targeting is strategic and gendered (Mustafa 
and Tillotson, 2013). 
Third, the Bali bombing myths reinforce 
patriarchal (bapakism) relationships within 
radical Islam in South-East Asia because of 
the hierarchal organizing, and the schooling 
and training the bombers had under key 
leaders of JI, creating good sons who are 
obedient and uphold their religious duty: 
“the bomb ... was truly the great work of 
Indonesia’s sons”.16 But it also empowered 
them against hegemonic others. Both Amrozi 
and Ali Imron boasted about how they, as 
poor village boys, were able to strike such 























































Table 1: Summary of four gendered violent extremist myths
Context Key characters Plot lines Functions
Jabidah 
Massacre
Bangsamoros in Mindanao 
struggle with Christian-dominated 
rule; desire for self-governance 
and frustration with discrimination
• Jibin Arula
• Nur Misuari
• President Marcos 












5-month armed conflict between 
state and ISIS-affiliated groups. 
1,000 dead and 4,000 displaced. 
Led to martial law. 
• Isnilon Hapilon
• Abdullah and 
Omarkhayam Maute












Militia engaged in armed conflict 
against government to set up an 
Islamic State of Indonesia post 
Dutch colonial rule. Darul Islam 
(DI) were established in 1942, 
but did not disband following 
independence. Founder was 
executed in 1962.
• Imam Kartosuwiryo Two swords 








JI shift strategy to ‘soft targets’ to 
help establish “Daula Islamiyah 
Nusantara” (pan-Islamic state 
across Indonesia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Singapore, Brunei). 202 
killed; 209 injured
• Imam Samudra
• Abu Bakar Ba’asyir












Characters: gender and 
extremism
Across all these myths, women are largely 
written out of the telling, even when they are 
central to it. Where they are included, their 
agency is rendered suspect (as treacherous with 
their beauty) or relational; as mothers, wives 
and sisters of the important men in the myths. 
Masculinity across the myths is presented as 
heroic when it is a) self-sacrificing and lacking 
in self-interest and b) connects to a steadfast 
and stoic manliness. Even in the face of defeat, 
the heroes of these myths do not surrender, 
and their goodness is unambiguous. They are 
also seen as ordinary men called to greatness 
by circumstance. Those who became martyrs 
attain a form of immortality through the myths, 
and all these heroes become greater or better 
men and Muslims, not only in their death but 
in the retelling. They are provoked through the 
unjust, cruel or un-Islamic behaviour of others 
and their actions are always defensive, even 
the Bali attacks. This presents their masculinity 
and violence as measured, reasonable, and 
justified, in contrast to  oppositional narratives 
that present them as barbaric, unjust, and 
irrational. Another key feature of masculinity 
in the myths is the importance of a father-like 
figure who shapes, supports, and motivates the 
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protagonists’ actions. There is an element of 
paternalism within the myths that mimics the 
social and political norms of Indonesia and 
the Philippines. 
Plot lines: gender quests and 
significance
The quests of myths do not fit neatly into the 
standard narrative structures. This is in part 
because the myths discussed here result in 
the martyrdom of the heroes rather than their 
return home as we find in classical Western 
myths. As a result, the ability to return home 
is rewritten as a return to God or paradise. 
Nevertheless, the myths provide quests and 
give significance to future violent acts by 
connecting them to past founding events, or 
as continuing to fight the same Devil. 
The plot lines show a great struggle against 
evil, and even if they lose a given battle, it 
contributes to the victory of good in the war. 
By presenting their actions as part of a grand 
historical struggle, it dehumanizes opponents, 
who are seen as dogs, shaytan (devils), or 
unbelievers. Consequently, the myths both 
grant and deny power to enemies: On one 
hand, they become worthy opponents who 
require great skill and courage to overpower, 
while on the other, the enemy can only be 
killed. 
The other important point from these myths 
is the importance of religion, and the divine 
as an active force in the world. They show how 
God, the divine and religion are not abstract 
concepts, despite often framing the myths 
as defensive oppositional political justice. 
Instead, the divine, by giving his faithful 
exceptional powers, strength, and aids (such 
as swords) to succeed, clearly shows groups 
which side he is on.
17 Moral geography is a term to denote the relationship between morality and space or place. The focus on moral 
landscapes aims to determine the association of particular landscapes with schemes of moral value. See  Matless (1997), 




The myths make sense within their local 
contexts; as Duriesmith’s paper also 
highlights, they connect to existing narratives 
of the state and anti-colonial or anti-Western 
framings. The forms of masculinity, while 
generalizable, are also connected to local 
cultural norms and ideas. In Indonesia and 
the Philippines, the connection to revenge is 
less evident in the narratives (except for the 
Bali bombings); rather, the myths connect to 
an idea of challenging deceit and betrayal 
(these appear like revenge but the framing is 
different, as it requires ongoing, not merely 
historic, deceit and betrayal). The myths 
therefore justify and give meaning not only 
to certain actions and events in the narration 
but also to a broader moral geography.17 
Conclusion and policy 
implications
These myths give us great insight into how 
extremist organizations construct their 
worldviews and sustain themselves in the 
face of challenges. The important elements 
are that the myths are enduring and resist 
alteration, even in the face of facts that 
contradict their telling. Myths work to build 
a coherent picture, linking organizations with 
the past, the divine, and with place. Myths, 
through their historicity and moral geography, 
provide origins, explanations, and justification 
for ongoing action by individuals and groups. 
This means that academic or policy theories 
(such as radicalization theories) that have 
the individual, not the group, as the primary 





















































and connective nature of violent extremism.
Many efforts to prevent violent extremism 
focus on providing socio-economic alleviation 
for populations seen to be at risk of violent 
extremism, and as a mechanism for addressing 
discrimination and marginalization. However, 
the centrality of world change and the notion 
of a quest both for and of significance to 
the myths of violent extremist groups shows 
that addressing material conditions is not 
enough. Certainly, PVE programming must 
tie these activities to an alternative sense of 
purpose and different worldview framing. 
Myths are gendered, promoting particular 
ideas about masculinity that create a gender 
hierarchy by granting authority, power to 
those that exhibit valued masculine traits, 
and legitimating their use of violence. They 
reveal that explanations for extremist violence 
that are rooted in toxic masculinity18 are less 
convincing when we look at the myths of these 
groups because in these myths, their men are 
heroes who are empowered through their 
actions against overwhelming odds, and act 
rationally and in measured ways. The myths 
highlight other male characters, including 
paternal or scholarly figures, which show 
how in these myths extremist masculinity is 
not rooted in uncontrolled hot-headedness 
or youth violence (traits associated with toxic 
masculinity) but is presented as a guided 
and considered action. This challenges ideas 
that violent extremism is a product of angry 
young men lacking outlets and acting alone. 
Despite these characteristics, myths can be 
challenged and programming can address 
the underlying values, plots and gender 
identities that they support. Moreover, 
programmers can learn from the myths 
that violent extremist groups advocate, as 
18 Toxic masculinity is a term to denote masculine norms that can be harmful to men. It links aggression, irrationality, 
misogyny and negative health outcomes for men to certain male behaviours, it posits the opposite, a healthy masculinity, 
as the cure. For an alternative argument see Haider (2016). For a related discussion see Duriesmith (2018). 
they reveal underlying structural conditions 
conducive to violent extremism in a particular 





Recommendation 1: appeal to 
different types of masculinity  
Violent extremist myths appeal to a range of 
male behaviours and attributes. This requires 
programmes shift their focus past those 
character types actively participating in the 
turning point event of the myth. Programmers 
need to consider activities that engage the 
whole supporting cast of men who appear 
in these myths, such as the supporters and 
guides for the hero(s).
Recommendation 2: focus on 
the teachable moment 
Myths, as narratives, reveal the underlying values 
and ideas of violent extremist groups and link 
events in causal chains of explanations. Therefore, 
rather than focusing on one element of a myth, 
the facts of an event, or the failings of a hero, 
alternative narrative efforts should challenge the 
lessons learned by the heroes in the myth.  
Recommendation 3: address 
the group as well as the 
individual 
Programmes and interventions need to address 
the recurring and connective nature of violent 
extremism. Interventions need to disrupt the 
autobiographical histories of violent extremist 
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groups and the claims to causality within them 
by addressing underlying conditions. This means 
the logic of the group’s existence and violence, 
as opposed to the motivation or behaviour of an 
individual, need to be analysed and addressed.
Recommendation 4: construct 
meaning in programming 
Plot lines show how important quests are for myths. 
Empowerment for men in violent extremist myths is 
often paradoxically rooted in narrating agency and 
autonomy through their submission and sacrifice to 
the quest. Therefore, programmes need to facilitate 
opportunities for pursing pro-social activities and 
discovering alternative ways to fulfil their sense of 
purpose and find empowerment.
Recommendation 5: disrupt  
the connections between 
violent extremist beliefs, 
belonging and behaviours 
Myths, to exist, do not rely on whether they are true 
or not, but on whether they are made real through 
the lived realities of believers. The beliefs of violent 
extremist groups, as brought out in their myths, 
connect to their modes of belonging and behaviours. 
Disrupting this trio of extremist beliefs, behaviours, 
and belonging is more important in PVE than 
attempting to disprove and undermine one of the 
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South Asia, and Bangladesh in particular, 
receives little attention in research on the 
prevalence of violent extremism, its underlying 
gendered impacts in the country and, most 
importantly, the crucial connections between 
gender, identity, and violence. The interest 
of researchers, however, has begun to shift 
in response to recent deadly attacks in the 
country. On the night of July 1, 2016, five pro-
Islamic State (IS) militants led an hours-long 
attack on the Holey Artisan Café in an upscale 
Dhaka neighbourhood. The incident left 29 
people dead and catapulted Bangladesh into 
the international spotlight.  Since the attack, 
research has explored the factors leading to 
radicalization in Bangladesh, the changing 
dynamics of violent extremism, and the 
response from the Bangladeshi government 
(Khan, 2016; Riaz and Parvez, 2018). Even 
more important is work highlighting women’s 
roles in countering violent extremism (CVE) 
in the country. Several prominent reports 
on CVE, particularly in the context of 
Bangladesh, provide insight into this growing 
topic of concern, including some that build 
on the premise that “women can be powerful 
partners in fighting violent extremism” (True, 
2018). 
A further study by Monash University’s 
Centre for Gender, Peace and Security (2017) 
finds that women occupy the role of “first 
responders” to potential radicalization within 
their communities, thus pointing to the need 
to promote gender equality and women’s 
empowerment. In a similar vein, Iftekharul 
Bashar (2017) argues that severe challenges 
in effectively countering violent extremism 
in the country remain, due to Bangladesh’s 
weak CVE programming; thus, a long-term 
strategy is required.
While understanding women’s roles and 
engagement in Bangladesh is certainly 
an important first step to countering and 
preventing violent extremism, further 
research can explore the perpetuation of 
violence at the macro level and how it initially 
takes root at the micro level; namely, the home 
and community. In important ways, violence 
against women and violent extremism are 
intrinsically linked. Thus, analysing the 
prevalence of violence and gender inequality 
at family, community, and everyday levels 
helps us understand the role of gender 
relations, and the construction of masculinity 
and femininity in violent extremism.
Gender inequality and violence against 
women is certainly not a new phenomenon in 
Bangladesh. Indeed, fatwa-related violence 
in rural areas is a serious concern, at times 
distorting Islam to resemble the extremism 
of IS and Al-Qaida. Typically, it is women 
who are placed at the forefront of the fatwa 
crisis. In the Libyan case of violent extremism, 
Sussan Tahmasebi (2017, p. 1) argues that 
“the targeting of women’s rights and the 
perpetuation of violence against women 
are strategies used by violent extremists to 
gain legitimacy within their communities.” 
In this example, violent extremists targeted 
women based on traditional beliefs and 
misinterpretations of religious texts.
Similarly, in Bangladesh fatwa-instigated 
violence remains prevalent in rural areas 
despite a government ban against it. In the 
countryside, the practice persists through 
mullahs (local religious leaders), imams 
(mosque prayer leaders) and d’objectifs 
(village political elites). These leaders can 
promote a patriarchal and authoritative 
stance on human rights coupled with an 
ideology of toxic masculinity that underpins 
a male-dominant status quo in society 
(Rahman, 2017). For instance, matabbors 
may use widespread social norms in rural 
Bangladesh, and the position of women 
in society, to propagate their ideology. 
The effect is to threaten female agency. As 
recently as December 2017, a mullah in a local 
mosque in Kushtia district banned women 
from leaving their homes to farm in the fields, 
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claiming that such an action contradicted 
religious tenets (Daily Sun, 2017). 
Previous research conducted in Sylhet and 
Comilla in rural Bangladesh found that 
women who engaged with women-centred 
programming run by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), such as the Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), 
experienced severe consequences within the 
household, further deepening the gender 
divide (Rahman, 2017). While on the one hand, 
women-centred NGO programmes provided 
independence and opportunities for women, 
their mobility outside the home became a 
point of concern for male family members 
(such as husbands and fathers) and local 
matabbors as the men felt they were losing 
their control over women (Rahman, 2017). 
Consequently, the breakdown of traditional 
gender identities, unequal power relations 
within the family, and gender inequality 
in rural contexts spiralled into increased 
violence against women. The situation led to a 
greater awareness of how gender relations at 
the familial and community levels perpetuate 
violent extremism in its various forms. 
Extensive research on the links between local 
and domestic violence and violent extremism 
is more readily available in the Western 
context than in Bangladesh, where systematic 
research exploring this relationship is scarce. 
There is also a need to examine how gender 
identities constructed in day-to-day lives 
are manipulated for recruitment purposes. 
Thus, through qualitative research, this 
paper explores the conditions under which 
violent extremist views are perpetuated 
in Bangladesh through stereotyped and 
traditional constructions of masculinity and 
femininity. The paper focuses on everyday 
gender inequality, violence against women, 
and violence-supportive attitudes at the 
family and community level. Furthermore, the 
study explores how these roots can extend 
to the use of collective violence, including 
violent extremism. 
The research is driven by the following 
questions:
1. What are the linkages between gender 
inequality or rigid, restrictive gender 
norms and violent extremism in rural 
Bangladesh?
2. In what ways is violence against women 
used as a strategy to support ideologies 
that promote violent extremism?
3. How do notions of masculinity and 
femininity impact gender inequality at 
the rural level?
4. How do these notions reconfigure 
mindsets, making them more vulnerable 
to certain extreme ideologies?
The research paper clarifies how structural 
inequality with respect to gender norms 
at the rural community level in Bangladesh 
helps construct gender identities and how 
groups advocating violent extremism can 
manipulate this inequality.  
Rural communities operate within strong 
and long-established power hierarchies that 
place men in a privileged position in society. 
This hierarchy is maintained through the 
promotion of strict and clearly defined gender 
roles, categories, and expectations for men 
and women. Religious leaders also play a role 
in maintaining hierarchies, as norms regarding 
religion and gender can be transmitted to 
children through madrasa education and 
mosques. Transgressors of these norms, such 
as women seeking work outside the home, 
are viewed negatively by the community 
and this helps maintain the existing power 
hierarchy. Norms regarding “appropriate 
behaviour” may then be manipulated by 
extremist groups. It is the relational quality 
and power dynamics between and among 
men and women in rural communities, and 
norms about manhood and womanhood, 






















































Certain extremist groups in Bangladesh 
sometimes recruit rural members to their 
rank and file by presenting the group’s own 
ideologies as compatible with community 
norms. When young men attend madrasas 
(religious schools), or move from rural villages 
to urban areas for university study, they 
encounter various ideologies. They also meet 
criticism of their rural community practices as 
regressive. Extremist groups manipulate the 
insecurity the rural youth may then feel and 
provide an apparently safe space where those 
individuals can seek validation of their rural 
practices. Furthermore, the resentment that 
arises from such vulnerability helps extremist 
groups advocate even more hard-line and 
violent practices, as a means of rejecting those 
ideologies viewed as “Western” or “liberal”. 
Thus, this paper helps elucidate how gender 
inequality and gender norms contribute to 
further violent extremism on a community 
and structural level in Bangladesh and how 
these gender rigidities may lead a person to 
violent extremism on an individual level.
A note is warranted on some of the 
terminology employed here. The focus on 
toxic masculinity throughout this paper 
is not meant to essentialize a diverse set 
of practices into a monolithic term (see 
Duriesmith in this volume for detailed 
discussion of the concept). Use of the term 
is sometimes criticized for collapsing the 
variety of masculinities that arise in different 
societies and treating them as a single 
concept that may be present or absent at 
varied levels. In this paper, the notion of 
toxic masculinity, which signifies masculine 
gender roles associated with aggression 
and possibly violence, is broken into its 
constituent components with the specific 
goal of understanding how it emerges from 
a combination of various conditions. This 
paper offers a granular understanding of the 
term through my interviews.
The first section delves into the concepts 
used to frame this research, detailing key 
background and contextual literature. 
Secondly, the paper highlights the analytical 
and research methods employed. Thirdly, 
I discuss the main qualitative findings that 
emerged from my interviews and other 
primary data before finally providing 
several key recommendations for policy and 




Constructions of gender 
identities in Bangladesh
Gender serves as an entry point for 
understanding the way constructions of 
masculinity and femininity in Bangladeshi 
society play an important role in 
understanding the intersections across 
gender inequality, violence against women, 
and violent extremism. By examining 
gendered identities – particularly masculinity 
– and how they are constructed in everyday 
life, we gain insight into how recruiters 
manipulate these constructions and influence 
the choice of men and women to become 
engaged in violent groups. 
Gender is a social construction: Men and 
women perform behaviours and practices 
strongly linked to the social order and culture 
of a society (Kandiyoti, 1988; Lorber, 1994; 
Butler, 1998; Ferree et al., 1999). Butler (1998) 
argues that gender identities are not based on 
inherent biological or natural characteristics, 
but rather are the “effects of signifying 
practices rooted in regimes of power-
knowledge characterized as compulsory 
heterosexuality and phallocentrism” that 
places male dominance at the core of 
gender construction (Jagger, 2008). Gender 
norms and behaviours are thus constructed 
57
by deeply entrenched power hierarchies 
and restricted by regulatory frameworks 
(Butler, 1998). This construction plays a role 
in the way gender relations are understood 
in society, as gender is a way by which 
societies and cultures construct ideas and 
knowledge about men and women through 
placing each in the context of differentiated 
gender relations. These constructions explain 
unequal power relations between the sexes 
and it is through this study of gender relations 
that feminist scholars have theorized gender 
relations as ones of domination, and that 
take place within hierarchies of power and 
privilege (Kandiyoti, 1988; Flax, 1990; Ferree 
and others, 1999).
What is central, then, to studying gender 
is the importance of understanding and 
analysing societal and cultural constructions 
of the notions of men and women, masculinity 
and femininity, and more broadly, how these 
notions structure human societies (Flax, 
1990). Thus, individuals are held accountable 
for their behaviour by societal and cultural 
expectations of what is appropriate for men 
and women, which in Bangladeshi society is 
guided by strict notions of masculinity and 
femininity, and expected roles for men and 
women. These gender theories serve as the 
backdrop for our qualitative analysis and 
provide the framework for understanding 
the way gender identities and roles have 
meaning within Bangladeshi culture.
Brief note on fatwa rulings  
in rural Bangladesh
It is important to note that fatwas play a 
significant role in the way gender inequality 
plays out in rural Bangladesh. Fatwa violence 
is a form of extreme violence particularly set 
against women. The way fatwas are decreed 
in Bangladesh misunderstands Islamic 
jurisprudence. According to a World Bank 
report, “Fatwa, essentially being a decision 
or decree on a complex jurisprudential 
issue touching upon human reality, cannot 
be violating or degrading” (World Bank, 
2008). Yet some fatwa rulings issued by 
village mullahs and matabbors in rural 
Bangladesh directly contradict the intention 
of the decrees. Sometimes local leaders and 
elites use their authority to enforce personal 
or political ideologies as they charge 
women with adultery (zina), or for engaging 
in development activities, premarital 
relationships, and other activities that may 
go against local norms or customs (Hodge, 
2014). This misinterpretation is due primarily 
to the lack of formal education of the fatwa-
givers in rural Bangladesh who have only 
attended madrasas and thus issue fatwas 
without being formally trained as muftis, or 
Islamic jurists. While the state has expressed 
anxiety over the increase in rural fatwas, it has 
also failed to maintain control and regulation 
over the education system and curricula of 
madrasas (Hodge, 2014; Rahman, 2017).
Although fatwa punishments are illegal 
under Bangladeshi law, the persistence of 
these verdicts in rural communities suggests 
a distortion of Islamic legal jurisprudence 
and an erosion of the basic human rights 
of women in the country (Riaz, 2004). This 
distortion is due to a complex web of cultural 
and societal forces and pervasive patriarchal 
ideologies with local matabbors and mullahs 
using the social norms of rural Bangladesh 
and the lower position of women in society 
to further propagate their ideology (Rahman, 
2017).
Research design  
and data analysis
The research involved 55 qualitative first-
hand interviews in three rural sites: Cox’s 
Bazar and Comilla in southern Bangladesh, 
and Rajshahi in the north. The findings help 
draw a picture of how extremist groups use 





















































their advantage. Through prior networks 
developed in earlier research, I gained 
access to these communities and worked 
with gatekeepers who ensured that my 
questions were appropriate and sensitive. 
Rural community members I interviewed 
were recruited by me initially with the help 
of my gatekeepers although over time this 
interaction led to further interviews with 
other diverse community members. 
I interviewed 12 men and 12 women in Cox’s 
Bazar and in Comilla. For this first group 
of men and women, the men were either 
identified as madrasa students or graduates, 
and imams or mullahs. The women were 
more varied; some participants were wives 
and mothers of madrasa graduates, or of 
men working in the community, while others 
were mothers of men studying at university 
in Rajshahi. The goal of these interviews 
was to gain insight into at least some of the 
communities’ prevailing norms and practices.
The second group of people I interviewed 
were university students in Rajshahi in 
northern Bangladesh. I chose Rajshahi 
because of the presence of extremist groups 
in the area. As well, three of the male university 
students studying in Rajshahi were also from 
the village in Cox’s Bazar, while one was from 
Comilla. I was introduced to these young 
university students by my gatekeepers; while 
no one was directly associated with terrorist 
groups, all were acquainted with members of 
such groups. Given the difficulty in locating 
such students, I was able to speak with only 
five male and two female students. From 
these interviews I began to understand how 
terrorist groups instrumentalize widespread 
norms and practices in rural communities – 
many of which are repressive towards women 
– to recruit members to their ranks.
All interviews, both individual interviews 
and focus group discussions, lasted 
approximately 40 to 50 minutes.  I recorded 
most comments and notes immediately after 
the interviews so as not to disrupt the flow of 
conversation. I used a recorder to tape the 
interviews and took notes at the same time; 
these were translated later from Bengali into 
English. With the aid of my gatekeepers, 
the transcripts were checked for accuracy 
upon translation. Due to the sensitive nature 
of the research, informed consent was 
obtained from all interlocutors. Questions 
revolved around toxic masculinity, gender 
inequalities, the use of fatwas, women’s 
rights, dissatisfaction resulting from the 
transformation of gender relations, violence 
against women, and attitudes towards violent 
extremism. The objective of the interviews 
was to hear first-hand the voices and 
perspectives of interlocuters and to discover 
common themes. Following transcription 
of the interviews, I began analysing each 
one using grounded theory approaches, 
assigning codes to content and ideas, and 
then creating themes and sub-themes.
Given the limited scope of the fieldwork, there 
are several limitations worth noting. Firstly, my 
research was not fixated on finding a direct 
causal relationship between practices in rural 
Bangladesh and the ideology of terrorist 
groups. Rather, I wanted to understand if, 
and how, extremist groups manipulate the 
ideologies held by individuals from rural 
areas who later have contact with such 
groups. In other words, the research sought 
to show what type of conditions, initially 
developed at the rural community level, 
could be manipulated by extremist groups. It 
is worthwhile noting here that I do not imply 
that all such rural community members were 
necessarily manipulated. 
Secondly, my research also focuses on the 
trajectory of ideologies of students from 
rural communities; it does not cover those 
students coming from educated and/or 
elite backgrounds who subsequently join 
extremist groups. 
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Thirdly, the study is limited in size to 55 
individuals. The goal is not to make any 
grand claims regarding the generalizability 
of the findings, but rather to use the words 
of a small set of individuals to provide a 
solid understanding of some of the existing 
trajectories to violent extremism.
Key findings
Toxic masculine ideologies 
spread through fatwas
The concept of  toxic masculinity relates 
to an understanding of masculinity that 
reflects attitudes of aggression and, if taken 
to the extreme, violence (Whitehead, 1999, 
2002; Connell, 2002, 2003; Kupers, 2005). 
The term “toxic” also serves to signify the 
notion of men’s dominance over women in 
social affairs, whether in the public or private 
realm. Elements of toxicity emerge from the 
social environment in which males are raised, 
socialized, and taught notions of what it 
means to be a man. These understandings 
are reinforced through interactions with male 
family members and male community leaders 
who may provide positive reinforcement of 
aggressive behaviour. Furthermore, exposure 
to treatment of women that restricts mobility, 
confines movement, and regulates their 
interactions in the public sphere also fosters 
the notion of men’s dominance over women 
in various areas of social life.
An emergent theme, revealed by interviewees, 
was a pervasive sense of toxic masculinity 
among boys and men. Importantly, a 
unique aspect of toxic masculinity in the 
community was its close ties to the issuance 
and implementation of fatwas by male 
community members. When a concern arises 
among community members, someone such 
as the community religious leader is asked to 
mediate the matter. While issues are raised 
by both men and women in the community, 
the latter case is less likely since male family 
members sometimes curtail women from 
raising issues that may affect their own image 
as men. In some cases, women require the 
tacit or direct permission of males to raise 
any issue in a public forum. 
Regardless of how matters reach the 
community level, those who deal with the 
matter are exclusively male. The community 
imam plays a crucial role in this regard, and 
authoritative rules often take the form of the 
issuance of a fatwa. To understand the role 
of fatwas, it is necessary to first appreciate 
the central role of the imam in daily life. The 
imam provides religious lessons in the boys’ 
madrasa to children aged five to sixteen. He 
provides lessons to girls from the age of five 
to nine, after which girls either go to an all-
girls institution or disappear from the public 
space. The centrality of the imam during the 
formative period of so many young people 
(of both sexes) reflects his position of respect 
within the community. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the tenets of 
Islam as providing the guiding principle in the 
lives of community members further bolsters 
the centrality of the imam since his primary job 
is to disseminate religious knowledge within 
the community. Even those male community 
members who do not attend the madrasa 
hold respect for the imam; they interact with 
him during visits to the mosque, chance 
encounters in the community, and vicariously 
through the discussions and conversations of 
his followers. Thus, the imam and the religious 
tenets he promotes play a decisive role in the 
socialization of community members and the 
dissemination of norms. 
Beyond day-to-day socialization, occasionally 
a community needs a decisive judgment on a 
matter. In such instances, the imam issues a 
verdict in the form of a fatwa.  This provides 
a definitive ruling on the matter based on 
the imam’s religious interpretation and its 
application in the specific context. The fatwa 





















































event, the fatwa underlines the centrality of 
the imam in driving the normative discourse, 
practices, and perceptions of the community, 
particularly when any unresolved matters 
require resolution. The fatwa, therefore, 
plays a constitutive role, not only for the 
substantive ruling it provides, but also in its 
reaffirmation of the existing power structures 
within the community. As a female university 
student in Rajshahi stated:
  You know, imams are the most highly-
respected person in the community. The 
matabbors use imams as a way to exercise 
their power. So, any matter that needs to 
be dealt with goes directly to the imam. 
Even if it’s against Islam, even if it has 
nothing to do with religion, if the imam 
says something everyone listens to him. 
This is how the elite men and matabbors 
always use the imam for their own political 
reasons, and this is usually done by giving 
a fatwa. 
Closer inspection of the use of fatwas reveals 
their entanglement with particular notions 
of masculinity – from which toxic masculinity 
sometimes emerges. The operation of fatwas 
in in Cox’s Bazar and Comilla reveals how 
they affirm the existing patriarchal structures 
that govern social life. The gatekeepers 
of rural communities, that is the imams, 
community leaders, followers, and heads of 
households (many of whom were previously 
madrasa students), are exclusively male. The 
discussions that take place among these 
gatekeepers exclude the voices of women. 
Moreover, many issues in the community are 
filtered by gatekeepers before ever reaching 
the imam. 
The comments of interviewees confirm 
how fatwas shape notions of masculinity 
and femininity and structure community 
patriarchy. In the name of upholding the 
existing patriarchy, notions of masculinity 
can sometimes turn toxic, as men become 
increasingly aggressive in their assertion of 
authority. Fatwas may then become more 
about maintaining those hierarchies than 
they are about providing religiously-informed 
decisions. The end result is that women suffer 
as their rights are neglected, including the 
right to voice opinions. Ill-informed fatwas 
can serve as a veneer for the underlying 
power interests they serve. One woman, 
unhappy about the use of fatwas in her 
Comilla community, observed the following:
  These fatwas are ruining everything. Only 
men are making all the rules and using 
religion falsely to say we cannot do this 
and that. We cannot work. We cannot go 
outside. Every decision is made by them. 
Everybody knows that these fatwas are 
not based on any real Islamic knowledge 
– men are just using their power willy-nilly 
to control us. It is these kinds of wrong 
ideologies that are leading men to do 
horrible things…Yes, fatwas have a role to 
play.  
When an issue eventually reaches the imam, 
his ruling provides direction on a matter while 
also affirming the existing patriarchy. The 
fatwa serves as the decisive ruling that helps 
to reaffirm categories of right and wrong 
that are aligned with existing patriarchies 
and aggression against women. Once 
internalized by male community members, 
these categories translate into behaviour 
that emerges as toxic masculinity. As a male 
university student in Rajshahi, also previously 
a madrasa student in Cox’s Bazar, asserted:
  You have to have control over your wife to 
be a real man. A real man uses violence and 
aggression against his wife to show that he 
is the boss of the house. This is why men 
are in charge of the shalish [community-
based dispute resolution] and decision-
making in the fatwa. I am telling you now, 
imams listen to everything we say. If we tell 
them to make a fatwa that women cannot 
do this thing, they’ll make the fatwa. And 
the imam will understand that such a fatwa 
is necessary. At the end of the day, in our 
society, if you don’t use force on your wife, 
what kind of man are you?
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While this remark was echoed by several 
interviewees, this student’s words were 
particularly striking as they reveal not only 
the way in which toxic masculinity lead to 
aggression against women, but also how 
the fatwa serves as a device to reinforce 
such behaviour. While such toxic masculinity 
reveals the chauvinism associated with the 
issuance of fatwas, some study participants 
also pointed out how such male behaviour 
could be linked to the parochial views held 
by more extreme terrorist groups. One male 
community member in Comilla, somewhat 
weary of the hyper-masculinity promoted by 
fatwas, stated:
  These imams say things like “women must 
not go outside, especially at night. They 
have to maintain purdah – if women go 
outside we will hurt them”. If they see 
women outside, they will ask them “what 
are you doing here?” It’s quite common 
knowledge that those who are against 
women have more tendency to join one of 
these terrorist groups.
This same community member went on to 
explain how terrorist groups build upon 
constructions of the world that are black 
and white. Such categorical thinking makes 
it even more possible for terrorist groups 
to superimpose notions of right and wrong, 
religious and irreligious, and Islamic and un-
Islamic onto a mindset already shaped by 
toxic masculinities. 
Fatwas also serve to sustain conditions at the 
community level that cause toxic masculinity 
to proliferate. While fatwas in themselves may 
not necessarily contain terrorist ideologies, 
violent extremist groups sometimes succeed 
in mobilizing toxic masculinity through their 
issuance and attract certain individuals to 
join their ranks. In this way, fatwas can help 
integrate extreme ideologies into existing 
notions of right and wrong.
As noted by an imam in Cox’s Bazar, 
fatwas  that direct violence towards women 
are not rooted in Islam and should not be 
seen as such; those who promote  such 
fatwas are thus going against what should be 
considered the proper behaviour of men and 
women. As the imam contended:
  Those imams who promote these ideas 
are not following the proper teachings of 
Islam. Our Prophet taught us to treat our 
wives with care, so those men who show 
aggression are directly going against our 
religion. Anybody who does this should 
not be followed. I make sure to teach this 
in my community.
The comments above underscore that while 
fatwas are sometimes used to legitimize 
violence, it is also true that diverse opinions 
exist among local community religious 
leaders on their usage. Some imams may be 
quite critical of the use of religious edicts to 
justify power hierarchies between men and 
women instead of promoting greater respect 
for women. This imam’s remarks indicate the 
variations that exist at the community level, 
thereby refuting the notion that processes 
such as the issuance of fatwas follow a 
homogenous script. The claim being made in 
this section is that while some imams issue 
such fatwas, others actively work to better 
educate men and it is these leaders who help 
counter the spread of extremist ideologies in 
rural communities.
Creating the “ideal man  
and woman”
While the previous section explored how 
fatwas have become tools through which the 
community perpetuates existing patriarchal 
hierarchies, it is also important to point out 
that the community holds ideal types of 
behaviour for men and women, respectively. 
These categories help define clear gender 
roles that sustain the day-to-day functioning 
of the rural community. In the regular course 
of socialization, males and females normally 
adopt these categories without even realizing 





















































The research indicated that the principle 
role of a man is to serve as the head of 
the household. Among rural community 
members, it is generally accepted that major 
decisions are taken by the male family head 
or by another person with his approval. The 
male head of the household may discuss a 
matter with his wife if he chooses to do so 
but it is not required. It is common for men, 
however, to discuss important matters with 
other men in the community, usually close 
family members and religious leaders. As one 
madrasa student in Cox’s Bazar stated:
  Men are the boss of the house. This is how 
it should be. When we have decisions to 
make, we consult each other – there is no 
need to consult the women.
Furthermore, it is principally the man’s role to 
take care of tasks in the public domain such 
as earning an income, attending public office 
if necessary, acquiring goods from markets 
outside of one’s immediate vicinity, and 
interacting with other community members. 
A woman, however, is expected to remain 
within the household and nearby areas. Her role 
is to maintain domestic affairs. She provides 
support to her husband by performing various 
domestic affairs, whether cooking, cleaning, 
making household purchases from nearby 
markets, and ensuring the general order of 
the house. While some view this position as 
subordinate to the men of the household, 
many of the women I interviewed view their 
position as complementary. Several women 
expressed contentment with their role in the 
household and shunned the idea of having to 
deal with the stress and hustle of working in 
the public domain. As one woman in Comilla 
commented:
  We are happy in the way things are here. 
We prefer staying at home – there is a lot of 
stress working outside and lots of difficulty. 
We’re not used to that. We believe a 
woman’s place is within the household – 
it has been like that for generations and 
that is how it should be. Why should we 
try to change this now? It has worked for 
our mothers and grandmothers. Men go 
outside to do the ‘outside’ work, and we 
do the ‘indoor’ work.
Importantly, maintaining this equilibrium 
within the household requires that women 
remain obedient to their husband. As 
suggested above, many women see this 
simply as the natural order of affairs. When 
asked whether they felt disempowered, 
some women pointed out that their primary 
task is to maintain the household and ensure 
that their children and other family members 
are all looked after, whether her husband’s 
parents or other relations in the household 
or nearby. Child rearing was viewed as an 
activity that only females are fully capable 
of performing. Thus, the willingness of these 
interviewees to adhere to the direction of 
their husbands was connected to the agency 
they gained by playing the central role in 
childrearing.
Community dynamics remain stable when 
all members follow their prescribed scripts. 
Those fulfilling their expected roles without 
any sign of issues arising in their household 
receive tacit rewards from other community 
members. The reputation of the family 
increases as others view their behaviour 
favourably and as a positive contribution 
to the community. The husband gains 
respect in the eyes of others for his ability 
to maintain his household and provide the 
family with adequate resources. The woman 
of the house increases in public esteem 
through her ability to listen to her husband, 
maintain the dignity and upkeep of the 
house, and raise the children. This positive 
reinforcement plays a crucial role in the 
reproduction of these idealized categories of 
performing “manhood” and “womanhood” 
since individuals naturally incline towards 
behaviour that is rewarded and supported by 
other community members. As one madrasa 
student in Cox’s Bazar noted:
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  Our society is built on community respect. 
It is important for others to view you in a 
positive way. If they do not, then you are 
not a proper man – you don’t know how to 
keep your family in order.
As the research suggests, disciplining one’s 
wife may help a man maintain his dignity. 
For instance, some men commented on how 
when a woman goes outside her domestic 
role by taking up employment, speaking 
to members of the opposite gender, or not 
showing adequate respect to her husband, 
he may physically discipline her with the tacit 
support of many in the community. In doing 
so, the man demonstrates that as household 
head he can maintain order when those 
under him fall out of line.
Respect is highly valued by both men and 
women. People go to great lengths to 
outwardly perform their expected gender 
roles, even if it masks other characteristics. 
For example, certain men adopt abusive 
behaviour within the household. Sometimes 
this may be due to an inability to find 
meaningful employment or by consuming 
too many locally produced intoxicants. At 
other times, such behaviour is a means for a 
male to vent his anger, whether due to the 
spouse’s actions or those of another person. 
As one woman in Cox’s Bazar said of her 
husband’s strong interest in extremist groups 
that condone violence:
  Before he became more interested in the 
teachings of these groups, he was always 
abusive and would remind me of what 
my place is. He was never particularly 
religious ever, so it was strange to me 
when he showed interest in these groups, 
especially because he was always a big 
drinker. His biggest problem is he drinks a 
lot, and then he becomes extremely angry. 
But it is hard for me to share with others 
that he has a drinking problem because 
that would make me a bad wife to share his 
shortcomings with others. I need to always 
show others that he is a good, religious 
man – even if he is not.
As the research suggests, a wife may hide 
any problems in the household since the 
spread of such information may affect her 
image negatively if others view her as unable 
to serve her husband and take care of the 
household. Furthermore, the husband may 
suffer reputational damage if rumours were 
to spread that impugned his character – a 
situation that may also result in future abusive 
behaviour in the household.
Women generally complained about the 
hypocritical behaviour of men in their 
community who act one way outwardly though 
differently in private. As one community 
woman in Comilla contended:
  The men who are the most active have 
a superiority complex and think they are 
better than everyone else. It is good to 
respect those who have true knowledge 
of Islam and understand the religion. But 
in our community, these men walk around 
wearing a tupi and panjabi and somehow 
believe they are a perfect example of a 
man. For them, the outward appearance is 
always more important than actually doing 
good deeds. They are always preaching 
that a good Muslim man does such and 
such a thing, he must dress this way, treat 
the women this way, do that. But the 
problem is that they are also preaching 
many things that are against Islam. Many 
madrasa students always do this.
Insurgent groups may seek to utilize these 
gender categories as a basis to promote 
their own ideologies of what being an ideal 
man and woman should mean in society. The 
coming together of rural notions of gender 
and their connection to religion with differing 
university perspectives provides an opening 
for extremist groups to recruit. As young 
men continue to study in madrasas and 
move from rural areas to attend universities, 





















































ideologies, such as those that encourage 
greater participation of women in the public 
space. Moreover, these ideologies often 
also justify their discourse through religious 
doctrine, as explained by one female 
university student in Rajshahi:
  But Islam does not restrict women – Allah 
has given women rights, but here in our 
culture, especially in the rural villages, 
men always take away women’s rights 
and create certain ideas of what a good 
woman is – that their place is in the home. 
And a good man is someone who should 
have superiority over men. Yes, men and 
women have different responsibilities, but 
Islam did not say anywhere women can’t 
work or shouldn’t have a say in decision-
making in the home. That is not what our 
religion teaches us. Even our Prophet’s 
wife was a successful businesswoman and 
was a leader in her community. It is these 
kinds of wrong thinking in the villages that 
make men think there is only one way to 
be a good man.
Thus, young men who move from conservative 
rural environments to study in madrasas or 
to the large cities where liberal discourses 
are present are sometimes castigated for 
their “backward” beliefs about men and 
women – beliefs that may contradict more 
progressive understandings. The situation 
presents extremists with an opportunity 
to capitalize on this vulnerability; they can 
provide young men with a safe space where 
their understanding of gender norms is 
not only preserved but also respected and 
encouraged. 
Limits of parenting
While the categories of ideal man and ideal 
woman provide a template for behaviour 
within the community, realities within rural 
communities reveal these categories to also 
contain significant boundaries, although 
these are not always apparent. Interviewees 
mentioned parenting as one of the principal 
tasks of women. They noted that rather than 
spending time in the public sphere, a mother 
should busy herself with domestic affairs, 
such as raising children. The position of the 
woman, therefore, seemingly places her in 
an ideal position to provide her children – 
particularly her sons – with various ethical 
values such as respect for women. However, 
based on concerns raised by research 
participants, the reality of rural women’s lives 
reveals their limited ability to spread such 
values.
While women in rural communities provide 
primary support to their children up to a 
certain age, adolescent boys are no longer 
primarily socialized by their parents (and 
particularly, their mother). Rather, the larger 
community takes over this role, as norms and 
practices enter the social world of adolescent 
children. Rural women face a common 
reality that the agency they gain in being 
in control of domestic affairs extends only 
over the early years of their children’s lives. 
The result is that in being socialized mostly 
by their fathers and the male-led community, 
male children and adolescents eventually 
adopt the general mindset that women are 
subordinate to men and that the man is the 
leader of the household. Sons may gradually 
change from being dependent on their 
mothers to being disrespectful and at times 
abusive towards them, though these sons are 
not necessarily aware of this change in their 
behaviour. Indeed, society tacitly encourages 
such behaviour. Moreover, women are often 
powerless to change the situation, since 
they lose the ability to control their children’s 
affairs after a certain age. Many women 
come to terms with this loss of influence by 
simply accepting it. As one woman in Comilla 
observed:
  My son is only 15 years old but since he 
was 10, he has been slowly going away 
from my control. I am not able to tell him 
65
anything and he never listens to me. There 
is general respect but you know in our 
society, especially growing up with poverty, 
these boys become men so quickly. Then 
they start making all the decisions and 
leave us behind. He spends a lot of time 
mostly with his father in the family shop at 
the bazaar and then with the other men 
in the village. I hardly see him all day. If I 
do see him, it’s just when he needs money 
from me.
Sons are particularly encouraged to prove 
their manhood among peers and other males 
in the community. By ascribing to the values 
expected of males, sons show their transition 
into adult members of the community. 
The expectations of males are transmitted 
through peer interactions, lessons in the 
madrasa, mosque, and school, and through 
lessons from adults. As a community man in 
Cox’s Bazar noted:
  Boys must spend time with their male elders 
in the community. That is the only way they 
will successfully learn what is expected of 
them in society. No boy should be with the 
women and doing women’s work – that is 
not right in our community. 
Women, however, are not asked for their 
opinions, nor are they given a voice in 
community affairs and in raising children 
beyond a certain age. Rather, a woman is 
tacitly rewarded by the community with 
respect for her ability to raise children up 
to a certain age and then allowing her sons 
to become men while she herself remains 
in a subordinate position. Throughout this 
transition, a woman is not expected to 
provide her opinion. One woman in Comilla 
explained this reality as follows:
  Women are not asked their opinion when 
it comes to raising their sons. My husband 
always says he knows better about what is 
best for my son so I let him take charge. 
There is no point in arguing because 
nobody will listen. I know everything that 
is going on – all the problems that my 
son is facing – but I cannot argue with 
my husband. I want to help my son, but I 
cannot argue with my husband.
The research revealed that young men are 
socialized by the larger community where 
they will have a voice while women’s voices 
are largely silenced.  The unfortunate 
consequence of this diminished role for 
mothers is the lost potential to counter 
violent extremism despite being well 
positioned to identify potentially extremist 
ideologies among adolescents and young 
adults. If their position in the family and 
community afforded them greater respect, 
they could possibly reorient such children. 
As the reflection of a woman in Cox’s Bazar 
suggests, it is difficult for mothers to exert 
any influence over their older sons: 
  My son, who is a madrasa graduate, is 
extremely religious now, which is good, but 
he is becoming more and more controlling 
especially towards his younger sisters – 
telling them how to dress and what where 
not to go. He was also involved in one of 
the fatwas that took place a few years ago. 
My husband is old now so my son is the 
head of the household. I cannot tell him 
anything to make him listen to me. He has 
been making a lot of the decisions in the 
house, whether financial or otherwise. I 
don’t always agree with what he is doing, 
but I am just a mother…which son listens 
to his mother after a certain age? 
The constraints on women’s parenting play an 
important role in not only the reproduction 
of patriarchal hierarchies in the community 
but also the ability of extremist groups to 
manipulate such mindsets. Not all, or even 
most, children who adopt hard-line views 
in their youth end up being attracted to 
extremist ideologies. But among those who 
do, rural women recognize that, were they 
aware of such ideologies brewing within their 





















































to make any significant changes. As some 
young men go on to university and become 
more extreme in their views, they also recycle 
these perspectives into the community, thus 
sometimes asking female family members 
to be stricter in their practice of purdah and 
covering their faces when going outside. 
As one male university student in Rajshahi 
stated:
  I don’t know whether, if my mother told 
me to stop, I would necessarily listen to 
her. You know, our parents come from 
a different generation and they are not 
educated like us. So many times we know 
better than them. Maybe I would listen to 
my father but that’s because he also goes 
to the mosque and has more direct access 
to religious knowledge than my mother 
and knows better than her.
Competition and an 
inferiority/superiority 
complex
A discussion on countering violent extremism 
would be incomplete if it did not address 
how competition between the sexes, and 
changing notions of masculinity, shape the 
behaviour and decisions of individuals. 
Among my interlocutors, an emergent theme 
concerned the superior status men hold 
over women and how this is compromised 
when women seek to work outside of the 
house and become more active in the 
public sphere. This shift in the role of men 
and women pulls at traditional notions of 
masculinity and femininity, with men feeling 
increasingly insecure. Indeed, this dynamic 
can lead to a perception of competition rather 
than cooperation in their respective roles. As 
men feel their masculinity increasingly under 
attack, they begin to harbour resentment 
and anger against women, thus seeking to 
change their condition through the violence 
expressed by fatwa decrees. Indeed, in certain 
instances extremists may be able to exploit 
the frustration felt by men. The ideologies 
and even the violent acts of extremist groups 
offer such men a sense of vindication and the 
opportunity to reclaim their manhood. 
In rural communities, men are commonly 
breadwinners outside the home while 
women remain largely outside the public 
eye. Tensions sometimes arise once women 
start to play a more direct economic role 
in the running of the house. By serving as 
the sole breadwinner, a man can assert his 
leadership position in the household through 
his economic authority, as decision-making is 
attached to finances. Men establish their self-
worth through their economic contribution to 
the family. When a wife starts to contribute 
to the family income, the traditional model is 
disrupted. The instability that ensues creates 
an inferiority complex as men struggle to re-
assert their role as head of the household. As 
a male community member revealed: 
  I felt a lot of resentment towards my wife that 
she could secure full-time employment. 
She always used to say that she wanted to 
buy so many beautiful things but I was not 
able to buy them for her. We used to fight 
a lot and she always accused me of not 
being man enough to hold down a job. It 
is too much pressure. Women are always 
getting more opportunities than us. It’s 
not acceptable at all. Their place is in the 
home – this modern thinking of going out 
to work is against our culture.
The research indicated that young men 
feel particularly resentful towards these 
shifting gender dynamics. In the transition 
into adulthood, young men are often 
expected by peers to assert their manhood 
as evidence of their maturity. In the private 
domain, this means taking control of their 
families as the leader of the household. This 
position then facilitates their interaction with 
other household (male) leaders in the public 
domain. If a woman seeks to enter the public 
domain and gain work, many men feel that 
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this threatens their position as leaders of 
the house. Thus, in seeking to maintain the 
existing hierarchy in the household, as well 
as the prevailing relational structure vis-à-vis 
other community members, a man may be 
expected to control his wife by preventing 
her from gaining a work position. 
A man’s inability to control his wife may 
be taken as an indication of his weakness 
on two fronts: First, he may be viewed as 
unable to support his family and second, in 
terms of his household, he will be viewed 
as unable to control his wife. When the man 
quoted above spoke, a male friend jumped 
into the conversation and added his own 
thoughts regarding the speaker’s feelings of 
resentment and anger:
  That’s because you don’t know how to 
control your wife! The role of a woman 
should be to stay at home and cook for 
you. She should not be working outside. 
Our fathers didn’t make our mothers go to 
work, why are we doing this now? I would 
slap my wife if she did something like this.
The friend’s comments underscored how a 
man’s self-image is tied strongly to widely 
held opinions within the community on the 
appropriate hierarchies within a person’s 
household and what is acceptable as 
appropriate action against a wife.  Since 
images of manhood take shape in the public 
domain, what is viewed as appropriate for 
a man are those that are accepted across 
the community. Failure to control one’s wife 
brings the husband under the suspecting 
gaze of other male community members. 
This community dynamic brings shame to the 
husband as his manhood becomes an issue 
of public discourse. At the same time, the 
public scrutiny serves as a mechanism through 
which the entire community reproduces the 
existing patriarchal hierarchy. Men who fall 
outside the existing normative structures 
because they have lost control of their female 
family members are regarded as weak men 
and afforded little respect in the community.
Men often complained about having 
unreasonable expectations placed on them. 
On the one hand, they were expected to 
be the sole breadwinners of their family, 
whereby the woman of the house could focus 
her energies within the household. On the 
other hand, the men were expected to find 
adequate income in a market with shrinking 
opportunities. Thus, the competing pressures 
of community norms and market realities 
only added to the bitter resentment felt by 
many young men. As one unemployed young 
man in Cox’s Bazar, facing financial stress, 
remarked:
  I sent my wife to work, but now everyone 
says I am a bad man for allowing her to 
work with other men while I stay at home. 
Sometimes I tell her to stop working. 
People make a lot of gossip. But then I 
think, where will we get food if we have 
no money? Why aren’t there more jobs 
for us men? Lots of companies and NGOs 
always only want to include women and 
forget that we [men] are supposed to be 
the breadwinners.
Noteworthy in this last statement is the moral 
dilemma this man faced between his own 
self-image and the household’s economic 
insecurity. Without a way to reclaim his 
manhood, the man shifts responsibility for 
his predicament from himself to companies 
and NGOs. Such NGO initiatives were seen 
by many respondents as only exacerbating 
a problem that was starting to take root in 
the community. Another young man in Cox’s 
Bazar made the following allusion to the 
perceived trouble related to the increasing 
presence of NGOs:
  The NGO types are the biggest problems. 
They are always giving women jobs. All the 
workshops and programmes, everything 





















































because of this women’s empowerment, 
women are going into the public sphere 
and working, which makes it more difficult 
for us men to find jobs. But we have to be 
the breadwinners – we have to take care 
of our families, not just wives, our parents, 
siblings and others. So, when women come 
and take the opportunities for us, you tell 
me, how should that make me feel when I 
am supposed to be the man of the house? 
It makes me so angry, I always fight with 
my wife…yes, because of this I do beat her 
sometimes, but I feel she deserves it. 
In summary, the changing role of women 
in the community has created a number of 
new insecurities for men. Firstly, the entrance 
of women into the workplace is changing 
the dynamic within some households since 
men are no longer viewed as the patriarch 
in control of their wives. Secondly, economic 
constraints compound this changing 
dynamic, placing added pressures on men 
to be the sole breadwinner even when jobs 
are scarce. Thirdly, the increased presence 
of NGOs, which often focus on rural women, 
further increases insecurities in young men 
by providing opportunities only for women. 
These factors combine to further upset 
community dynamics. Some men who 
experience increased frustration, as they feel 
their manhood is attacked, lash out through 
violent acts against their wives.
Another man in Cox’s Bazar, however, noted 
that masculinity in his community is not 
necessarily attached to how well one can 
provide for his family or more traditional 
constructions of dominant masculinity. 
Instead, masculinity is rooted in being a 
“good man” – one who is kind-hearted and 
shows respect for his wife and others. As he 
remarked:
  Here in rural Bangladesh we are poor 
people, most of us are all trying to live an 
honest, simple life. I try my best to be a 
good man and treat my wife with respect. 
I am not opposed to her going outside to 
get a job. I don’t like to beat her or use 
force with her. But the problem is also that 
we are ridiculed in our community if we do 
not use some force. People will say we are 
becoming weak like women.
The interviewee’s comments point to 
constructions of masculinity within the 
community that are at odds with each another. 
On the one hand, there is the goal of being 
a “good man” while on the other hand, he 
faces pressure to be more aggressive and 
“forceful” so as not to be viewed “like a 
woman”. Aware of the ongoing tension with 
respect to masculinity in their lives, such 
community men constantly seek to strike a 
balance between the two perspectives. In 
so doing, they challenge categories such as 
“inferior” and “superior” since some men 
seek to assert their masculinity through 
empowering and respecting women.
Nonetheless, these changing community 
dynamics allow extremist groups to provide 
an outlet for certain men who feel they 
have been “pushed to the end” and can 
no longer bear humiliation before their 
families and communities. The discourse of 
extremist groups reasserts the importance of 
the patriarch in the proper functioning of a 
household. These groups may provide such 
embittered men a safe space and validation. 
As recounted by one madrasa student in 
Cox’s Bazar, whose friend had joined a 
militant group a few years earlier:
  With all the luxuries women are getting 
these days – education, going out to work 
and so on – my friend became very angry. 
He was always arguing and complaining 
to the imam to do something about it. He 
was one of the ones that created a fatwa 
against women leaving the house to do 
NGO work – it was a big problem in our 
village. He didn’t want women to leave 
the house at all, do any work, even to go 
to the market. He didn’t listen to anybody 
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and then eventually he got very upset and 
moved away with the group. I don’t know 
where he is exactly now. 
Extremist groups seek to go a step further 
by providing frustrated men with an outlet 
to prove their manhood. By adopting hard-
line ideologies, young men may be able to 
transform their feelings of resentment into 
expressions of male domination and women’s 
subordination, as well as hostility towards 
“Western influences” such as those brought 
about by NGOs. Expressions of bravado help 
a man regain his manliness, thereby raising his 
self-image. Honour and self-respect coalesce 
in an act that is simultaneously vengeful; it 
has at its core a redemptive element, while 
also leading to a sense of contentment in 
having regained one’s dignity. As one male 
university student in Rajshahi stated:
I feel frustrated when I think of the political 
situation and the very difficult situation we 
have to grow up in. There are no opportunities 
for us. There are so many expectations on us 
to take care of our families. When I am not 
able to provide what is socially expected of 
us men, you tell me how I should feel then? 
I am always frustrated. This frustration can 
sometimes lead to violence against the 
women in my family. I know one student here 
who joined a group because he really needed 
the money. Honestly, if someone offers me a 
lot of money to join such a group, I might do 
it. There is so much pressure on men to take 
care of our families. It would be better for me 
to take the money if it means I can take care 
of my family…Yes, I would definitely join the 
group for money.
Discussion
The findings above highlight the various 
factors that explain how ideologies in 
Bangladesh’s rural communities lead to a 
sharp demarcation of gender roles. When 
young men from these communities attend 
madrasas, or travel to university and become 
exposed to extremist ideologies, rural 
community norms are manipulated, making 
these men increasingly prone to violence, 
particularly against women.
Gender violence against women must be 
viewed as a product of the construction 
of both male and female gender norms. 
Constructions of masculinity and femininity, 
established at the rural community level, 
inform the norms that community members 
are expected to follow. These norms maintain 
and reproduce various power hierarchies in 
the community and ultimately confine the 
movement and participation of women in 
the public sphere. Women’s activities are 
monitored by their husbands and other male 
family members – including their sons – as 
well as by the community. 
Men are expected to work and provide 
support to their families by participating in 
the public sphere and remaining the leader 
of the household, while women are expected 
to limit their activities to domestic affairs. It 
is the relational quality and power dynamics 
between and among men and women, and 
the norms about manhood and womanhood, 
that create the background conditions for 
violent extremism (Kuehnast and Sudhakar, 
2011). These relational qualities exist not 
only by looking at the relationship between 
husband and wife, but also between mother 
and son, father and son, and so forth.
The research focus on the two rural 
communities of Cox’s Bazar and Comilla 
stresses that ideologies travel across spaces 
and may transform in the process. Within 
rural communities, patriarchal hierarchies 
are used to maintain power structures at 
the community level. However, when young 
men attend madrasas or travel to universities 
(Rajshahi in this instance), these hierarchies 
are then transformed as they encounter 





















































from rural communities who go on to attend 
universities in urban areas may develop 
resentment in response to discourses that 
paint their home communities as regressive. 
Violent extremist groups latch onto this 
insecurity by validating and supporting strict 
categories similar to those found in rural 
communities. Furthermore, violent extremist 
groups channel men’s frustration into 
allowable forms of violence that also further 
promote this separation of gender categories. 
Thus, such men are more prone to violence 
against women as a means of promoting 
gender rigidities while simultaneously 
supporting more extreme ideologies that 
condone and even promote violence.
It is critical, therefore, to view violent 
extremism as more than simply fatwas 
issued by rural imams. It is vital to see the 
deeper structural issue regarding how 
violent extremist ideologies are developed 
by manipulating community practices. At 
the level of rural communities, fatwas serve to 
uphold prevailing patriarchal structures and 
ultimately create a specific understanding 
of the world as well as form notions of 
femininity and masculinity. As such, the social 
construction of what it means to be manly 
plays an important role in hindering gender 
equality through the perpetuation of fatwas 
that promote and legitimize violence.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that 
this research does not claim that all forms 
of violence at the local community level 
are causally related to violent extremism. 
Patriarchal structures exist to help reproduce 
the prevailing hierarchy that allows men 
to remain the decision makers and power 
holders in their communities. However, this 
process does not necessarily (nor is it sufficient 
to) lead to extremist ideologies. Rather, 
this study finds that extremist ideologies 
that promote violence may emerge from 
a combination of the movement of young 
men from their communities to hard-line 
madrasas or universities in more urban 
areas, exposure to competing ideologies, 
feelings of insecurity and resentment, and, 
importantly, contact with violent extremist 
groups keen to exploit youth dissatisfaction 
for their own purposes. 
The combination of these factors begins to 
explain how rural community-level practices 
may ultimately lead some individuals to 
adopt violent extremist ideologies. Such 
ideologies promote and legitimize violence, 
which in turn foster gender inequality and 
violence against women. Violence against 
women thus becomes a means of proving 
manhood and family leadership as well as 
rejecting non-extremist ideologies. As such, 
this paper contributes to understanding how 
gender inequality and gender norms may 
enable violent extremism at the community 
and structural level in Bangladesh; it helps 
clarify how these gender rigidities may lead a 





Help rural communities 
become aware of how their 
practices can be manipulated 
by extremist groups.
While rural communities are certainly not 
the reason violent extremist groups exist, 
communities can foster practices that such 
groups can attempt to manipulate for their 
own ends.  Rural communities need to be 
made aware that extremist groups sometimes 
recruit community members to their ranks 
by first validating rural community practices. 
Awareness-raising is the first step in enabling 
rural community members to recognize this 
manipulation and take steps to counter 
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it. Greater awareness of the factors that 
can lead to violent extremism would allow 
community leaders to distinguish between 
local notions of masculinity and more toxic 
forms of masculinity – the latter being much 
more susceptible to violent extremism. It is 
critical that local leaders and lay members, 
along with NGOs, engage in community-level 
dialogues on the topic of violent extremism 
to identify how individuals may intervene to 
help combat its presence. 
Educate men and women 
on the role of families in 
preventing violent extremism.
Both men and women need to understand 
that the family plays a crucial role in 
countering potential violent extremism. As 
fathers (or male guardians) play a significant 
role in influencing children’s lives, men must 
be made aware that a culture that fosters 
the ill-treatment of women in domestic 
affairs risks allowing violent extremist 
tendencies to go unnoticed and unchecked. 
Both men and women need education on 
recognizing the signs that their children, 
particularly adolescent sons, may be moving 
towards violent extremism. Unaddressed 
tendencies may have repercussions for the 
entire community, both male and female. 
Programming for both men and women is 
required to improve parenting skills, child 
development, and to understand gender 
norms. Such programming also needs 
to recognize men’s burdens and social 
pressures, and help community members to 
discern early warning signs of radicalization. 
For example, religious leaders, who already 
provide religious education to young men, 
are well-positioned to emphasize the role 
that men need to play in child-rearing, 
which could include early identification and 
addressing of potentially radical ideologies.
Employment opportunities 
for women must take place 
alongside the creation of 
similar opportunities for men.
If women are provided employment in 
a context where men do not have such 
opportunities, there is potential to create 
community resentment and exacerbate 
hostilities towards women. Violent extremist 
groups may use these tensions to prey on men 
who harbour resentment towards women. To 
avoid potential backlash against women and 
men who allow wives to work outside the 
home, community leaders, imams, and local 
NGOs must focus on awareness initiatives 
that stress the importance of employment 
for both men and women. Efforts need to 
coincide with policy planning that stresses 
equal provision of work opportunities. One 
step would be for NGOs to emphasize 
hiring men who may then be included in the 
organization’s various initiatives.  
Consider power differentials 
in programmes that address 
gender inequality. 
Programmes that promote gender equality, 
whether through women’s participation 
in community affairs or otherwise, must 
be mindful of the way power hierarchies 
operate in the community. Rural communities 
are structured to perpetuate patriarchal 
hierarchies. Programmes that counter these 
hierarchies run the risk of creating problems 
in the community as men may feel that their 
way of life is under threat. Such feelings of 
vulnerability may then be manipulated by 
violent extremist groups and subsequently 
translated into violence against women as 





















































In addition, as men play an influential role 
in the decision-making of their children’s 
lives, programmes must leverage this 
role and promote gender equality by 
integrating men into the process. It is vital 
to design community-level human rights-
based programming that raises awareness 
of how gender norms hinder women’s 
empowerment. This can be done by 
including men as key partners in women’s 
empowerment. Furthermore, awareness 
of the social pressures that affect men’s 
mental health can help foster much-needed 
discussion around the factors that leave 
men vulnerable to recruitment by violent 
extremists and the appropriate steps to 
counter such an outcome.
Gender programming should 
help empower women in the 
domestic sphere, rather than 
take such empowerment for 
granted.
There is a false understanding among 
policymakers that women always have a 
strong role in the domestic sphere even if 
they are not visible in public. Instead, the 
research indicates that many women feel 
disrespected by husbands and sons (noting 
that they feel “invisible”). In interviews, 
women highlighted that they are indeed 
aware of power hierarchies; the real issue is 
that they are simply not listened to by males. 
As well, to keep peace in the family, women 
may not speak up against their husbands 
and children. Thus, there is a need to help 
empower women as sisters, wives, mothers, 
and daughters so that they have a stronger 
voice within the home. Without voices to 
speak up against their children, mothers 
can be passive or active enablers of violent 
extremism (often unknowingly). 
Programming, therefore, needs to provide 
tools to help women speak up when family 
members shift towards radicalization. One 
practical step would be to encourage the 
formation of community-level collectives 
consisting of other women. Study participants 
sometimes fixated on the false binary of 
women either having to remain in the house 
or finding employment outside. However, 
there are many other productive activities 
that women can play in the public sphere 
besides working. For instance, they can meet 
with other women to educate one another, 
exchange experiences, provide mental and 
emotional support and organize community 
activities. Local NGOs could help provide a 
sense of organization, enabling community 
women to be the driving force in these 
collectives.
Researchers need to 
examine the nexus between 
rural community leaders and 
violent extremism.
Further research must be conducted on the 
role community leaders can play in countering 
violent extremism. On the one hand, male 
community leaders, particularly imams, play 
a key role in perpetuating categories, such as 
ideal notions of manhood and womanhood, 
and these can consolidate patriarchal 
hierarchies. On the other hand, these same 
leaders may not necessarily ascribe to 
extremist ideologies. Thus, further research 
must consider the potential role community 
leaders can play in actively directing men 
away from violent extremism. By extension, 
greater focus on community leaders also 
raises the relational dynamics between all 
members of the community. Further research 
on the myriad roles and relationships found 
in rural communities can help to identify 
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The Nexus between Masculinities, Femininities, and Violent Extremism
Chapter 4
Sexual and Gender-based Violence 
























































There has been significant research into the 
conditions under which mass or large-scale 
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) 
occurs and where the risk factors for such 
violence increase (Heise and Kotsadam, 
2015). We know, for instance, that SGBV is 
heightened during recognized civil conflict 
(Cohen and Nordås, 2014), in natural 
disasters and humanitarian disaster response 
(Neumayer and Plumper 2007) and during 
large events such as football matches and 
sizeable development projects involving 
housing evictions and land confiscation 
(True, 2012; Cohen and Nordås, 2014). But 
does reported sexual and gender-based 
violence increase alongside the rise of violent 
extremism that leads to terrorist events? 
There remains a gap in the literature regarding 
how sexual and gender-based violence, and 
distortions of masculinity, relate to acts of 
violence leading to terrorism. To develop 
policy and programmes that address terrorism 
and violent extremism, further research is 
needed on the relationship between gender 
inequality, sexual and gender-based violence, 
and the presence of violent extremist and 
terrorist groups. SGBV is not limited to 
conflict situations; indeed, women and girls 
experience sexual and physical violence both 
from ideological/militant/violent extremist 
groups and counter-terrorism security forces. 
Further, the latter is often the reason why 
women become resistors and combatants 
(Brown, 2018; Parashar, 2014). Importantly, 
this research paper asks whether an increase 
in the reports of sexual and gender-based 
violence is a lead indicator or precursor to 
terrorist violence. 
1 Surveys commissioned by The Asia Foundation (2017) suggest that GBV is one of the deadliest types of violence in Asia, 
killing more women across the region than armed conflict. It should be borne in mind that GBV is undoubtedly part of 
conflict dynamics, but that it also exists before and after armed conflict.
Data is now available to measure both 
SGBV reports and terrorist attacks; however, 
the measurement of violent extremist acts 
is more complicated due to the lack of 
consensus on the definition of such acts. 
Exploration of the relationship between 
terrorist acts and SGBV reports has crucial 
implications for early warning systems and 
preventing violent extremism from leading 
to terrorist attacks. With more information on 
the location of crimes, of the perpetrators, 
and of the organizations reporting SGBV, we 
can better report, respond to, and prevent 
future violence (Caprioli, 2005).
In Asia, the history of conflict-related sexual 
and gender-based violence is deep. Painful 
testimonies of rape and sexual violence reach 
back to the Rape of Nanking (Chang, 2012), 
the experiences of Korean comfort women in 
World War II (Yoshimi, 2002), the tribulations 
of South Asian women during the Wars of 
Partition in India and Pakistan in 1947 and 
the 1971 Bangladesh War (Da Costa, 2010), 
and the forced marriages and sexual slavery 
during the Cambodian genocide (Tyner, 2018). 
At the same time, there is little knowledge 
about the prevalence and patterns of SGBV 
in Asia1. Beyond single-case studies no 
research has yet examined the relationship 
between SGBV and terrorism in the region. 
Thus, this paper also asks a new question: 
To what extent are reports of sexual and 
gender-based violence associated with – or 
have even anticipated – acts of terrorism in 
Asia? 
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State of knowledge 
on patterns of sexual 
and gender-based 
violence and political 
violence
Despite the recognition of acts of sexual 
and gender-based violence as international 
crimes, scholars continue to struggle to 
explain why and when this violence is used 
in conflict, and what is unique about its 
occurrence in conflict (Henry, 2016). Some 
scholars argue that conflict-related sexual 
and gender-based violence is likely to be 
heightened in the context of above-average, 
systemic and structural gender inequality 
(Davis, True and Tanyag, 2016). Moreover, 
recent research has shown that societies 
with higher levels of gender equality are less 
at risk overall of being both targets/victims 
and/or creating perpetrators of terrorist 
violence (Salman, 2015). The causal pathways 
through which gender equality affects the 
occurrence of terrorist events have yet to be 
fully explored. The implication of this macro 
research, however, is that more equal gender 
norms and societal structures that uphold 
women’s rights may well be protective factors 
against the rise of extremism that condones 
or promotes violence and terrorism. Gender 
inequalities within states are already known 
to affect conflict and state behaviour in a 
range of ways. During crises, the instigation 
of conflict and the escalation and severity 
of violence are exacerbated in states with 
greater domestic gender inequality (Caprioli, 
2005). 
In the field of political science and 
international relations, crucial typologies of 
sexual and gender-based violence in conflict 
situations have been developed (Boesten, 
2017). This violence includes opportunistic, 
instrumental, and genocidal crimes as well 
as gender-targeted persecutions (Baaz and 
Stern, 2013). Such crimes are perpetrated by 
one or more sides (ethnic, political, religious, 
or criminal groups) that are in conflict (Da 
Costa, 2010). The perpetrators may be state 
or non-state actors. They may be men and 
women, soldiers, militias, or civilians. 
An analysis of all relevant books, research and 
review articles on the topic sexual violence in 
conflict published in social sciences journals 
and books between 1998 and 2018, however, 
reveals that most of these 418 publications 
identified just three main types of conflict to 
help understand sexual violence patterns: 
civil war, war (interstate conflict), and the 
ceasefire peace process (Web of Science, 
2019). Most studies and datasets, however, 
tend to select cases of sexual violence 
within one of these types of conflict; in 
other words, they are studies of patterns of 
sexual violence in civil wars or comparative 
studies of civil wars and interstate conflicts 
(Cohen and Nordås, 2014). Studies of sexual 
violence during public protests, locations of 
terror attacks and one-sided violence against 
civilians (such as genocide) are all single-case 
study explorations (Brown, 2018; True and 
Eddyono, 2017). 
Qualitative and quantitative studies on 
sexual violence in armed conflict point to a 
tip-of-the-iceberg phenomenon (Palermo 
and Peterman, 2011), where there is a high 
prevalence of SGBV but a low level of 
reporting. However, the norm of reporting 
sexual violence is shifting, and the number 
of reports grows each year (Skjelsbaek, 2018). 
For instance, the International Protocol on the 
Documentation and Investigation of Sexual 
Violence in Conflict directs humanitarian 
organizations to document the crimes that 
they witness (Maras and Miranda, 2017) and 
calls on states to not supply arms to countries 
where sexual and gender-based violence 
is widespread (Women’s International 





















































also important to note here that increased 
reporting may fail to reflect the scale, intensity, 
or diversity of crimes and their geospatial 
location – notably at the subnational level 
and in fragile situations. Certainly, this is an 
opportune moment, both politically and 
academically, to examine the relationship 
between the patterns of reported SGBV and 
terrorist attacks. 
SGBV against women and girls is pervasive 
in the Asian region, even before accounting 
for the effects of conflict or terrorism. The 
prevalence rate, however, varies within and 
across Asian countries. Ever-partnered2 
women in South-East Asia have been found 
to have the highest lifetime prevalence of 
physical violence of those in any region (37.7 
percent), second only to Africa (World Health 
Organization, London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine, and South African 
Medical Research Council, 2013). In the 2010 
Global Burden of Disease study, the South-
East Asia region also recorded the second-
highest prevalence rate of intimate partner 
violence at 41.73 percent, after Central sub-
Saharan Africa. A UN survey of men and 
women in nine rural and urban sites across 
six countries found men’s perpetration 
of intimate partner physical and sexual 
violence extremely common, with rates of 
26 percent to 80 percent across sites, and 
women’s experience of partner victimization 
at 25 percent to 68 percent. Among women 
respondents, between 10 percent and 59 
percent reported rape by a non-partner. 
According to the study, the majority of men 
perpetrating rape – between 72 percent and 
97 percent of those, across the nine sites – 
did not experience any legal consequences 
(Fulu et al., 2013).
2 Reporting having had sex, been married, or been in a romantic relationship at any point.
We expect that acts of terror would increase 
the prevalence of these types of gender-
based violence. But research has found 
causal links of several types, and in both 
directions. There is some evidence that 
sexual assault, rape and other violence may 
be used to shame or lure victims into joining 
or supporting terrorist groups (Brown, 2018; 
True and Eddyono, 2017). Women have 
joined militant or guerrilla groups of all 
ideological persuasions after experiencing 
sexual violence not just within their own 
communities but especially when perpetrated 
by state security forces in their counter-
terrorism efforts (Komnas Pereumpuan, 2006, 
2007, 2009). Where there is heavy military 
counter-terrorism deployment, for example, 




This paper assesses the relationship between 
acts of terrorism and SGBV reports between 
1998 and 2018 in Myanmar, the Philippines 
and Sri Lanka. As mentioned, it is challenging 
to measure violent extremism because there 
is no consensus on the definition of these 
acts. So, based on the data available, the 
paper analyses the relationship between 
terrorist attacks and SGBV reports in three 
specific country cases in Asia. The research 
draws upon a new dataset on SGBV reports, 
Preventing Mass Sexual Violence in Asia-
Pacific (PSVAP), which compiles all existing 
reports of types of sexual violence and 
gender-based violence by official, unofficial 
and media organizations (see box 5). 
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The PSVAP dataset codes a wider range of 
sources of reporting than the Sexual Violence 
in Armed Conflict dataset (Cohen and Nordås, 
2014). The latter relies on three international 
sources of English language reporting, namely 
the United States State Department, Human 
Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, that 
are likely to be heavily compromised in Asia, 
where local civil society and news reports may 
be more important for tracking SGBV. 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) defines 
a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual 
use of illegal force and violence by a non-
state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, 
or intimidation.” GTD has several variables that 
measure the occurrence of terrorist attacks 
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism, 2018). In this paper, 
the variable attack type is used, which includes 
nine categories of attack: assassination, armed 
assault, bombing or explosion, hijacking, 
hostage taking using a barricade, hostage 
taking involving kidnapping, attack on a 
facility or infrastructure, unarmed assault, and 
unknown. 
Moreover, to be recorded in the GTD dataset 
as a violent extremist (VE) or terrorist attack, the 
event must meet three criteria: 
1. The incident must be intentional, aimed at 
attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal. 
2. It must entail some level of violence or 
immediate threat of violence to a large 
audience. 
Box 5: PSVAP database definition of sexual and gender-based violence
The dataset uses the international definition of sexual and gender-based violence. The 1998 Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) defines sexual and gender-based crimes (SGBV) as 
follows:
 Gender-based violence (GBV) is a crime committed against persons, whether male or female, 
because of their sex and/or socially constructed gender roles that “results in or is likely to result 
in physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm or suffering, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.” Coding 
for gender-based violence excludes sexual violence. Reports refer to attacks on women and girls, 
and men and boys, because of their gender, i.e. attacks or arrest for homosexuality, forced nudity 
or strip searches at checkpoints, and forcible removal of children from parents. Acts of domestic 
violence against women are not included (International Criminal Court, 2014). 
 Sexual violence (SV) is listed in 1998 Rome Statute as acts of violence that constitute acts of 
genocide (Article 6), crimes against humanity (Article 7) and war crimes (Article 8). The Rome 
Statute and the ICC Elements of Crimes list crimes of sexual violence which may occur during 
conflict and in the absence of conflict. Acts include: rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence. 
Acts of trafficking are not included.
A report is recorded when at least one listed SGBV crime was mentioned and/or the terms “sexual 
violence” or “gender-based violence” or “sexual and gender-based violence” were used in the relevant 
report.
Note: GBV and SV are both gender-based but because we wanted to understand the specific reporting prevalence of 
gender-based violence that is distinct from reporting on sexual violence, we disaggregated these categories, and for the 
purposes of this research on terrorism have combined them. 





















































3. The perpetrators must be subnational 
actors with the action outside international 
humanitarian law. 
This paper adopts the GTD definition, and 
Global Terrorism variable, to count any attack 
that meets all three of these criteria for every 
year in the period 1998–2016 and for each 
country. If an attack involves a sequence of 
events, only the first event is counted. 
In previous research, Davies and True (2017, 
2018) analysed the relationship between 
SGBV reports and patterns of armed conflict 
based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP).3 The researchers found that SGBV 
reports often precede and anticipate the 
outbreak of conflict. The increase in crimes of 
sexual violence occurring not only in previously 
conflict-affected areas but proximate areas 
warns of escalating conflict. Reports are not 
an exact proxy for actual violence. However, 
taken together with analysis of the context 
and local conditions for reporting, and with 
increasing awareness of the possibility to 
disclose these crimes, reports can provide a 
strong indication of patterns of SGBV. In this 
paper, with analysis of the new PSVAP dataset, 
there is an opportunity to explore the difficult-
to-test and entirely unresearched causal 
relationships between sexual and gender-
based violence in any location or region 
and the violence associated with terrorist 
groups. Descriptive statistics and panel data 
analysis enable us to examine patterns of 
association between terrorist events and 
official, unofficial and media reports of sexual 
and gender-based violence by organizations 
rather than individuals (which may include 
3 Studies of conflict typically use the Uppsala Conflict Dataset (UCD) that identifies a conflict situation in terms of battle 
death counts per year. Organized state violence is measured between the state and (at least) one other state or non-
state armed group if deaths are above 1000 per year. Non-state conflict, which is conflict between two or more non-state 
armed groups is measured if deaths are above 25 per year. One-sided violence is measured where civilians are targeted 
by the state or non-state actor with one or more deaths. These definitions of conflict typically do not include situations 
that do not meet battle-death thresholds but have experienced recurrent insurgency, violent extremist events, terrorist 
attacks, and countries facing the impending threat of war identified as ‘fragile’. See Bauer, Ruby, and Paper (2017). 
4 Uppsala Conflict Data Program states that the threshold for a conflict to be classed as low-intensity is fewer than 1,000 
battle deaths in any given calendar year. 
multiple acts affecting many individuals). 
They also allow this examination with respect 
to the reported prevalence, count and 
location of the violence, as well as whether 
the gender and ethnicity of the perpetrators 
and victims of these types of violence are 
similar or different. 
Terrorism and  
SGBV in Asia
An SGBV lens helps us see how forms 
of violence are connected, from the 
interpersonal to the intergroup and overtly 
political types of violence. The power 
of SGBV, compared with other types of 
violence, lies not only in the physical acts of 
violence themselves, but also in the shame 
and social stigma that victims suffer. Physical, 
psychological, sexual, or economic (e.g. 
controlling family resources) SGBV intends 
to denigrate and silence the victims and, by 
association, their families and the groups 
to which they belong. It both exploits and 
reinforces stereotypes and oppression based 
on gender, ethnicity, class, caste, sexuality, or 
other identities. Thus, SGBV may be a lead 
indicator of the onset, or acceleration, of 
conflict or other violence such as terrorism. 
These types of violence may play into and 
affect one another. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship 
between acts of terrorism and reports 
of SGBV in three low-intensity, conflict-
affected countries: Myanmar, Philippines 
and Sri Lanka.4 The average number of 
terrorist attacks is lowest in Myanmar and 
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highest in the Philippines, where the average 
number of SGBV reports is likewise higher. 
The Philippines is home to several terrorist 
or violent groups, including splinter groups 
and communist insurgents. The country also 
has the most developed infrastructure for 
reporting sexual and gender-based violence, 
including designated police units with female 
officers ready to receive reports from women 
and girls. These provisions notwithstanding, 
this study also considers unofficial and media 
reports of these types of violence. In the 
Philippines, there is evidence that SGBV is a 
trigger for rido or clan-based violence at the 
community level, and that where clans are 
connected to armed groups SGBV also serves 
to fuel political violence (Hilsdon, 2009). 
However, the purpose is not to compare the 
three countries but rather to analyse the 
trends and relationships between the two 
broad categories of violence within each 
country. Given the variation in reporting 
of specific kinds of SGBV committed by 
civilians, non-state armed groups and 
government militaries in each case, further 
qualitative research within communities 
affected by terrorism would be necessary to 
further corroborate the observable macro 
patterns for particular regions and localities. 
For instance, not all official, unofficial and 
media reports provide the region or the exact 
location of the acts of sexual and gender-
based violence. Region or locality may not 
be essential however, for an analysis of the 
relationship to potential acts of terror given 
that the location of these acts may not reflect 
the grievances of the perpetrators but rather 
their political objective to gain the greatest 
attention, usually in urban areas with a large 
presence of civilians. This research is indicative 
only and is limited in its specific analysis 
of risk-prone areas and regions. However, 
the strong correlations demonstrated here 
and contextualized with reference to field 
research suggest that there remains a need 
for further localized analysis and research on 
the dynamics of sexual violence and acts of 
terror in the countries under study here as 
well as in other countries around the world.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by country, 1998–2016
Myanmar
Variable mean std. dev. min max
Number of VE/terrorist attacks 13.16 17.23 2 74
Number of reports SGBV/SV 22.16 19.77 2 78
 Philippines
Variable mean std. dev. min max
Number of VE/terrorist attacks 225.11 239.95 18 721
Number of reports SGBV/SV 43.16 39.67 1 114
 Sri Lanka
Variable mean std. dev. min max
Number of VE/terrorist attacks 47.47 58.60 1 217





















































Myanmar: narrative and 
patterns
Figure 1 shows trends, by year, in the number 
of terrorist attacks and sexual and gender-
based violence reports. The data on SGBV 
reports is lagged by one year; that is, we 
look at reports the year before a VE/terrorist 
attack. This is to see whether these reports 
precede, and therefore might predict, 
terrorist attacks. So, where the SGBV graph 
line traces the number of reports by year, the 
year of reporting is one year previous. Thus, 
when there is a correlation between the 
increase in terrorist acts and SGBV reports, 
as we see in figures for the years 2003, 2008 
and 2011–2012, this pattern is based on 
SGBV reports in 2002, 2007 and 2010–2011, 
respectively. 
Myanmar’s conflict was at one of its deadliest 
points in 2007 and the number of terrorist 
attacks increased from three in 2007 to 20 in 
2008. But there was a significant increase in 
SGBV reports up to 26 in 2007 – an increase 
which anticipated by one year the peak 
in both SGBV counts (how many victims 
affected in each report) and acts in 2008 
(Gender Equality Network). Threats, as well 
as acts, of sexualized violence against women 
and girls that aim to oppress and shame an 
entire ethnic group, may be used in conflict 
scenarios by non-state militia groups such 
as the Kachin Army in Myanmar to recruit 
and mobilize members to fight, as well as 
by government forces such as the Tatmadaw 
state military (McCarthy and Menager, 2017). 
Overall, reporting of SGBV was high between 
2006 and 2008. As acts of terrorism declined 
in 2008 and 2009, SGBV reports also begin to 
decrease. 
There is no specific anti-VAW law in Myanmar, 
only the Criminal Penal Code providing some 
redress for victims of sexual and gender-based 
violence. However, reports of sexual and 
gender-based violence, while not systematic 
and likely the tip of the iceberg due to the 
many institutional barriers to reporting, were 
routinely made by official, unofficial and 
media organizations throughout the period 
of analysis, 1998-2016. These reports by 
organizations rather than individuals have 
increased alongside the increased presence 
of international humanitarian agencies in the 
country with its democratization since 2010. 
The rise in SGBV reports in 2011 and 2012 
(some relating to unofficial reports of sexual 
violence in Rakhine state) also occurred a 
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year prior to a spike in terrorist attacks. Based 
on this increase, we might have predicted 
increased terrorism today, in the period after 
2014. However, SGBV reports are in decline 
in this period. This decrease is likely due to 
the extreme difficulty for minority women 
and girls in reporting SGBV, as in the case 
of Rohingya women and girls in camps for 
internally displaced persons with restricted 
humanitarian access, a situation indicated 
by the testimonies of humanitarian workers. 
Qualitative studies of the Rakhine case in 
this period suggest that SGBV is widespread 
and the low level of reporting does not 
reflect actual levels (Davies and True, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the PSVAP 1998–2016 dataset 
reveals a striking general pattern: that an 
increase in sexual and gender-based violence 
reports in Myanmar occurs just before, and 
at the same time as, an increase in terrorist 
attacks.
The Philippines: narrative 
and patterns
The Philippines has among the highest levels 
of reported violence against women and girls 
in Asia, reflecting the country’s early adoption 
of an elimination of violence against women 
(EVAW) law and the government’s institutional 
capacity to implement the law. However, the 
conflict-affected Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), where many of 
the VE and terrorist attacks have taken place, 
recorded the lowest number of SGBV cases 
of any region in the Philippines in 2014 and 
2015. Due to strong gender-based codes of 
honour within families and communities in 
ARMM, including the shame associated with 
rape and other sexual violence, women and 
girls are expected to keep silent about the 
violence they experience. They may do this to 
prevent the escalation of further violence in 
contexts where abduction, rape, and forced 
marriage are common, and where daughters 
may be offered for marriage to appease 
warring clans (Davies, True and Tanyag, 2016).
Despite these limitations in SGBV reporting, 
there is evidence of correlations between 
rising SGBV reports in the year preceding 
an increase in terrorism in two key periods: 
2005 to 2006 and 2012 to 2015 (see Figure 
2). In 2006, there were 58 terror attacks in the 
Philippines; an increase from 25 the previous 
year, when SGBV reports increased to 35 
from 13 in 2004. A similar pattern is evident 
in the 2012-2015 period. SGBV reports 
substantially increased to 91 in 2012 from 39 
the previous year prefiguring a more than 





































































































doubling in terrorist attacks from 249 in 2012 
to 651 in 2013. In the following two years, 
2013 and 2014, we see consistent increases 
in SGBV reporting as well as the highest 
number of terror attacks in the Philippines, 
with 721 recorded in 2015. Overall, in the 
Philippines, as with Myanmar, we observe a 
broad pattern where an increase in sexual 
and gender-based violence reporting takes 
place the year before, and alongside, 
increases in terrorist attacks.
Sri Lanka: narrative and 
patterns5
In Sri Lanka, government reports refer widely 
to SGBV; however, there are only a few official 
reports of sexual violence (UNFPA 2016). 
The United Nations Report of the Secretary-
General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability 
in Sri Lanka  (Darusman, Ratner and Sooka, 
2011) found that acts of SGBV were 
committed by both the Sri Lankan armed 
forces and the Tamil Tigers, also known as 
LTTE and categorized as a terrorist group by 
the European Union and the United States. 
This is despite the official narrative that the 
LTTE did not perpetrate SGBV within the 
group due to a moral code prohibiting sexual 
relations (Darusman, Ratner and Sooka, 2011). 
The failure to recognize conflict-related 
SGBV and the lack of institutional capacity 
to respond to post-conflict SGBV reflect a 
self-reinforcing cycle of acceptance of this 
violence. According to reports available 
since the end of the war in 2009, minority 
women in Northern and Eastern Provinces 
appear to experience the highest levels of 
SGBV, as well as other violations of physical 
security (FOKUS, 2016; Guruge et al., 2017). 
A UN survey of SGBV perpetrated by men, 
based on a national sample across four 
5 This research only considers the period 1998-2016. Therefore, terrorism attacks occurring 2017-2019, and notably the 
significant recent attack on 21 April, 2019, are not included in the analysis, though we might argue that the trends in this 
research and the model presented may have predicted the chance of such an attack.
districts including two in the war-affected 
Eastern Province, indicated that less than 10 
percent of rape cases have been successfully 
prosecuted in Sri Lanka, and that 60 percent 
of men feel entitled to sex without the prior 
permission of a partner (Fulu et al., 2013). 
In Figure 3, based on the PSVAP database, 
we do not observe an overall correlation, as 
in the other two cases, between the trend 
in increased reports of SGBV and increased 
VE or terrorist attacks. There are points in 
2006 and 2014 where a similar rise in both 
SGBV and VE or terrorist attacks is evident. In 
2006 this is possibly due to overall increased 
violence near the end of the Sri Lanka civil 
war, since most of this violence involves 
armed groups (and, where the region is 
reported, is in conflict-affected areas), while 
the violence in 2014 mostly involves civilians. 
However, the relatively low reporting of SGBV 
during the war in Sri Lanka makes it difficult 
to establish how systematic the relationship 
may be. We do see a pattern toward the 
end of the civil war in 2004 and 2005, when 
SGBV reports rise to 25 and 34 respectively 
with concomitant increases in VE attacks 
to 133 and 217 in the respective following 
years. Despite the official narrative, the LTTE 
were suspected of committing SGBV within 
the Tamil and Muslim minority populations 
to increase conscripts and coerce civilian 
support with threats of rape and abduction 
of family members (Davies and True, 2014). 
Given that no prosecutor has been appointed 
to investigate war crimes, including SGBV, 
there are strong incentives to not report this 
violence. 
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6 United Nations (UN) investigations have identified this perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence human rights 
violations. See Darusman, Ratner, and Sooka (2011); Petrie (2012); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (2015); and Davies and True (2017b). 
After the war’s end in 2009, however, VE 
acts diminish while SGBV reports continue 
to increase, with greater potential to report 
this violence. Yet, in 2013 there is an uptake 
in SGBV from 34 reports in 2011 to 55 
reports in 2012 and 83 reported incidents 
in 2013. These reports do not indicate the 
number of violent acts or count of SGBV, 
rather one report by an official government 
or international organization, an unofficial 
organization such as an NGO or by a media 
organization may involve multiple acts of 
violence against a number of individuals. The 
publicly available PSVAP dataset provides 
further details, although the region or area is 
often not reported for Sri Lankan incidents. 
Where possible the location (urban, prison, 
state or military compound, refugee camp, 
home, village etc.) as well as the region of the 
violence is reported, as is the sex of the victim 
and of the perpetrator, and any reason or 
motivation for the attack that can be gleaned 
from the report. This uptake is followed by an 
increase in VE acts from four in 2012 to 14 in 
2013 and 16 in 2014. How do we explain this 
apparent pattern? 
Both the government of Sri Lanka and the 
Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) were 
responsible for sexual and gender-based 
violence war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in the final stages of the war. 
Victory further led to the government forces 
committing ongoing sexual abuse, torture 
and other human rights violations in the 
aftermath of the war, and failing to create a 
transparent and accountable transitional and 
reconciliatory justice process (Davies and 
True, 2018). The data shows us that violent 
extremist attacks increase when government 
legitimacy is fragile, particularly in Northern 
and Eastern Provinces.6 This pattern lasts only 
until 2015 when SGBV reports and VE attacks 
diverge again. However, were the dataset to 
include 2017 and 2018, we may see further 
relationships. Violent hate crimes took place 
in Kandy in March 2018 and unofficial SGBV 
reports (including via social media) are known 
to fuel intergroup grievances and conflict 
leading to terrorism. Moreover, the political 
crisis in Sri Lanka has increased tensions – 
and, potentially, political violence – within 





















































What other factors 
explain patterns of 
terrorism?
So far, correlation and a potential causal 
pattern have been established between the 
two types of violence for Myanmar and the 
Philippines by analysing the relationship 
between SGBV reports for one year and 
terrorist attacks in the following year. We 
have also provided some contextual, case-
specific explanations for the relationship. 
However, other factors may explain the 
trends in terrorist attacks. By modelling their 
effects, we can assess whether reports of 
sexual and gender-based violence are still a 
lead indicator of future terrorism. To do this, 
we used a panel data method to analyse 
the same three country cases by year for 
the period 1998 to 2016.7 The data for some 
indicators was statistically imputed in order 
to achieve a strong balance in the panel.8 We 
adopted a matrix-form model to explain the 
number of terrorist attacks, following the GRD 
definition above, per year and per country.9 
As in the bivariate analysis above, this 
dependent variable was constructed based 
on the Global Terrorism Database (National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 2018).
7 The advantages of panel data are twofold: First, since panel data relate to countries over time, there is bound to be 
heterogeneity in these units. The panel data estimation can take such heterogeneity explicitly into account by allowing 
for subject-specific variables. Second, panel data gives more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among 
variables and greater efficiency. 
8 The dependent variable had missing data in Myanmar 1998 and 2000, and Sri Lanka 2011. Also, the variable number 
of reports of GBV/SV had missing information in 2016. In both cases, the missing information was imputed using the 
previous or later year with information available. The variables from the Worldwide Governance Indicators with missing 
information was imputed following a linear interpolation.
9 The matrix equation is as follows: Yit=β0+ β1xit-1+β2xit+β3Dit+εit
 Where i represent the countries and t years. Also, x represents the explanatory variable of interest, lagged for a period 
and non-lagged, D is the matrix form for explanatory variables in our model and  contains the residuals. We used a fixed-
effects model (FEM). In particular, the model that we estimate takes the form:
  attackterorristit
   =β0+β_1SGBVreportsit-1+β2SGBVreportsit+β3socialDisordersit
   +β4PoliticalStabilityit+β5Corruptionit+β6FreedomExpit 
  +β7equalDistributionit+εit
We also considered a range of social, political 
and economic factors that conceivably 
influence trends in terrorism as well as the 
PSVAP dataset’s record of the number of 
reports of SGBV per country per year – both 
in the year before and in the same year as an 
attack (Davies and True, 2017a).
Social disorder events in the public realm, 
where individuals and groups with grievances 
can visibly express their grievances and/
or political identities, may be expected 
to diminish terrorist attacks. These events 
allow the state to monitor the activities of 
potentially violent groups and avert any 
attacks. At the same time, they provide an 
outlet for individuals and groups that might 
otherwise resort to clandestine methods 
to make their causes heard, such as those 
used in terror attacks. Through employing 
information from the urban social disorder 
events dataset (Urdal and Hoelscher, 2012), 
we combined six types of social disorders in 
a categorical variable per year and country as 
follows:
• General warfare: Distinct events related 
to a protracted, interactive, and violent 
conflict involving at least one organized, 
non-state actor group fighting with 
government authorities over ethnic, 
political or economic issues.
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• Organized violent riot: Distinct, 
continuous, and coordinated actions 
staged by members of a singular political 
or identity group and directed toward 
members of a distinct “other” group or 
government authorities.
• Spontaneous violent riot: Distinct, 
continuous, and uncoordinated actions 
resulting from an originally non-violent 
protest and directed toward members of 
a distinct “other” group or government 
authorities.
• Organized demonstration: Distinct, 
continuous, and coordinated largely 
peaceful actions directed toward members 
of a distinct “other” group or government 
authorities.
• Pro-government demonstration: Distinct, 
continuous, and largely peaceful actions 
in support of government. May be 
coordinated or uncoordinated.
• Spontaneous demonstration: Distinct, 
continuous, and uncoordinated largely 
peaceful action directed toward members 
of a distinct “other” group or government 
authorities.
When Myanmar, the Philippines or Sri Lanka 
experienced any of these six types of social 
disorders we coded the variable 1, or 0 if 
no such events occurred. These values are 
aggregated in this single categorical variable 
with 6 representing the highest number of 
social disorders that a country can have in a 
given year and 0 representing the minimum 
value.
Political factors
With respect to political factors, the stability 
of a government and the perception of its 
governance, notably whether it advances the 
interests of the people or the private interests 
of elites or factional groups, can be expected 
to have an impact on the presence of terrorism 
(Newman, 2006). Powerless individuals and 
groups may perceive government corruption 
and look for ways to combat it. Indeed, such 
actors may view acts of terrorism as their only 
form of recourse. 
To operationalize these factors, two variables 
from Worldwide Governance Indicators are 
included in our model. Political stability as a 
variable captures perceptions of the likelihood 
that a government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means (World Bank, 2018) and control of 
corruption captures perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as the capture of the state 
by elites and private interests (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010).
The degree of political freedom of expression 
is another factor that may indirectly affect 
the likelihood of terrorist attacks (Abadie, 
2006). If there are few opportunities for 
voice and freedom of expression to attract 
attention and influence the political system, 
terrorism may be seen as a potent option. To 
consider this factor in our model, we include 
the Freedom of Expression Index from the 
Varieties of Democracy dataset. This index 
is based on six indicators: government 
censorship efforts; harassment of journalists; 
media self-censorship; freedom of discussion 
for men and women; freedom of academic 
expression; and of cultural expression. 
This index ascertains the extent to which 
the government respects press and media 
freedom, the freedom of ordinary people 
to discuss political matters at home and in 
public, as well as the freedom of intellectual 
and cultural (including religious) expression 
(Coppedge et al., 2018).
Economic factors
 While some economists discount economic 
root causes of terrorism such as poverty, 





















































(Krueger, 2007), high levels of inequality in 
a society and poor access to resources and 
services among the population are frequently 
considered factors that increase support 
for violence and thus create conditions 
conducive to terrorist attacks. The Equal 
Distribution of Resources Index measures 
equality of distribution of tangible and 
intangible resources in a society. The index 
measures the distribution of power among 
different socioeconomic groups, ethnic 
groups, sexes and so on (Coppedge et al., 
2018). The source of the data is the V-Dem 
dataset. 
Table 3: Model Results
Table 2 below sets out three models which test the effects of SGBV reports both one year before 
the terrorist attack (dependent variable) – our lagged variable – and in the same year (our non-
lagged variable).


































































F(7,44) = 13.88 
Prob >F = 0.0000
0.66
F(6,45) = 14.83 
Prob >F = 0.0000
0.59
F(6,48) = 11.57 
Prob >F = 0.0000
 
Model 1: lagged and non-lagged
Model 2: only lagged
Model 3: with non-lagged only
   
As shown in Table 3, Model 1 is the best model 
for analysing the factors that explain and 
potentially predict the prevalence of terrorist 
attacks. Combined, the factors in this model 
explains 69 percent of the yearly change in 
the number of terrorism attacked. Moreover, 
increasing SGBV reports in the year before 
a VE or terrorist event is a very significant 
factor that predicts an increased chance of 
a terrorist attack in the following year. We 
can see that all variables are significant at a 
95 percent confidence interval, except for 
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non-lagged SGBV reports and the Equal 
Distribution of Resources Index variables 
which are significant at 90 percent. 




































F(7,44) = 13.88                                     Prob >F = 0.0000
*Significant at 0.1  
** Significant at 0.05  
***Significant at 0.01
Error standards in brackets
Specifically, holding all other factors affecting 
terrorist attacks constant, the analysis finds 
that:
• For every additional report of sexual or 
gender-based violence (SGBV) in the 
previous year (lagged variable), the chance 
of a terrorist attack increases by 3 percent. 
Thus, there is a relationship between rising 
reports of SGBV in the year before, and the 
likelihood of a VE or terrorist attacks above 
and beyond the impact of other factors. 
• There is a negative relationship between 
social disorder events and terrorist attacks. 
Every additional social disorder event 
reduces the likelihood of a terrorist attack. 
• When the perception of political stability 
increases by 1 percent, there is a 5 percent-
lower likelihood of a terrorist attack.
• If the lack of control of corruption increases 
by 1 percent, the chance of a terrorist 
attack increases by 13 percent. 
• When freedom of expression increases by 
1 percent, a terrorist attack is 7 percent less 
likely.
• For an increase of 1 percent in the equal 
distribution of resources, the likelihood of 
a terrorist attack is 10 percent lower.
Based on the model shown in Table 4, 
social disorder events, corruption, unequal 
distribution of resources, political instability 
and lack of freedom of expression appear 
to have a greater impact on the likelihood 
of terrorist attacks in each country and year. 
Table 5 shows that when we remove the SGBV 
reports (both one year before and in the same 
year), the model is no longer significant. The 
F statistic shows that our model is correctly 
specified. However, omitting lagged and 
unlagged SGBV reports, the R square is far 
lower than the original model, explaining only 
29 percent of the variation in terrorist attacks 
compared with 69 percent. SGBV reports 
one year before, and in the same year, are 
not only significant variables helping explain 
the occurrence of terrorist attacks, but when 
included in the model the association with 
the independent variables and terrorism is 
stronger. Thus, increases in SGBV reports 
form a critical component of the overall 






















































Table 5: Comparing models with and 
without SGBV reports variable 


























































F (7,44) = 13.88 
Prob >F = 
0.000
57
F (5,49) = 4.03 
Prob >F = 
0.003
While not the focus of this paper, tests 
of the bivariate relationships between 
the independent variables show strong 
relationships between increases in social 
disorder and increases in SGBV reports. 
There is also a robust relationship between 
the SGBV lagged report one year before 
and social disorder events, political stability, 
freedom of expression and equal distribution 
of resources, thus verifying the significant 
relationship among the variables without 
attributing causation. These results are 




and future research 
This research paper explored whether there 
is a relationship between the reporting of 
sexual and gender-based violence and the 
occurrence of terrorist attacks using a new 
dataset based on three Asian countries 
that have experienced such attacks. While 
the literature has theorized some of the 
causal mechanisms linking incidence and 
prevalence of violence against women to 
violent extremism leading to terrorism, the 
empirical relationship has until now been 
neither studied nor quantified. This research 
on Myanmar, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, in 
its depiction of critical correlations between 
SGBV and terrorist events based on available 
data, has significant implications for the 
prevention of violent extremism that leads 
to terrorism. Based on these findings, we 
recommend further investigation, monitoring 
and assessment and research on sexual and 
gender-based violence as a lead indicator. 
Given the pattern of correlation between 
SGBV reports in the previous year (lagged 
variable) and the number of terrorist attacks, 
which is statistically significant, we make the 
following recommendations:
• Monitoring SGBV in the community 
needs to be part of PAVE indicators and 
strategies with the purpose of preventing 
a potential pathway to terrorism. 
• SGBV reporting data should inform all 
country-specific terrorism intelligence 
assessments.
In order to improve risk assessments for 
terrorism, and extremism that condones or 
promotes violence leading to terrorism, it 
is also crucial to similarly build into these 
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assessments knowledge about locations and 
populations at higher risk of SGBV.10 
Country-specific analysis of the relationship 
between the incidence of sexual and gender-
based violence and indicators of terrorism 
should inform early warning and prevention 
strategies. At present, to anticipate and respond 
to international security situations of concern 
for SGBV, the international community draws 
on two sources to inform prevention: United 
Nations reports on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
(UN 2018) and the (Inter-Agency) Gender-Based 
Violence Information Management System 
(GBVIMS 2019) (see Appendix 1). 
However, some countries that were in the 
top 20 for acts of terrorism in 2017 are not 
currently considered situations of concern for 
conflict-related SGBV. Indeed, several countries 
(including four in Asia) that are known by 
humanitarian actors on the ground as situations 
of concern for SGBV, and have experienced 
terrorist attacks, are not currently focus countries 
in the GBVIMS lists, namely: Pakistan, India, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Cameroon, 
and Turkey. Thus, we further recommend the 
following:
• SGBV should be monitored in known high-
risk countries for terrorism. Reporting 
conditions should be closely assessed and 
reporting institutions strengthened. 
• Consider terrorist attacks and extremism 
condoning violence leading to terrorism as 
possible reasons for the underreporting of 
SGBV. 
• Closely examine cases where there is a high 
risk of terrorism and evidence of SGBV.
The failure of governments in Myanmar, Sri 
Lanka and the Philippines to prosecute the 
perpetrators of conflict-related sexual and 
10 There is now interest in linking risk assessments of sexual and gender-based violence to the UN Security Council Sanctions 
Committee and Arms Trade Treaty States Conference. See Huvé (2018) and the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom (2019).
gender-based violence crimes, or to provide 
women victims with justice, reparation, and 
rehabilitation, may fuel support for and 
recruitment to terrorist groups. That is, the 
response to impunity and widespread individual 
and group shame and stigma may ultimately 
encourage violent extremism leading to 
terrorism. As research by Fulu and others (2013) 
suggests, male sexual entitlement appears 
widespread in the region. If gender inequalities 
in the law and justice system are not addressed, 
perpetrators will continue to commit unlawful 
violence with possible connections to terrorism. 
• The investigation of SGBV victims and 
survivors should include profiling of the 
perpetrators and their connections to 
terrorist groups. 
Moreover, if better government service 
provision for survivors (e.g. women police units 
in areas of high risk) is not provided to address 
victim or survivor’s health, psychological and 
livelihood needs then their anti-government 
grievances will fester and carry over into the 
next generation. 
Further research should explore the relationship 
between SGBV as a precursor to acts of violent 
extremism with a need for enhanced data 
collection on SGBV reports and reporting acts 
of violent extremism.
Finally, given that this is a pilot research project 
analysing SGBV reporting data for three 
countries only, further research should be 
conducted on an expanded set of medium- to 
high-risk country cases. For instance, research 
could focus on countries that appear both in the 
top 20 countries on the Global Terrorism Index 
for terrorist attacks and on the cumulative UN 
Secretary-General’s list of situations of concern 
for conflict-related SGBV. Such research 





















































condones or promotes terrorism is prefigured 
by sexual and gender-based violence. Nigeria 
and Thailand are two such examples where 
we observe a strong correlation between 
SGBV and terrorist attacks, a pattern to be 
further investigated at a more granular level 
with respect to subregion and by monthly 
rather than yearly occurrence. This type of 
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Known situations of widespread sexual violence in armed conflict and gender-based violence in 
emergencies
UN sexual violence in armed 
conflict list 2010–2018  











• Democratic Republic of 
Congo 













• North Korea 
• Sierra Leone 
• Somalia 
• South Sudan 
• Sri Lanka 









• African Republic 
• Colombia 
• Cote d’Ivoire 
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Number of terrorist attacks and number of reports of SGBV and SV per country and year 



















1998 4 2 18 3 35 5
1999 4 2 31 3 46 9
2000 3 5 132 1 68 8
2001 3 2 50 6 36 13
2002 4 9 48 6 3 17
2003 9 4 107 14 9 13
2004 2 12 32 13 33 25
2005 8 16 25 35 133 34
2006 2 20 58 17 217 24
2007 3 26 65 26 132 22
2008 20 22 276 43 100 34
2009 14 14 229 86 37 46
2010 11 16 205 114 3 26
2011 2 39 151 39 4 34
2012 17 78 249 91 4 55
2013 18 48 651 101 14 83
2014 15 44 597 114 16 69
2015 37 36 721 54 11 111






















































Bivariate tests of the SGBV unlagged with the other variables in the model
Dependent variable:  
reports of SGBV/SV (unlagged)
Coef R-sq Prob > F






Control of corruption 0.158
(0.585)
0.0014 0.7875
Freedom of Expression Index 0.417
(0.340)
0.0277 0.2248
Equal distribution of resources 3.687**
(1.428)
0.1117 0.0127
*Significant at 0.1  ** Significant at 0.05  ***Significant at 0.01
Error standards in brackets
The F statistic test analyses whether the coefficient in the model is different to zero. The expectation 
is that this number will be lower or equal to 0.05. If not, the model is not correctly specified; that 
is, the independent variable does not explain the dependent variable (which is the case with the 
‘control of corruption’ and ‘freedom of expression’ variables). 
Bivariate tests of the SGBV lagged with the other variables in the model
Dependent variable:  
Reports SGBV/SV (lagged)
Coef R-sq Prob > F






Control of corruption 0.665
(0.609)
0.0233 0.2798
Freedom of Expression index 0.723** 0.0828 0.0386
Equal distribution of resources 0.0654
(1.497)
0.0674
*Significant at 0.1  ** Significant at 0.05  ***Significant at 0.01
Error standards in brackets
The interpretation in those models is neither logical nor explanatory. We cannot say that an increase 
in social disorder today reduced the number of reports of SGBV/SV a year ago. However, these 
correlations are useful to verify the significant bivariate relationships. 
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